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 ABSTRACT 
The Internet is experiencing an evolution towards a ubiquitous network paradigm, via the 
so-called internet-of-things (IoT), where small wireless computing devices like sensors and 
actuators are integrated into daily activities. Simultaneously, infrastructure-less systems 
such as mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) are gaining popularity since they provide the 
possibility for devices in wireless sensor networks or vehicular ad hoc networks to share 
measured and monitored information without having to be connected to a base station. While 
MANETs offer many advantages, including self-configurability and application in rural 
areas which lack network infrastructure, they also present major challenges especially in 
regard to routing security. In a highly dynamic MANET, where nodes arbitrarily join and 
leave the network, it is difficult to ensure that nodes are trustworthy for multi-hop routing. 
Wormhole attacks belong to most severe routing threats because they are able to disrupt a 
major part of the network traffic, while concomitantly being extremely difficult to detect.   
 
This thesis presents a new unified wormhole attack detection framework which is effective 
for all known wormhole types, alongside incurring low false positive rates, network loads 
and computational time, for a variety of diverse MANET scenarios. The framework makes 
three original technical contributions: i) a new accurate wormhole detection algorithm based 
on packet traversal time and hop count analysis (TTHCA) which identifies infected routes, 
ii) an enhanced, dynamic traversal time per hop analysis (TTpHA) detection model which 
is adaptable to node radio range fluctuations, and iii) a method for automatically detecting 
time measurement tampering in both TTHCA and TTpHA.  
 
The thesis findings indicate that this new wormhole detection framework provides 
significant performance improvements compared to other existing solutions by accurately, 
efficiently and robustly detecting all wormhole variants under a wide range of network 
conditions.   
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1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is experiencing an evolution from the traditional desktop to a ubiquitous 
paradigm where a multitude of small computing devices, such as computer chips, actuators, 
and small sensors are involved in daily activities and routines. These devices can collect, 
store and process information which will be shared with other devices and collaborate in 
creating smart environments and systems (Mashal et al., 2015). This fast emerging global 
and collaborative network structure is popularly known as the internet-of-things (IoT) (Li et 
al., 2014).  
 
The IoT trend is leading to an ever increasing number of devices being connected to the 
Internet and the evolving of new more effective types of wireless infrastructures, such as 
fourth and fifth generation (4G and 5G) network technologies. Simultaneously, 
infrastructure-less and self-configuring systems like mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) have 
also gained popularity among the research community.  The MANET paradigm provides the 
possibility for example, for wireless sensor networks (WSN) and vehicular ad hoc networks 
(VANET) to be able to share measurements and monitor information without being 
connected to a base station. These are therefore widely recognized technologies e.g. for 
several IoT application domains in smart cities (Bellavista et al., 2013; Yovanof & Hazapis, 
2009).  
 
While self-configuring, infrastructure-less and dynamic topological features bring 
significant advantages including easier and faster large-scale deployments, at the same time 
they also generate considerable challenges in regard to for example, the quality of service 
(QoS) provisioning (Marwaha, et al., 2008), connectivity management (Dengiz, et al., 2011), 
end-to-end delay and packet loss on multi-hop routes in latency-sensitive applications 
(Lindeberg, et al. 2011) and internet protocol (IP) address management (Choudhury et al., 
2 
2015). Security is recognized as one of the most significant challenges to facilitate wide 
scale MANET adoption. An overview of MANETs and their main security challenges now 
follows.  
1.1.  Overview of Mobile Ad hoc Networks and their Security Challenges 
A MANET device can move independently in any direction, at any time. Therefore such 
networks have a dynamic topology. MANETs can be utilized for a variety of applications 
including military communications and rescue operations where a network infrastructure 
either does not exist or has been eliminated. They can also be seen as an alternative to 
Internet connectivity, for devices in both rural and urban areas which are temporarily located 
out of range of an Internet access point (Ding, 2008). Several communication network 
paradigms including WSN, VANET, wireless mesh, opportunistic and people-centric 
networks are examples of real-world applications based on the MANET paradigm (Conti & 
Giordano, 2014). 
 
General purpose MANETs have been an intensive research area for decades but have not yet 
significantly impacted upon the wireless networking market mainly due to several 
weaknesses in design and research approach (Basagni et al., 2013). Security is one of the 
key challenges since the infrastructure-less nature of MANETs leads to many new threats 
compared to wired and wireless infrastructure networks. These threats include (Goyal et al., 
2010): 
- Lack of centralized management makes network monitoring and security attack 
detection a challenging task. 
- MANETs have high scalability which sets a correspondingly high requirement on 
the security protocols. Security mechanisms must be capable of handling both 
small and large networks.  
3 
- In dynamic network topologies, trusted relations between nodes are intrinsically 
difficult to implement. 
- Limited power supply leads many nodes to behave in a selfish manner which can 
disrupt the routing. 
- MANET routing algorithms generally rely on all network nodes being non-
malicious and cooperative which makes it relatively easy for a malicious node to 
disrupt routing. 
 
Routing is an essential feature of any computer network to enable communications over 
multiple hops. MANETs, particularly WSNs, typically consist of energy-scarce, hardware-
restricted devices with short communication ranges and thus successful information sharing 
in such networks is highly dependent on multi-hop communications. If routing is disrupted, 
it means that data packets are dropped and they cannot reach their destination. MANET 
routing is particularly vulnerable from a security point of view since there are no dedicated 
routers and each node in the network must take part in the routing process. Thus, routing can 
easily be disrupted, for example by selfish nodes for battery saving purposes or by nodes 
with malicious intentions. In the next section, an overview of the most well-known attacks 
on MANET routing is provided together with existing countermeasures.  
1.1.1. Overview of Mobile Ad hoc Network Routing Security 
Security threats on MANET routing can roughly be divided in two main types; passive and 
active attacks. A passive attack typically involves traffic monitoring with the intention to 
confiscate vital information from data packets, though the normal functionality of the 
network is not affected. Through a passive attack, a malicious node often tries to identify 
communication parties and functionality that potentially provides information to launch 
further attacks. In contrast, an active attack is performed with the intention to specifically 
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change the routing functionality. Examples of such attacks include (Karlsson, et al., 2012; 
Soni et al., 2010): 
- Malicious modification of routing packets, e.g. falsely decreasing the hop count (HC) 
parameter of a routing packet such as in the blackhole attack, with the intention to 
advertise a short route and thus attract network communications. 
- Spoofing an IP address for example, to capture data packets meant for other nodes. 
- Fabrication, with the main purpose to drain off limited resources in other MANET nodes 
like battery power and network bandwidth. 
- Selfish behaviour of a node which refuses to take part in the routing process for energy 
saving purposes. 
- Wormholes, which are usually launched by two malicious nodes located far apart, who 
capture and tunnel routing packets to each other. As a result they attract a large portion 
of network traffic and create the illusion that the two wormhole endpoints are 
neighbours, even though there is a long distance between them.     
 
A wormhole attack is a particularly severe threat on MANET routing since it is relatively 
easy to launch, difficult to detect and can cause major network communications disruption 
(Khabbazian et al., 2009; Hu et al., 2003). If a wormhole is successfully established in a 
MANET, the malicious wormhole nodes can choose to launch further attacks such as 
selectively dropping packets to disrupt network communication or capture confidential 
information by sniffing data packets. An example of a wormhole attack is visualised in 
Figure 1.1, where A is the source node, D is the destination node, M1 and M2 are malicious 
wormhole nodes and all the other numbered nodes are legitimate. In this scenario, the 
shortest route in terms of hops, will traverse intermediate nodes #2, #3, #4, #5 and #6. 
However, if M1 records routing packets received from its neighbours, tunnels them to M2 
which in turn replays the tunnelled routing packets to its neighbours, then M1 and M2 create 
the illusion that the shortest route traverses the two wormhole nodes. 
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Figure 1.1: A wormhole attack example. 
 
Wormhole attacks are difficult to detect mainly because they can be launched in several 
different modes where each mode sets its own requirements upon the detection algorithm:      
- Hidden Mode (HM). Malicious nodes tunnel routing packets to each other without 
modification. As a result the wormhole nodes never appear in routing tables. If the 
wormhole example in Figure 1.1 is launched in HM, the fictive route will be 
A#1#7D. 
- Participation Mode (PM). The wormhole nodes process routing packets just like a 
normal MANET node, so the malicious nodes appear in an infected route as any pair 
of legitimate nodes, so the fictive route path for a PM wormhole will be 
A#1M1M2#7D. 
Both HM and PM wormhole nodes can also tunnel routing packets to each other by using 
one of the following two communication link types:   
- In-Band (I-B). A malicious node forwards routing packets to the other wormhole 
node by tunnelling them through genuine network nodes, so in Figure 1.1, routing 
packets between M1 and M2 will be tunnelled through legitimate nodes #3, #4, and 
#5. This type of wormhole is easy to launch since a dedicated communication link 
between the wormhole endpoints is not required.  
- Out-of-Band (O-B). This type of wormhole is more complex to launch since an 
external communication channel between the malicious nodes is needed, such as 
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network cable or directional antenna, but it attracts more traffic than an I-B wormhole 
since the link is significantly faster.  
 
Originally, MANET routing protocols were designed on the assumption that malicious nodes 
did not exist in such environments and therefore included no security mechanisms. During 
the last decade, several secure routing protocols for MANETs have been proposed, either as 
stand-alone protocols (Sanzgiri et al., 2002) or more typically as extensions to existing 
routing protocols (Papadimitratos & Haas, 2003; Buchegger & Le Boudec, 2002; Hu, 2002; 
Hu et al., 2002; Papadimitratos & Haas, 2002; Zapata, 2002; Yi, et al., 2001) suggesting 
authentication, hashing techniques, encryption or digital signatures as preventive security 
mechanisms. Security attacks like wormholes cannot however, be realistically detected 
simply by using cryptography. In an open large-scale MANET, where nodes are allowed to 
join or leave at any time, trust in a node based on cryptography is difficult to realise in 
practice. Also, it must be taken into account that MANET nodes may consist of hardware 
restricted devices like sensors, small chips and actuators, on which the use of cryptographic 
measures would incur a significant computational cost. 
 
An alternative approach for detecting malicious and selfish nodes in a MANET is to analyse 
either node behaviour or certain features of a route to build a reputation amongst nodes. 
These types of reputation/behaviour based security mechanisms can be classified as point 
detection algorithms, focusing on a single attack type, or more unified mechanisms, e.g. 
intrusion detection systems (IDS), being able to detect a range of attacks (Nadeem & 
Howarth, 2013). Several unified reputation-based security systems have been proposed for 
MANETs (Eissa et al., 2013; Saha et al., 2012; Buchegger & Le Boudec, 2002; Michiardi 
& Molva, 2002), though current systems do not cover all types of routing threats. 
Furthermore, many proposals require special types of nodes like guards or centralized nodes 
to be present in the network, which is impractical in a large-scale dynamic MANET.      
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Many security schemes have been proposed specifically for detecting wormhole attacks, 
although most solutions have some recurring limitations, such as the inability to detect all 
the wormhole variants defined above. Others require either dedicated hardware or make 
unrealistic assumptions about the network environment or the capability of the nodes and 
end up by imposing either high bandwidth loads on the network or computational overheads. 
A wide-ranging review of the state-of-the-art wormhole attack detection methods will be 
presented in Chapter 3.  
1.2.  Research Motivation 
The lack of a single inclusive wormhole attack detection solution provided the motivation to 
investigate new potential detection mechanisms which are lightweight in terms of their 
computational complexity as well as network bandwidth load and have the ability to detect 
all wormhole variants. In the literature, several types of route or node features have been 
utilized for identifying wormholes or wormhole nodes, such as received signal strength 
indicator (RSSI) (Jain et al., 2012), number of neighbours (Song et al., 2012), network 
visualization (Lu et al., 2013), frequency of node appearances in routes (Su, 2010), HC (Jen 
et al., 2009), geographical location information (García-Otero & Población-Hernández, 
2012), and packet delay (Khabbazian et al., 2009; Chiu & Lui, 2006). Most of these features 
however, are unsuitable for analyzing the existence of all wormhole variants and some are 
based on unrealistic assumptions as will be highlighted in Chapter 3. The focus of many 
proposed wormhole detection schemes is on packet delay analysis and involves measuring 
the delay incurred by sending a packet to either neighbouring nodes or alternatively over 
multiple hops. If the delay is unrealistically high it may be inferred that a wormhole exists 
between two disjoint neighbors or on a route. These types of detection schemes are attractive 
since they are efficient, easy to implement, and are thus applicable on a wide range of 
network devices. However, current solutions rely either on some impractical or unrealistic 
assumptions, typically that packet processing delays at each node are approximately the 
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same, since round trip time (RTT) measurements are used or they are only applicable to 
specific wormhole types under certain network conditions. In a real-world MANET, 
differences in node hardware and potential queuing delays at nodes will inevitably lead to 
variations in packet processing delays and so RTT alone is not sufficiently accurate to 
identify for example, a PM O-B wormhole, which has a fast link.  
 
The lack of unified and robust wormhole detection technique allied with the appeal and 
potential that packet delay based schemes afford, provided the context for the overarching 
thesis research question and related objectives, which are now formally defined.  
1.3.  Research Questions and Objectives 
From the discussion in Section 1.2, the following main research question addressed in this 
thesis was framed: 
 
How can wormhole attacks be accurately detected in a generic MANET with 
minimal network overheads? 
 
Following a detailed literature review to survey existing wormhole detection solutions, 
packet delay analysis was identified as a fertile area for further investigation in seeking to 
develop a unified detection framework which can offer accurate performance across a 
variety of network scenarios. The following key specifications for this new framework were 
formulated: 
- Detects all existing wormhole types 
- Easy to implement with NO additional hardware requirements.  
- Low cost in terms of computational complexity, network bandwidth load, and 
false positive (FP) detection. 
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- Independent of network topology and adaptive to various network environments, 
like indoors and outdoors, which lead to variability in node radio ranges.  
- Resistant to malicious packet delay time measurement tampering. 
Three objectives were framed based on these requirements as well as underpinning the 
overarching research question, and three original contributions presented in this thesis to 
fulfill these objectives as outlined in Figure 1.2. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Layout of the objectives of the wormhole detection framework and contributions for 
fulfilling these. 
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The objectives and their justifications will now be presented, while the resulting framework 
contributions are surveyed in the next Section:  
 
1. To investigate the development of a novel robust wormhole attack detection model 
based upon packet delay analysis.   
 
Justification:  Building on the compelling reasons detailed in Section 1.2, this objective 
critically evaluates the potential of developing a new lightweight robust wormhole attack 
detection model using packet delay analysis. A new algorithm called traversal time and hop 
count analysis (TTHCA) (Karlsson et al., 2011) is designed within a MANET simulation 
environment, initially under the assumptions of identical node hardware and a line-of-sight 
(LOS) scenario within a homogeneous network arrangement where LOS refers to nodes 
being located in an open space environment, i.e., outdoors or in a large room, where the 
nodes have direct visible contact with each other.  
 
 
2. To design an adaptive mechanism for the framework to manage dissimilar node 
hardware and variable radio coverage.  
 
Justification: High fluctuations in radio ranges can be anticipated in heterogeneous 
MANETs comprising nodes with dissimilar wireless hardware and antennae located in 
obstructed environments. This makes wormhole attack detection based on packet delay 
analysis more challenging than in a homogeneous, direct LOS network environment. This 
objective critically analyses the impact of relaxing the two assumptions made in Objective 1 
on node hardware and network environment, by developing a new wormhole identification 
process which employs a dynamic threshold to enable the algorithm to automatically adapt 
to prevailing network conditions. 
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3. To critically analyse the conditions for malicious tampering of packet delay 
measurements and to frame suitable mitigation strategies. 
 
Justification: Packet delay measurements can potentially be altered by malicious nodes to 
prevent wormhole attack detection.  This objective firstly analyses the specific conditions 
that must exist and the corresponding impact of packet delay time measurement tampering 
on the wormhole attack detection performance of the new framework. Innovative strategies 
will then be advanced to successfully prevent time tampering attacks while concurrently 
retaining low false positive detection performance. 
1.4. Contributions 
This thesis presents a new unified wormhole attack detection framework which is effective 
for all wormhole types, is lightweight, and generates low FP rates. The framework, shown 
in Figure 1.2, makes a number of innovative contributions to the field. To fulfil Objectives 
1 and 2, two contributions in MANET wormhole attack detection based upon packet delay 
analysis are proven. The first is the TTHCA (Karlsson et al., 2011) algorithm, which 
measures and analyses the overall route packet traversal time (PTT) which better reflects the 
route distance since RTT may have high variance due to variable packet processing delays 
at intermediate nodes. If PTT in relation to the route HC is greater than a predefined static 
threshold, then a wormhole is suspected to exist on the found route. In homogeneous LOS 
environments, where the variation in node radio range coverage can reasonably be assumed 
to be low, TTHCA satisfactorily fulfils Objective 1 as will be shown in Chapter 5.  
 
In the second contribution, the initial LOS and identical node hardware assumptions are 
relaxed and the corresponding performance of using the fixed detection threshold in TTHCA 
is critically evaluated. To fulfil Objective 2, a modification to TTHCA is introduced called 
traversal time per hop analysis (TTpHA) (Karlsson et al., 2016), which uses a dynamic 
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threshold for the maximum permissible PTT per hop. This renders TTpHA significantly 
more flexible than TTHCA, since it can now automatically adapt to prevailing network 
conditions as well as tolerate higher radio range variations.  
 
The third novel contribution critically analyses the prevailing conditions for successful 
tampering of PTT measurements by a malicious node, with the explicit aim of preventing 
either TTHCA or TTpHA from detecting a wormhole. An extension, called ∆T vector 
(∆TVE) (Karlsson et al., 2013), is then proposed, which can be seamlessly integrated into 
both TTHCA and TTpHA to automatically detect time tampering attacks in PM I-B 
wormholes by applying statistical analysis of collected packet processing delay 
measurements. This contribution partially fulfils Objective 3 since it does not consider PM 
O-B wormholes. 
1.5. Thesis Structure 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: 
- Chapter 2 presents a rigorous and generic literature review on MANET routing 
security research.  A survey on MANET routing protocols as well as established 
routing attacks is given and a critical review on security extension proposals is 
provided. Work from this Chapter has been published in Karlsson et al. (2012). 
- Chapter 3 focuses specifically on the state-of-the-art of wormhole attack detection 
research. Existing detection schemes are classified into categories according to their 
approach and their comparative advantages and disadvantages, and gaps in the field 
identified.   
- Chapter 4 explains the research methodology adopted in this thesis, the choice of 
simulation test platform, the performance metrics and the software code validation 
as well as statistical significance verification processes pursued to ensure the 
correctness of the new framework. 
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- Chapter 5 introduces the TTHCA wormhole detection algorithm and critically 
evaluates its wormhole detection performance in comparison to RTT and HC 
analysis based schemes. Work from this Chapter has been published  Karlsson et al. 
(2011). 
- Chapter 6 critically analyses the limitations of the fixed threshold for determining 
the maximum permissible PTT/HC used in TTHCA and introduces a new, more 
flexible TTpHA wormhole detection algorithm that is able to automatically adapt its 
performance to prevailing network conditions. Work from this Chapter has been 
published in Karlsson et al. (2016).  
- Chapter 7 evaluates the feasibility for a wormhole node to tamper with the PTT 
measurements in TTHCA and TTpHA in order to prevent wormhole detection. A 
security extension called ∆TVE is proposed for the detection of such time tampering 
attacks. Work from this Chapter has been published in Karlsson et al. (2013). 
- Chapter 8 discusses future research avenues for exploiting key features of the new 
framework, including their possible integration with existing machine learning based 
IDS to create a single system for detecting the most severe routing security threats.     
- Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the key findings and original contributions presented 
in this thesis.  
 
In the next Chapter, a critique of the literature relating to firstly general MANET routing 
security research is presented, before specifically focusing upon wormhole attacks and 
existing techniques for their effective detection.  
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2. MANET ROUTING SECURITY: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
MANETs have no fixed infrastructure and are therefore more vulnerable to routing attacks 
than infrastructure networks. Since dedicated routers are missing in MANETs, each node 
takes part of the routing process and in a dynamic network, where nodes are continuously 
joining and leaving the network, it is difficult to discern nodes with malicious intention from 
normal routers. In this Chapter an overview of the most known attacks/threats on MANET 
routing as well as proposed security protocols/extensions is presented. To provide a better 
understanding of the routing attacks, an overview of existing MANET routing protocols is 
first given.  
2.2.  Overview of Routing Protocols 
Several routing protocols have been proposed for MANETs in recent years. These can 
broadly be classified in table driven/proactive, on-demand/reactive, and hybrid routing 
protocols. Examples of well-known protocols from each category will now be individually 
examined. 
2.2.1. Table driven/Proactive Protocols 
These use a proactive routing scheme, so every node in the network maintains consistent up-
to-date routing information from each node to all other nodes in the network. Table driven 
routing protocols have a low route acquisition delay because every node always has a fresh 
route available to all other nodes in the network. However, the requirements on storage, 
bandwidth, and power are high since each node must always keep its routing table up-to date 
(with route information to all other nodes) which requires periodical exchange of routing 
messages. Examples of well-known table driven protocols are the highly dynamic 
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destination-sequenced distance vector routing (DSDV) (Perkins & Bhagwat, 1994) and 
optimized link state routing (OLSR) (Clausen et al., 2003).  
Destination-sequenced Distance Vector routing (DSDV)  
DSDV is one of the originally proposed MANET routing protocols. It is based on the 
distributed Bellman-Ford distance vector algorithm where the main contribution is to solve 
the routing loop problem by using a sequence number for each routing entry. Routing tables 
are generated and maintained by periodically exchanging routing messages among 
neighbours. Apart from the destination each entry in a routing table consists of the next hop 
to reach it, the route HC, the sequence number generated by the destination, the install time 
(which is the time when the entry is made), and stable data. Install time is used for identifying 
obsolete routes, i.e. a route which has not been updated for a certain period of time and which 
will be removed from the routing table.  The stable data entry is a metric for determining the 
stability of a route.  
 
A major advantage of DSDV is that each node always knows the next hop on the path to all 
destinations in the network which means that minimum time is consumed for setting up a 
route. A disadvantage on the other hand is that regular updates of routing tables consume 
battery power and network resources even when the MANET is idle. Furthermore, DSDV is 
not suitable for dynamic and large scale networks as a new sequence number is necessary 
before the network re-converges whenever the topology of the network changes.  
Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR)  
OLSR is a modification of basic link state routing optimized for MANETs. In link state 
routing, each node exchanges messages with all nearby nodes for discovering its neighbours. 
This information is then distributed to all other nodes by flooding control messages into the 
network. To reduce control traffic overhead in OLSR, a node only distributes control 
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messages to a preselected set of neighbours called multipoint relays. This saves network 
resources since it prevents the same control message from being distributed multiple times 
to the same region. When each node has received the topology information of the MANET 
it can calculate the shortest HC route to all other nodes.  
2.2.2. On-demand/Reactive Protocols 
On-demand protocols are based on a reactive routing scheme, so a route is established only 
when needed. On-demand protocols place a much lower load on the network, compared to 
table driven, since each node need not constantly keep own routing tables up-to-date. 
However, route acquisition delay is high since routing messages must be exchanged every 
time before communication is possible over a new route. On-demand routing protocols are 
though more suitable than table-driven for dynamic network topologies.  Two prominent 
MANET routing protocols, based on reactive routing schemes are dynamic source routing 
(DSR) (Johnson & Maltz, 1996) and Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) (Perkins 
& Royer, 1999) which will now be respectively considered. 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
To set up a link to the destination node, the source node floods the network with a route 
request (RREQ) message. If a node receiving this RREQ is neither the destination nor has a 
fresh route to the destination, then it adds its own address to the RREQ packet before 
broadcasting it to neighbouring nodes. Each intermediate node also caches all node addresses 
received in the RREQ packet, i.e. the path to the source node. If the receiver of a RREQ is 
the destination node it adds its own address information to a new route reply (RREP) packet 
which is sent back to the source node as a unicast packet through the nodes listed in the 
RREQ. As during the RREQ broadcast, each node receiving a RREP caches the node 
addresses received in the RREP before adding its own address to the packet. As a result, 
when the RREP reaches the source node, all intermediate nodes have registered a fresh route 
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to both source and destination nodes. The destination node replies to each RREQ it receives 
and hence, the source node will know more than one route to the destination node upon 
reception of all RREP packets. The advantage of registering multiple routes to a destination 
node in the routing table is that if a link fails, the source node does not need to re-initiate the 
route discovery process. Instead it chooses an alternative route from its routing table. 
However, in highly dynamic MANET topologies, cached routing information may become 
obsolete in a short period of time.   
Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV)  
To set up a new route in AODV, the source node initiates the route discovery process by 
flooding the network with a RREQ message such as in DSR. In contrast to DSR, node 
address information is not added to the RREQ packet. Instead, each intermediate node and 
the destination node creates a reverse route to the source node when receiving a RREQ, i.e. 
registers the previous hop, from which it received the RREQ, as next hop towards the source 
node. If the receiver of a RREQ is the destination node it sends a RREP message back to the 
source as a unicast packet over the shortest route and each intermediate node receiving the 
RREP registers the next hop information to the destination node in its routing table. As a 
result, when the RREP reaches the source node, all nodes in the shortest route path will have 
a route both to the source and destination. In contrast to DSR, a destination node only replies 
to the first RREQ message it receives and therefore there will be only one registered route 
between the source and destination nodes. While DSR incurs a lower routing overhead due 
to its multiple route feature, AODV still provides superior performance in highly dynamic 
MANET environments. It is also the most popular on-demand routing protocol (Zhong et 
al., 2015) with most existing routing protocol versions and security extensions being based 
around it, including the framework developed in this thesis.  
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2.2.3. Hybrid Protocols 
A hybrid routing protocol is a combination of proactive and reactive schemes with the aim 
of exploiting the advantages of both types. A proactive scheme is used to discover routes to 
nearby nodes and reactive schemes are used to discover long distance nodes. An example of 
a hybrid routing protocol is zone routing protocol (ZRP) (Haas et al., 2002). ZRP can also 
be categorized as a hierarchical routing protocol where the network can be grouped in to 
clusters, trees, or zones, where one node is chosen to be a leader that manages that particular 
routing area.  
 
Hybrid protocols incur less route acquisition delay than reactive protocols and a lower 
overhead than proactive protocols. They are however, not suitable for highly dynamic 
MANET environments since in such network conditions, it is not feasible to delegate roles 
to nodes and segment the network into zones.    
2.3. Overview of Routing Security Attacks 
Due to the self-configuring nature of a MANET, each node participates in the routing process 
in addition to its other activities and there are no dedicated routers in the network. This 
causes a significant security threat especially in highly dynamic MANETs where a large 
number of network nodes can join and leave the network so it is impossible to know in 
advance whether a node is a trustable router or not.  
  
Security attacks in MANET routing can be divided in two main types; passive and active. 
The intention of a passive attack is typically to listen and retrieve vital information inside 
data packets, for example by launching a traffic monitoring attack. In such an attack, a 
malicious node tries to identify communication parties and functionality which can provide 
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information to launch further attacks. The attack is called passive because the normal 
functionality of the network is not altered. 
 
An active attack is performed by a malicious node with the intention to interrupt the routing 
functionality of a MANET. Examples of active attacks are (Karlsson et al., 2012; Soni et al., 
2010): 
- Modification attacks 
- Impersonation attacks 
- Fabrication attacks 
- Rushing attacks 
- Wormhole attacks 
- Replay Attacks 
- Selfish behaviour 
2.3.1. Modification Attacks 
This is typically launched by a malicious node with the deliberate intention of redirecting 
routing packets, by for example modifying the HC value of a packet to a smaller value. By 
decreasing the HC value, a malicious node can attract more network communication. A 
typical modification attack is the black hole attack (Hongmei et al., 2002) where a malicious 
node uses the routing protocol to advertise itself as having the shortest path to the node 
whose packets it wants to intercept. As a result, the target node will send its packets through 
the malicious node when communicating with the destination node. The malicious node can 
choose to either drop the packets or place itself on the route as the first step in what is known 
popularly as the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. A modification attack can also be a 
special kind of denial-of-service (DoS) attack. In this situation the intention is to destruct the 
entire routing function by for instance altering the source routes in the header of the routing 
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packet. This type of DoS attack however, is only effective on routing protocols where 
intermediate nodes are included in the packet header, such as DSR.  
2.3.2. Impersonation 
In this type of attack (also known as spoofing), a malicious node uses for example the IP 
address of another node in the outgoing routing packets. As a result, the malicious node can 
receive packets meant for the other node or even in the worst case, completely isolate that 
node from the network.  
2.3.3. Fabrication 
The main purpose of fabrication attacks is to drain off limited resources in other MANET 
nodes, such as battery power and network connectivity by for example flooding a specific 
node with unnecessary routing messages. A malicious node can for example, send false route 
error (RERR) messages. This kind of attack is more prominent in reactive routing protocols 
where path maintenance is used to recover broken links. 
 
In a fabrication attack a malicious node can also attempt to create routes to nodes that do not 
exist. As a result, the routing table of a neighbour node can become full which prevents it 
from registering any new routes. This type of fabrication attack is however, only effective 
on table-driven routing protocols where each node in the network keeps an up-to-date route 
to all other nodes in the network.    
 
A fabrication attack can also be launched by a selfish node that duplicates the transmission 
of packets to another node, just to ensure all packets reach the destination node. This 
behaviour may lead to an excessively high network traffic load.  
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2.3.4. Rushing Attacks 
This is a DoS attack effective on reactive routing protocols. Under normal circumstances the 
medium access control (MAC) layer impose delays between the instant the packet is 
delivered to the network interface for transmission and the moment when the packet is 
actually transmitted. Reactive routing protocols normally specify a delay between receiving 
and sending a RREQ packet for avoiding collisions. In a rushing attack a malicious node 
ignores these delays with the intention to achieve fast forwarding of RREQ messages. By 
doing so it will attract more routes than nearby nodes since most reactive routing protocols 
only process the first received RREQ messages meaning that the messages received later 
from legitimate nodes will be ignored. A malicious node can also obtain faster RREQ 
forwarding than its neighbours by flooding them with data packets to keep their queues full. 
A more powerful rushing attack can also be achieved by employing a wormhole attack, 
which will be described next. 
2.3.5. Wormhole Attacks 
A wormhole (Hu et al., 2003) is a particularly severe attack on MANET routing. A malicious 
node captures packets from one location in a network and tunnels them to another malicious 
node, located several hops away, which forwards the packets to its neighbouring nodes. This 
creates the illusion that two endpoints of a wormhole tunnel are neighbours even though they 
are located far away from each other in reality. A strategic placement of a wormhole causes 
most of the network traffic to go through the malicious nodes. Once the wormhole link is 
successfully established, further attacks can be launched by the malicious nodes such as 
selective packet drop to disrupt communication or data sniffing in order to capture 
confidential information.  
 
There are two classes of wormhole attacks (Khabbazian et al., 2006): HM and PM. In the 
former, HM wormhole nodes are invisible from legitimate nodes as they do not process 
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routing packets. They simply capture, tunnel and forward packets to each other and never 
appear in routing tables. In contrast, PM wormhole nodes are visible during the routing 
process since they process routing packets as any normal node. Aside from relaying routing 
packets to its neighbours, a PM wormhole node tunnels routing packets to the other PM 
node, giving it the opportunity to deleteriously control network performance. 
 
A shortcut link between two HM or PM wormhole nodes can be established using either an 
I-B or O-B channel (Mahajan et al., 2008). An I-B channel is one where the wormhole nodes 
tunnel packets to each other through legitimate nodes in the network, while an O-B channel 
connects the two malicious nodes through an external communication link like a network 
cable or directional antenna.  
2.3.6. Replay Attacks 
In this kind of attack, a malicious node records routing information messages sent from 
neighbour nodes and resends them later to other nodes. Since MANETs typically do not have 
a fixed topology, nodes receiving maliciously replayed routing messages will store old 
information in their routing tables. As a consequence, major disturbance of the MANET 
routing operation may be caused.  
2.3.7. Selfish Behaviour 
Selfish behaviour means a node does not wish to cooperate in any routing. It may for 
example be that it wants to save energy and so switches to a “sleep mode” whenever it is not 
taking part in any network communication. While such an attack may not be launched with 
explicitly malicious intentions, it can lead to serious disruptions in network communications 
such as high route discovery delays and dropped data packets. If the selfish node also 
happens to be the only communication link between two MANET endpoints, 
communications between these endpoints will be become unavailable. 
23 
2.4.  Survey of Secure Routing Protocols 
Most routing protocols have originally been designed without taking security into account. 
It was assumed that all nodes in a MANET were trusted. However, this is not the case in a 
large scale and dynamic MANET and if the routing protocol is unprotected, the whole 
MANET can be liable to several different types of security attacks. A lot of research has 
been done in the area of MANET routing security and several secure versions have been 
derived from current routing protocols to provide secure MANET routing protocols (Koul 
& Sharma, 2015; Karlsson et al., 2012). The purpose of this Section is to present an overview 
of well-known secure routing protocols that have been developed with the intention to 
provide protection against a range of security attacks. These can mainly be divided in 
cryptographic based, reputation based or a combination of both.   
2.4.1. Secure Routing Protocols based on Cryptography 
Cryptography can be used for preventing external attacks, such as modification, fabrication, 
impersonation and rushing. Several existing secure routing protocols propose node 
authentication, hashing techniques, encryption and digital signatures for protecting against 
routing attacks. Some of these protocols will now be critically evaluated.  
Secure AODV (SAODV) (Zapata, 2002) 
This protocol was introduced to protect the routing messages of the AODV protocol. In 
SAODV, hash chains are used to authenticate the HC fields within the RREQ and RREP 
packets. Since all other fields of the RREQ message are non-mutable they can be 
authenticated by verifying the signature in the RREQ. The RREQ message is signed by the 
private key of the source node and the RREP message is signed by the private key of the 
destination node. By doing so, both the source and the destination nodes can identify their 
communication partners and thus avoid impersonation attacks. SAODV also prevents most 
modification attacks since both the non-mutable and the HC field in the routing packets are 
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protected. The intermediate nodes verify their signatures in both the RREQ and RREP 
messages as well, and only store a forward or reverse route entry in the routing tables, if the 
signature in the routing message is verified so routes to unauthorized nodes are not permitted.   
 
By using digital signatures in the RERR packets SAODV can also prevent malicious nodes 
from forging RERR message, which is a type of fabrication attack. Replay attacks are also 
prevented by SAODV since in AODV only routing packets with unique sequence numbers 
are processed and the sequence number field in the routing packets cannot be altered by a 
malicious node. However, since only the end nodes (source and destination) are 
authenticated, attacks not requiring false modifications of the routing packets, such as 
rushing attacks, wormhole attacks, and selfish behaviour cannot be detected by SAODV.  
Ariadne (Hu, 2002) 
This is a secure reactive routing protocol based on DSR that provides authentication of 
routing messages. Authentication can be performed by using shared secret keys between 
each pair of nodes, shared secret keys between communicating nodes combined with either 
broadcast authentication or digital signatures. Ariadne is based on the timed efficient stream 
loss-tolerant authentication (TESLA) protocol (Perrig et al., 2005) which is a broadcast 
authentication procedure requiring relaxed time synchronization. It consists of two steps; 
routing message authentication and routing header verification  
 
During the routing message authentication step, a node forwarding a RREQ message 
indicates a message authentication code (which throughout the thesis is abbreviated as MAC 
not to confuse it with medium access control (MAC)) which is computed with a shared secret 
key over a time stamp (or other unique data). The receiver of the message can then 
authenticate the message by using its own shared secret key.  Routing header verification 
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includes per-hop hashing to verify that no hop has been omitted, i.e. no node has been 
removed from the source root (list of intermediate nodes) included in the routing packet.  
 
Due to the authentication of routing messages, and prevention from false modification of the 
source route and HC field, Ariadne provides protection from all routing attacks described in 
the previous Section, except selfish behaviour, under the assumption that none of the nodes 
owning legitimate shared keys, are malicious.  In addition to PM wormholes, Ariadne can 
also provide protection from HM wormholes, when used with the TESLA instant key 
disclosure (TIK) protocol for precise time synchronization between neighbour nodes.  
Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) (Sanzgiri et al., 2002) 
The purpose of this protocol is to detect and protect against malicious actions by third parties 
and peers. It provides authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation. ARAN can be 
used in two different security stages; a simple mode which is mandatory and an optional 
stage which provides stronger security but also more overheads. It is not suitable for mobile 
devices with very low processing or battery capacity. ARAN uses digital certificates for 
authentication and non-repudiation. Each routing message is signed by the source node and 
broadcasted to all neighbours. An intermediate node removes the certificate and signature of 
the previous hop and replaces them with its own.  
 
Due to the strong authentication, message integrity and non–repudiation ARAN affords like 
Ariadne, effective protection from all the attacks described in Section 2.3. However, due to 
heavy asymmetric cryptographic operations and large routing packets, ARAN has a high 
computational cost for route discovery. Another drawback of ARAN is vulnerability to 
selfish nodes and HM wormhole attacks.  
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Security Aware Ad hoc Routing (SAR) (Yi et al., 2001) 
This protocol incorporates security attributes as parameters in MANET route discovery. It 
enables the use of security as a negotiable metric with the intention to improve the relevance 
of the discovered routes. While AODV discovers the shortest path between two nodes, SAR 
can discover a path with desired security attributes. For instance, the criterion for a valid 
route can be that every node in the route must own a particular shared key. In such a case, 
routing messages would be encrypted with the source node's shared key and only the nodes 
with the correct key can read the header and forward that routing message. As a result, if a 
routing message reaches the destination, it must have travelled through nodes having the 
same trust level as the source node. It is then for the node initiating the route discovery to 
decide upon the desired security level for that route.  
 
SAR has been presented as an extension to AODV but it can also be extended to any existing 
routing protocol. Due to the strong cryptographic protection of routing messages 
modification, impersonation, rushing, fabrication, replay and PM wormhole attacks are 
effectively eliminated. A major problem with SAR however, is that it involves a significant 
encryption overhead since each intermediate node has to perform both encryption and 
decryption operations. As with all other cryptography-based secure routing protocols, HM 
wormhole nodes and selfish nodes cannot be detected using this protocol. 
Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance Vector (SEAD) (Hu et al., 2002) 
SEAD is a proactive routing protocol, based on DSDV, that uses a hash chain method for 
verifying the authenticity of the sequence number and route metric elements of the routing 
packets. SEAD thus provides protection against attackers trying to create incorrect routing 
state in other nodes. SEAD requires authentication of the source to ensure that routing 
information has been received from a legitimate node which prevents impersonation attacks. 
One way of performing source node authentication in SEAD is to set up a shared secret key 
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between each pair of nodes in the MANET. This key is then used for MAC calculations 
between the nodes for authenticating a routing update message. 
 
A limitation of SEAD is that the next hop or destination field of a routing update packet is 
not protected and thus modification attacks are only partially eliminated. Furthermore, even 
though the sequence number is authenticated, SEAD does not recognize packets sent 
multiple times with the same sequence number and is thus vulnerable to replay attacks. 
Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) (Sanzgiri et al., 2002) 
This is a protocol designed for ZRP but it can also be used with pure reactive routing 
protocols. In ZRP, a security association (SA) is required between each source and 
destination node. It is assumed that the SA can be established by using a shared key between 
the two communicating nodes. The shared key is negotiated based on the other party’s public 
key. SRP uses an additional header to the underlying on-demand routing protocol packet. 
The header contains a sequence number, an ID number and a MAC field where the output 
of a key hashed functions is inserted. RREQ messages are discarded by intermediate nodes 
if the SRP header is missing.   
 
When the RREQ message has reached the destination node it verifies if it has a SA with the 
source node. The RREQ packet is dropped if the sequence number is greater or equal to a 
maximum value since it is then considered to be replayed. If the sequence number is valid, 
the destination calculates the keyed hash of the request fields and compares the output with 
the MAC field of the SRP header. If they match the authenticity of the sender and the 
integrity of the request message are verified and the destination generates a RREP message 
where it includes the path information from the source to destination node, the ID and 
sequence number. 
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The source node validates the sequence number and the MAC field in the same way as the 
destination node. The source node also compares the source route (path information) 
included in the reply message with the reverse of the route carried in the reply packet. If they 
match, it can be assumed that the route information in the routing packet has not been altered.   
 
In SRP, intermediate nodes are not authenticated so SRP is vulnerable to routing attacks not 
requiring false modification of routing packets, including all wormhole types and selfish 
behaviour.     
2.4.2. Reputation based Secure Routing Protocols 
Some routing attacks like selfish behaviour, cannot be detected using cryptography and in 
an open large scale MANET, where any node is allowed to join or leave at any time, trust in 
a node based on cryptography is difficult to realise in practice. Another approach for 
detecting malicious and selfish nodes in a MANET is to analyse the behaviour of the nodes 
and based on that create lists where the trust against other nodes are weighted. In this 
subsection, a few examples of reputation based secure MANET routing protocols are 
examined.  
Cooperation of Nodes: Fairness in Dynamic Ad hoc NeTworks (CONFIDANT) 
(Buchegger & Le Boudec, 2002) 
The main idea of CONFIDANT is to make non-cooperative nodes unattractive for other 
nodes to communicate with. A node chooses a route based on trust relationships built up 
from experienced, observed or reported routing and forwarding behaviour of other nodes. 
Each node observes the behaviour of all nodes located within the radio range. When a node 
discovers a misbehaving node, it informs all other nodes in the network by flooding an alarm 
message. As a result, all nodes in the network can avoid the detected misbehaving node when 
choosing a route.  
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CONFIDANT consists of the monitor, reputation system, path manager and trust manager 
components. The monitor component listens to its neighbours and inspects if they forward a 
routing packet that has been sent to them and thus detects non-cooperative nodes such as 
selfish nodes. The monitor can also check whether a forwarded packet is modified according 
to the routing protocol, if not then a modification attack is suspected. The trust manager is 
responsible for sending and receiving alarm messages which are sent by nodes suspecting 
malicious behaviour in a certain node. The reputation system maintains a table with node 
ratings and the path manager component manages route information according to feedback 
from the reputation system.  
 
A major weakness of CONFIDANT is that an attacker is able to send false alarm messages, 
and as a consequence the attacker can claim that a node is misbehaving even if that is not 
true. No wormhole is detected due to the fact that they do not either drop or falsely modify 
routing packets during the route discovery procedure. Furthermore, CONFIDANT has no 
capability for detecting impersonation, replay, rushing or fabrication attacks.  
Collaborative Reputation Mechanism to Enforce Node Cooperation in MANETs 
(CORE) (Michiardi & Molva, 2002) 
CORE is similar to CONFIDANT but employs a more complicated reputation exchange 
mechanism. Reputation is divided into three distinct components; subjective reputation, 
indirect and functional. Subjective reputation is created through their own observations, 
indirect reputation is built based on reports from other nodes, and functional reputation is 
based on behaviour monitored during a specific task. All these reputations together are 
weighted for a combined reputation value. The major difference between CORE and 
CONFIDANT is that CORE only allows positive reports while CONFIDANT also accepts 
negative reports. As a result, in CORE it is not possible to decrease the popularity of a certain 
node by sending false reports.  
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Friendship-based AODV (FrAODV) (Eissa et al., 2013) 
FrAODV is a trust based security extension for AODV where each node maintains a list of 
friends and a friendship value for each friend. The friendship value can range from 0 to 100 
where 100 refers to the highest level of trust. Three features, i.e. packet precision, blacklists 
and trust value metric are used to assess the level of trust for each node (Samian et al., 2008). 
Packet precision means the accuracy of a routing packet forwarded by a neighbouring node, 
which can be used for example, to detect malicious modifications of routing packets, while 
a node will be listed in a blacklist if it does not forward a routing packet it has received and 
can thus be suspected as a selfish node.  Trust value metric means the use of discrete values 
to define the trust level of a node. 
 
Trusted routes are built by two algorithms, i.e. RvEvaluate and FwEvaluate. The RvEvaluate 
algorithm builds up a trusted reverse route from the destination and intermediate nodes to 
the source node. When an intermediate node receives a RREQ its previous and next hop 
node’s friendship value is evaluated and the RREQ is rejected if either of these values are 
less than a threshold for friendship (TF) value. If the friendship value is greater than TF the 
friendship value of the whole reverse route, i.e. the average friendship value of all nodes on 
the reverse path between the current and source nodes, is calculated. If the friendship value 
of the reverse route is greater than a possible previous reverse route to the source, the 
intermediate node updates the previous route with the new route in its routing table. When a 
destination node receives a RREQ the procedure is the same, except that the friendship value 
is only evaluated for the previous hop. Similarly, the FwEvaluate algorithm builds up a 
trusted forward route from the source and from an intermediate node to the destination node 
upon receiving a RREP.  
FrAODV has no measures for detecting routing attacks that do not modify or drop routing 
packets such as malicious nodes distributing false RERR messages (fabrication), rushing, 
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replay and wormhole attacks. Node authentication mechanisms are also missing, which 
means that spoofing is possible.  
2.4.3. Secure Routing Protocols based on a Combination of Cryptography and 
Reputation 
Several secure MANET routing protocols propose a combination of cryptography and 
behaviour analysis for providing broader protection features. A critical review of these will 
now be presented. 
Two-level Secure Re-routing (TSR) (Saha et al., 2012) 
This scheme, which is designed for the DSR protocol, detects attacks at the transport layer 
and responds to them at the network layer. TSR implements four modules, i.e. local 
supervision (LS), node isolation algorithm (NIA), congestion windows surveillance (CWS) 
and alternate route finder (ARF).  
 
Initially a data structure of one-hop neighbours is built at each node by broadcasting HELLO 
messages to which the neighbours respond. The neighbour nodes then exchange theirs lists 
of one-hop neighbours to which each node can supplement its data structure with also its 
two-hop neighbour information. After this process a packet will not be forwarded to a node 
that is not in the neighbour list and correspondingly a packet received from a fake neighbour 
will be dropped. Also if a routing packet is received where the previous hop field is not in 
the list of two-hop neighbours, the packet will be discarded.  
 
After successful neighbour discovery, the LS module can monitor incoming and outgoing 
traffic of neighbours. In TSR, a node that is a neighbour of two successive nodes A and B 
obtains the role of a watch node for A and B. The watch node records all information sent 
from A to B and stores it in a watch buffer. The stored information includes for example; 
packet source, type, identification, next hop and previous hop. The watch node examines 
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each packet that the monitored node forwards and compares it with the watch buffer. A 
malicious counter for each monitored node at the watch node is incremented for each 
detected malicious behaviour. 
 
When the malicious node counter for example, of monitored node B exceeds a threshold, the 
NIA module at the watch node revokes B from its list of neighbours and sends an alert 
message to all neighbours of B. This alert message is authenticated using a shared key 
between the watch node and all receivers of the alert.  
 
After receiving alert messages about a node B the receiver invokes the CWS module to verify 
if B really is malicious. This is a process performed at the transport layer where variations 
in the size of the TCP congestion window are used to detect abnormalities. If a node on a 
path is verified to be malicious the ARF module is invoked to find an alternative route 
between the source and the destination avoiding the malicious node.  
Secure Link State Routing Protocol (SLSP) (Papadimitratos & Haas, 2003) 
The main functionality of SLSP is to secure the discovery and distribution of link state 
information by using asymmetric keys. SLSP consists of three major steps: public key 
distribution, neighbour discovery and link state updates. Public keys are distributed between 
a node and all its neighbours. A central server for key distribution is thus not needed. Periodic 
hello messages, used in neighbour discovery, are signed using the private key of the sender. 
Signed link state update messages are identified by the IP address of the initiating node and 
include a sequence number. A node receiving a link update messages verifies the attached 
signature using the public key it received earlier during the public key distribution phase. 
The HC in the update message is protected by using a one-way hash chain.  
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DoS attacks are avoided in SLSP since each node maintains a priority ranking of their 
neighbour nodes based on the rate of control traffic they have observed. Neighbour nodes 
that generate update packets with the lowest rate are given highest priorities. Thus, malicious 
neighbours generating a huge amount of unnecessary update packets will get the lowest 
priority which limits the effectiveness of a DoS attack.   
Secure Routing Against Collusion (SRAC) (Yu et al., 2009) 
This is a secure routing protocol in which each node makes a routing decision based on the 
trust and performance of neighbour nodes. This trust is built by performing continuous 
observations on incoming and outgoing packets to/from neighbouring nodes.  Pair-wise 
secret keys between the source, intermediate nodes and the destination are then used to 
protect route discovery messages. The route discovery process is performed as follows; the 
source node chooses a random number which it signs with its private key and then a key 
hash function is used to protect the route discovery message.  The signature and the key hash 
value is appended to the route discovery message being sent hop by hop to the destination. 
In a route, the nodes with the highest level of trust are chosen first. If the trust level is the 
same for two or more nodes then the choice of path is based on HC information. If the HC 
is also the same, then the route is chosen based on the nodes’ performance.  
 
Due to strong cryptographic protection of routing packets in combination with monitoring 
of neighbour node behaviour, SRAC provides protection against modification, 
impersonation, rushing and replay attacks as well as selfish behaviour. However, RERR 
packages are not protected and thus SRAC is vulnerable to RERR packet related fabrication 
attacks.  
Trusted AODV (TAODV) (Li et al., 2004) 
The main purpose of TAODV is to provide a trust model for the AODV routing protocol  
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presented earlier in Section 2.2.2. It assumes each node is equipped with monitoring 
mechanisms or intrusion detection units so that it can check the behaviour of its neighbours. 
Trust among nodes is represented by an opinion derived from subjective logic (Jøsang, 
2001). These opinions are dynamic and updated frequently. A node performing normal 
communications will have its opinion from another node’s point of view increased and 
correspondingly decreased as a result of some malicious behaviour. TAODV also 
implements a trust recommendation mechanism to exchange trust information amongst 
nodes.  
 
TAODV recommends that a cryptographic security protocol, such as Ariadne (Hu, 2002), is 
used in combination with TAODV so that nodes can be authenticated e.g. through digital 
certificates, when the MANET is initiated and before nodes have established trust relations 
among one another through TAODV.  A prominent feature of TAODV is that there is no 
need to request and verify certificates once the trust relations are established, which 
significantly reduces the computational overheads.  
Friend-based Ad hoc Routing using Challenges to Establish Security (FACES) 
(Dhurandher et al., 2011) 
FACES is a MANET routing protocol where secure routing is established by means of four 
steps; i) challenge the neighbour, ii) rate friends, iii) share friends and iv) route through 
friends. Each node maintains an unauthenticated list containing nodes of which no security 
information is present, a question mark list with suspicious nodes and a friend list consisting 
of trusted nodes rated on a scale of 0 to 10.  
 
The challenge the neighbour step is used to establish trust for a new node and consists of a 
basic test to complete for proving honesty and integrity. Before the new node is challenged, 
it is listed in the neighbour nodes’ unauthenticated list. Then, one of the neighbouring nodes 
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challenges the new node by first performing the share friends stage to which the new node 
responds with either its friends list or unauthenticated list, if the friend list is empty. From 
the received friends list, the neighbouring node chooses a destination node to which it 
already has a safe route and exchanges challenge and response messages with that node 
through both the new node and a trusted intermediate node. Public key cryptography is 
applied for encrypting these messages. If the responses received from both the trusted 
intermediate node and the new node are the same then the neighbouring node adds the new 
node to the bottom of its friend list. As a result of this procedure the neighbouring node can 
ensure that the new node behaves genuinely, at least initially. If no response is received from 
the new node or if the response received from the new node does not match the one received 
from the trusted intermediate node then is considered suspicious and added to the question 
mark list.  
 
Nodes on the friends list are rated on a scale of 0 to 10 and has three classes of ratings, i.e. 
data rating (DR) based on the amount of data a friend node has successfully transferred, 
friend rating (FR) based on how other nodes have rated the same friend node, and net rating 
(NR) which is a combination of DR and FR. In FACES, new routes are requested on demand 
but challenges, friend sharing and rating are periodic processes which renders FACES a 
hybrid routing protocol. 
2.5. Summary 
This Chapter has presented an overview of the most common MANET routing protocols, 
routing attacks, and a critical evaluation of the well-known secure MANET routing 
protocols. Originally routing protocols were designed without taking security into account, 
so secure routing protocols have tended to be introduced as extensions to existing protocols. 
These are mainly divided into three categories; cryptography based, reputation based and 
their combination. All the reviewed routing protocols and the secure extensions are 
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summarised in Table 2.1 while their routing attack protection capabilities are comparatively 
evaluated in Table 2.2.    
 
Table 2.1: Well-known MANET routing protocols and their secure extensions.  
Routing protocol 
Type 
Routing 
protocol base 
Secure routing protocol 
Cryptography 
based 
Reputation 
based 
Cryptography 
& reputation 
based 
Reactive 
AODV 
SAODV 
SAR 
CORE 
FrAODV 
TAODV 
DSR Ariadne 
CONFIDANT 
TSR 
 
AODV/DSR   SRAC 
- ARAN   
Proactive 
DSDV SEAD   
OLSR   SLSP 
Hybrid 
ZRP SRP   
-   FACES 
 
 
Table 2.2: Comparative evaluation of the most well-known secure routing protocols and their key 
protection attributes.  
 
Secure routing protocols based on cryptography, typically require each node in the network 
to cryptographically authenticate itself. For example Ariadne, ARAN, and SAR provide 
protection against modification, fabrication, impersonation, rushing and PM wormhole 
attacks, where malicious nodes need to read and modify routing packets for the attack to 
succeed. However, HM wormholes cannot be detected using cryptography since they do not 
modify any routing packets. Cryptography-based protocols also assume that none of the 
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authenticated nodes are malicious. In a MANET environment where it is straightforward to 
discern legitimate users/nodes from others, such as in a military or small company MANET, 
trust relations are easy to set up and security measures based on cryptography are 
correspondingly straightforward to realise.  
 
In contrast, in a dynamic large-scale MANET where a multitude of nodes are arbitrarily 
joining and leaving the network, it is impractical to predict whether a node will act 
maliciously or legitimately without having prior knowledge of its behaviour. Another 
drawback of using cryptography is that trusted third parties are needed, including 
certification authorities to establish trust in certificates and centralised key distribution 
mechanisms to deliver shared secret keys to nodes which is not congruent with the 
infrastructure-less nature of MANETs and are impractical in highly dynamic topologies. 
Furthermore, on hardware restricted devices, such as small sensors, cryptography cause a 
high computational overhead. Notable in the Table 2.2 evaluation is that it is assumed that 
selfish nodes are legitimate and thus cryptography based secure routing protocols cannot 
detect them. 
 
An alternative approach to building up trust to other nodes is based on their reputation. To 
detect selfish nodes and modification attacks the communication activity of each node can 
be monitored as proposed in CONFIDANT, CORE, and FrAODV.  If it is identified that a 
certain neighbour node is not forwarding routing packets or it falsely modifies routing 
packets, then its trust level will be decreased and omitted during future routing discovery 
procedures. However, these protocols have no mechanisms for authenticating nodes or 
routing messages and thus they are vulnerable to impersonation, fabrication, rushing and 
replay attacks where malicious nodes neither drop nor falsely modify routing packets. To 
address this limitation, several secure routing protocols which are a combination of 
cryptography and reputation have been proposed, such as TSR, SLSP, SRAC, TAODV, and 
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FACES. Another challenge to the real-world adoption of reputation-based mechanisms is 
that they impose extra network overheads, as they typically involve MANET nodes 
operating in promiscuous mode. A promiscuous node is one which analyses all received 
packets, including those addressed to other nodes, in order to monitor the behaviour of its 
neighbours.  
 
A common limitation of all evaluated secure MANET routing protocols is that they do not 
provide complete protection from wormhole attacks. All protocols requiring authentication 
of each intermediate node, such as ARAN, SAR, SLSP, SRAC and TAODV, prevent the 
formation of a PM wormhole by assuming an authenticated node is not malicious. In 
contrast, HM wormholes are not detected based on encryption since these do not need to 
either read or modify routing packets.  The Ariadne protocol exceptionally also detects HM 
wormholes by including a timestamp in the routing packets to measure the time-of-flight of 
the routing packets between two neighbours, but it impractically requires tightly 
synchronized clocks.  
 
These observations provided the motivation for doing further research into wormhole attack 
detection in MANETs. The research area, has in recent years been particularly topical due 
to the severity and corresponding challenges in accurately detecting wormhole attacks and 
many security extensions to routing protocols have emerged which directly focus on 
wormhole attack detection.  In the next Chapter, wormhole attacks and their impact on 
MANET routing security will be examined in detail, with a rigorous literature review on 
wormhole detection strategies being presented.   
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3. WORMHOLE ATTACK DETECTION: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1. Introduction 
From a MANET perspective, wormholes are especially difficult to detect for two key 
reasons. Firstly there is the latent variability in the environment in terms of the number of 
users, their locations, and the applications and services they are executing. A MANET can 
operate as either a closed network, where a legitimate node may easily be separated from an 
unauthorized node, or alternatively as a highly dynamic network exhibiting considerable 
intermittent nodal connectivity making it very challenging to distinguish malicious from 
legitimate nodes. Furthermore, network devices can vary from small energy constrained 
computing devices with limited hardware capability to powerful personal computers. The 
second reason is the diversity of feasible wormhole attacks, i.e., participation mode (PM), 
hidden mode (HM), in-band (I-B) and out-of-band (O-B) channels. Each wormhole type has 
its distinct characteristic providing the opportunity to launch the attack in many different 
modes, with each mode imposing its own set of challenges for any detection mechanism. In 
addition, cognizance of the incidences of erroneous wormhole identification, so called false 
positive (FP) must also be considered in any proposed detection paradigm.   
 
During the last decade, a lot of research has focused on wormhole attack detection, on the 
distinctive features of an attack, and on the behaviour of both the network and specific nodes 
when a MANET is under attack (Gupta & Gupta, 2014; Khan et al., 2013). In the next 
Section, state-of-the-art wormhole detection methods are reviewed and critically evaluated.   
3.2. Classification of Wormhole Detection Proposals  
Typical features that have been utilized in wormhole detection schemes are RSSI, number 
of neighbours, network visualization, frequency of node/link appearances in routes, location 
information and packet delay. Some schemes also utilize a combination of the above 
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mentioned features for achieving more robust wormhole attack detection. The 
appropriateness of these individual features for detecting the different wormhole variants 
and examples of wormhole detection methods based on these features will now be critiqued. 
3.2.1.  Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) 
In Jain et al. (2012) a scheme based on wireless channel characteristics is proposed for 
detecting and avoiding wormhole attacks. The basis is that when two nodes send data frames 
to each other during a short time period, the frames will be received with similar RSSI values 
and these values can be correlated with the communication partner. Correspondingly, when 
a node communicates with several artificial neighbours through the same HM wormhole 
link, then the RSSI values for the frames received from all neighbours will be similar and 
can thus not be correlated with the neighbours. This observation can be utilized for wormhole 
attack detection either during the neighbour/route discovery phase or during the whole 
duration of transmission of data packets between two nodes to build up a trust metric. In 
order to achieve optimal wormhole attack detection by analysing RSSI, multiple data frame 
exchanges are required so the trust metric method is significantly more robust. Some 
assumptions concerning the wireless channel must be upheld however, namely that it is 
symmetric between each node pair, and while this may be reasonable for a static network or 
in a network where there is low node mobility, for a dynamic MANET it is not a viable 
solution.  
 
A similar protocol, called secure channel reciprocity-based wormhole detection 
(SCREWED) is proposed in Krentz & Wunder (2014) to detect HM wormholes in IPv6 over 
low-power wireless personal area networks. In SCREWED the assumption for symmetric 
RSSI is relaxed by using alternative channel reciprocity metric. SCREWED improves 
wormhole and reduces false positive detection compared with Jain et al. (2012) by using 
channel hopping, randomized transmission powers, message integrity codes and a special 
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replay protection mechanism. However, neither of these two protocols is capable of 
detecting PM wormholes since these always appear in a network as legitimate neighbours 
and therefore they are not viable for fulfilling the overarching research question.  
3.2.2.  Neighbour Count  
A statistical wormhole apprehension using neighbours (SWAN) (Song et al., 2012) 
algorithm has been proposed which is based on the observation that the number of 1-hop 
neighbours is significantly higher for a node placed in a region close to a HM wormhole than 
when placed in a wormhole-free region. When a node moves into a wormhole infected region 
it experiences a rapid increase in the number of neighbours, and this irregularity in the 
number of neighbour nodes is detected using an outlier detection algorithm. This approach 
however, is not able to detect PM wormholes since such wormholes do not affect the number 
of 1-hop neighbours. Furthermore, SWAN only identifies a wormhole infected region and 
not the exact infected route or the malicious nodes.  
3.2.3.  Network Visualization  
The main idea of network visualization based wormhole detection schemes is to collect 
connectivity information from each node in the network, using for example, signal strength 
or neighbour information, and then to visually recreate the network to identify anomalies in 
its structure. Since the whole network can be examined, and not only the neighbourhood of 
a specific node, both PM and HM wormholes are detected independently of the connectivity 
link used, i.e. I-B or O-B. Some of these schemes will now be critically evaluated.  
Multi-dimensional Scaling Visualization of Wormhole (MDS-VOW) (Wang & 
Bhargava, 2004) 
MDS-VOW is a centralized wormhole defence mechanism proposed for sensor networks. 
All network nodes estimate the distances to their neighbours based on signal strengths, and 
these are all sent to a centralized controller which calculates the distances between all nodes 
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in the network using Dijkstra’s algorithm. The controller then uses multi-dimensional 
scaling to graphically reconstruct the whole network. If the surface of the reconstructed 
network is flat, it indicates that no wormhole exists. If the surface between two nodes is 
warped, then a wormhole is suspected to exist. However the need for a centralized controller 
is unrealistic because this compromises the essential self-configuring and infrastructure-less 
features of a MANET. 
Topological Detection (Dong et al., 2011) 
This approach is similar to MDS-VOW but includes the enhancement that no centralized 
controller is needed. Instead, wormhole detection is based on a distributed approach 
completely relying on network connectivity information. Network nodes are basically 
exchanging neighbour connectivity information between each other and are then able to find 
anomalies in the network topology by analysing a connectivity graph.  However, this scheme 
places a high overhead on network nodes since connectivity information must be 
periodically exchanged.      
WormPlanar (Lu et al., 2013) 
WormPlanar is a topology based wormhole detection using planarization to reflect essential 
changes in the network topology caused by wormholes based on only local connectivity 
information. Each node gathers k-hop neighbourhood information before applying a 
planarization algorithm (Dong et al., 2013) on the neighbourhood subgraph of each node. 
The authors have observed through simulations that k = 5 is sufficient to achieve good 
wormhole detection results. Planarization simply means redrawing the neighbourhood sub-
graph in such a way that when drawing a line between each connected node pair, none of the 
lines intersect each other. In Dong et al. (2013) it has been proven that a connected planar 
topology can be extracted from a normal network sub-graph by using the planarization 
algorithm while the algorithm will fail when a wormhole attack is present in the sub-graph. 
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Under normal circumstances the neighbourhood of a node would expand continuously 
around it, while if it is a wormhole node or close to an end of a wormhole, its neighbourhood 
would expand at the two ends of the wormhole link.  Each node that fails to obtain a planar 
topology is considered as a suspect wormhole node. Finally, possible FP detections are 
removed by performing a refinement process where all suspected nodes are filtered by two 
simple wormhole attack conditions. For instance, legitimate nodes located close to one of 
the ends of the wormhole link will not pass the planarity test and so are falsely suspected as 
being wormhole nodes.  
 
WormPlanar provides a reasonable detection performance for all types of wormholes, 
though it is highly dependent on the node density in the network. For example, the 
requirement for 100% wormhole detection in a randomly deployed network is that the 
average amount of 1-hop neighbours per node is at least 10 (Lu et al., 2013). So, if a 
wormhole link is the only connection link between two portions of a MANET, then the 
detection algorithms will fail.  
3.2.4.  Frequency of Node Appearances in Routes 
These wormhole detection approaches are based on the fact that wormhole nodes typically 
attract significantly more network traffic than legitimate nodes. Therefore, wormhole nodes 
appear more frequently in routing tables than legitimate nodes.  Examples of such wormhole 
detection schemes are statistical analysis of multipath (SAM) (Qian et al., 2005), wormhole 
avoidance routing protocol (WARP) (Su, 2010), and the wormhole avoidance scheme based 
on route participation cost (Azer et al., 2009). These will be now be surveyed. 
Statistical Analysis of Multipath (SAM) (Qian et al., 2005) 
SAM detects wormhole attacks in multipath routing protocols such as DSR. The relative 
frequency of each link that appears in all obtained routes for one route discovery is  
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calculated, and the link with the highest relative frequency identified as a wormhole link.  
Wormhole Avoidance Routing Protocol (WARP) (Su, 2010) 
This is an AODV-based protocol where legitimate nodes are able to discover wormhole 
nodes with abnormal path attractions. If the wormhole node appears in more routes than a 
certain threshold value in the neighbour’s routing table, then the wormhole node will be 
avoided in future communication. Hence, the wormhole node will gradually become isolated 
by neighbouring nodes and eventually be quarantined by the full network. 
Wormhole Avoidance based on Route Participation Cost Analysis (Azer et al., 2009) 
This is a wormhole prevention extension to AODV where each node is assigned a cost 
according to the number of times it has participated in routing for a certain destination. The 
route with the minimum cost is then always chosen during route discovery. As a result, a 
wormhole node is unable to attract traffic all the time. This solution, however, does not detect 
either the wormhole route or the malicious nodes and it also increases the delay compared 
to the default AODV protocol.   
 
A common and crucial limitation considering their potentials for answering the main 
research question is that these schemes can only detect PM wormholes because HM 
wormhole nodes never appear in any obtained route. Furthermore, they rely upon the 
assumption that a particular wormhole node always appears in the network with the same 
identity. If a specific malicious node would for example alternate between several different 
identities it would be registered in routing tables with many different identities and thus a 
high frequency of routing participation of that node would not so easily be discovered.    
3.2.5.  Hop Count 
Wormhole attacks typically offer a route with a lower hop count (HC) than legitimate routes 
and therefore they attract a high amount of network traffic. This feature is utilized in Multi 
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hop-count analysis (MHA) (Jen et al., 2009) which is a wormhole avoidance scheme 
designed as an extension to AODV. As a result of basic AODV route discovery, the route 
with smallest HC is obtained. MHA introduces a RREP number limit (RREPlim) variable 
defining the number of unique routes that need to be obtained during the route discovery 
process. If RREPlim > 1, the source node stores the intermediate nodes of the discovered route 
in a so-called graylist which is distributed to all other nodes in the network along with a 
second route discovery. An intermediate node receiving a graylist broadcast message checks 
whether the previous hop is in the graylist. If it is, then the broadcast message is dropped. If 
not, the message will be treated as a normal AODV RREQ message. As a result of graylist 
broadcast, the source node obtains an alternative route to the destination, consisting of other 
intermediate nodes than the ones in the previously obtained route. The graylist broadcast 
procedure is repeated as long as the number of discovered routes is less than the RREPlim 
value.  At the end of the graylist broadcast procedure, the HC values of the obtained routes 
are compared and a route with a significantly lower HC than other obtained routes will be 
avoided during data communications.  
 
In the context of the overarching research question defined in Chapter 1, MHA is an 
attractive solution since it is computationally lightweight, only the source node needs to 
execute the detection algorithm, no additional hardware is required and it is independent of 
the wormhole type. As a consequence, MHA will be used as one of the comparators in the 
critical evaluation of the new wormhole detection framework presented in this thesis. The 
major weakness of MHA is that it relies on the fact that the wormhole route will always have 
the smallest HC which is not necessarily true in a real world network topology, where source 
and the destination nodes are not always located close to each end of the wormhole link. The 
example in Figure 3.1 illustrates this problem where A is the source node, D is the destination 
node, while E and F form a PM O-B wormhole.  
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Figure 3.1: MANET topology example including source node A and destination node D where MHA 
fails to detect a PM O-B wormhole formed by nodes E and F. 
 
In this case, the HC of the shortest route is 2 (AHD), while the alternative route HC = 
6 (ABCGEFD) results in MHA preventing packets from being routed through 
H since that route has a significantly lower HC than the wormhole infected route. Therefore, 
in a real world MANET where nodes are uniformly distributed, MHA causes many FP 
detections.  
3.2.6.  Node Location 
Since the purpose of a wormhole attack is to create the illusion that two distant nodes or 
network regions are neighbours it is natural to counter such an attack by analysing the 
geographical locations of the nodes in the network. In this Section, a review of some 
wormhole detection schemes based on location information is presented.  
Geographical Leash (Hu et al., 2003) 
A Geographical leash ensures that the recipient of a packet is within a certain distance from 
the sender. It is based on the assumption that all nodes know their own locations and have 
“loosely” synchronized clocks. The sending node adds to every packet a leash, including its 
geographical position and the time when the packet was sent. The node that receives the 
packet then compares the leash values with its own geographical position and time of 
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reception. If the nodes are located further away than a threshold (maximum radio range 
between two nodes) a wormhole is suspected to exist between the sender and receiver. This 
type of geographical leash is only effective however for HM wormholes since the distance 
is only validated between two neighbours, and not over several hops as would be required 
for PM wormhole detection.    
Route Packet Leash (Wang et al., 2006) 
A node location-based approach similar to geographical leashes is proposed to detect 
anomalies in neighbour relations. Each node forwarding a RREQ inserts a time stamp and 
its location information into the routing packet. This information is secured with a MAC. 
When the destination node receives a RREQ it checks the positions of all intermediate nodes 
on the route and if two nodes are out of communication range from each other, then a 
wormhole is suspected. This mechanism is capable of detecting all types of wormholes (HM, 
PM, I-B, and O-B) with the underlying assumptions that the source and destination have a 
trusted relationship, that all intermediate nodes have access to their location information, and 
that node clocks are “loosely” synchronized. 
Simple and Efficient End-to-End Protocol (SEEEP) (Gupta & Khurana, 2008) and 
First End-to-End Protocol with Variable Ranges (FEEPVR) (Khurana & Gupta, 
2008) 
Two other approaches which adopt the same principle are SEEEP and FEEPVR. In these 
protocols a route is suspected to be under wormhole attack if the route HC is small in relation 
to the route distance and the node radio ranges. SEEEP and FEEPVR also provide defence 
against PM wormhole nodes, which present false HC values, by requiring each intermediate 
node to include its ID and MAC (calculated by a secret key shared by itself and the 
destination) to a traversed hop list (THL). However, this requires every node to share a secret 
key with every other node in the network, which makes them impractical for dynamic 
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MANET environments. To check whether every node provides correct location information, 
the destination node checks from the received THL whether every two consecutive 
intermediate nodes are in the communication range of each other. All checks are performed 
by the destination node.      
A Range-free Localization Scheme (García-Otero & Población-Hernández, 2012) 
This scheme is proposed for detecting wormhole attacks in WSNs where only certain 
MANET nodes are required to know their exact locations. This scheme can be integrated 
within any WSN localization protocol and can operate either during the localization 
procedure or be used as validating already estimated positions after the localization process. 
An arbitrary node i can estimate its position with the help of anchor nodes and RSSI analysis 
of their wireless signals. An anchor node is a device having exact location information and 
is directly connected to node i. It must also be in direct communication range with at least 3 
other anchor nodes and be able to obtain RSSI values for these connection links to estimate 
its position. By estimating its position, each node is able to detect HM wormholes trying to 
make two distant regions of a WSN appear adjacent.  The authors showed through 
simulations that the proposed scheme is effective under good channel conditions, though the 
wormhole detection performance degrades in the presence of shadowing effects that occur 
in non-LOS environments.     
 
Detection methods based on location information are effective on all types of wormholes as 
long as each node has a positioning device and is able to provide accurate location 
information. However, the use of a positioning device, such as global positioning system 
(GPS), is impractical, especially in WSNs consisting of hardware restricted computing 
devices. Even in a MANET consisting of more powerful device like smart phones or tablet 
computers, the GPS device leads to high battery consumption and if the MANET is located 
indoors, GPS devices are unable to receive accurate position information. Even though the 
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range-free localisation scheme slightly relaxes the assumption that each node is aware of its 
exact location, it still requires in practice that the majority of the nodes are located outdoors 
and equipped with positioning devices. For these reasons, location based detection schemes 
have not been considered for further study in this thesis.   
3.2.7.  Packet Delay  
The rationale behind packet delay based countermeasures is to estimate either the average 
distance per hop or the distance between two neighbour nodes on a route by measuring the 
delay of transmitting a packet (typically routing packet) to another node. A route having a 
large delay in relation to the HC or a hop delay being significantly larger than others can 
indicate a wormhole. There now follows a critical evaluation of some existing packet delay 
countermeasures. 
Temporal Packet Leash (Hu et al., 2003) 
The basic idea of a temporal packet leash is to define an upper limit on the lifetime of a 
packet to restrict the maximum distance DMAX it can travel. When a node sends a packet at 
local time tloc1 it sets the packet expiration time to 𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝 = 𝑡𝑙𝑜𝑐1 +
𝐷𝑀𝐴𝑋
𝑆
− ∆ where S is the 
propagation speed of the wireless signal (i.e. the speed of light = 3∙108 m/s) and ∆ is the 
maximum time synchronization error. A receiver at which the packet arrives at local time 
tloc2 suspects that a wormhole exists between the sender and the receiver and drops the packet 
if texp > tloc2.  The texp value must be protected to prevent it from being altered by a wormhole 
node with MACs, digital signatures and hash chains being proposed for this purpose.  
 
While the temporal packet leash is an effective method for detecting HM wormholes, it 
cannot detect PM wormholes because these appear in routes as legitimate neighbours and 
therefore they can easily ignore the packet leashes. Ariadne (Hu, 2002) on the other hand 
(see Section 2.4.1) uses the TIK protocol for implementing temporal packet leashes for 
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detecting HM wormholes and uses symmetric keys for authenticating all intermediate nodes 
to prevent PM wormholes.  Another limitation of packet leashes is that they require tight 
clock synchronization, which is an impractical restriction in a heterogeneous MANET.  
Timing-based Countermeasure (Khabbazian et al., 2009) 
The timing-based countermeasure eliminates the need of clock synchronization in temporal 
packet leashes. Each node in the network validates its neighbours by an exchange of two 
signed messages as illustrated in Figure 3.2.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Exchange of Hello messages between nodes A and B. 
 
Suppose node A wants to verify that node B is its neighbour. Node A sends a Hello message 
(broadcasted to all neighbours), to which B responds with its own Hello message. Both nodes 
then send a Follow-Up message after receiving a Hello message (see Figure 3.3). When node 
A receives the Follow-Up message from node B it firstly verifies the signature of B and 
checks if the received nonce is the same as the one A sent in its Hello message. If both 
verifications are successful, node A can accept node B as neighbour provided         
(𝑡𝐴𝐵−𝑡𝐴)−(𝑡𝐵−𝑡𝐵𝐴)
2
∗ 𝑆 ≤ 𝑅 where R is the maximum node radio range. This solution though 
is similar to temporal packet leashes, in only being effective against HM wormholes since 
PM wormhole nodes can easily ignore the neighbour validation process. Additionally, since 
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every node in the network is required to execute a signature and a signature verification 
operation for every routing packet it both receives and forwards. This imposes a significant 
high load upon the network devices, many of which will have low processing capacity and 
be energy constrained. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Exchange of Follow-Up messages between nodes A and B. 
 
However, the underlying concept of time measurement, attractive due to its accuracy and 
independence of synchronized clocks, provided the motivation to investigate in greater 
depth, how this concept could be extended to detect PM wormholes. This partially formed 
the basis of the new TTHCA wormhole detection model which will be introduced in Chapter 
5.  
Two-hop Neighbour Discovery (Lee et al., 2008) 
This is a packet delay and cryptography based scheme proposed to detect both HM and PM 
wormholes. Each node must maintain a list of valid 1-hop and 2-hop neighbours and set up 
a session key with each of them. Neighbours are validated by broadcasting control messages 
over 2 hops. All 1-hop and 2-hop neighbours responding to the broadcast message within a 
certain time interval are considered valid. Every node sending or forwarding routing 
messages must include its identity and a MAC in the message. A node receiving a routing 
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message checks whether it was sent from a valid 1-hop or 2-hop neighbour by validating the 
MAC. If a routing message with an invalid MAC is received a wormhole attack is suspected.  
 
This scheme is more effective than temporal packet leashes and the timing-based 
countermeasure described previously, since it can also detect PM wormholes, but involves 
heavy cryptographic operations. Moreover, to continually monitor both 1-hop and 2-hop 
neighbours is a time consuming process, especially if the network topology is highly 
dynamic. Also a PM O-B wormhole cannot be effectively detected by solely analysing the 
time delay of the exchange of neighbour broadcast and acknowledge messages, because the 
time delay on such a wormhole link is negligibly small compared to the variation in packet 
processing delays on the 1-hop and 2-hop neighbours.  
Delay per Hop Indicator (DelPHI) (Chiu & Lui, 2006) 
The purpose of the DelPHI technique is to find all available routes between a source and a 
destination by using a modified AODV route discovery procedure. During this procedure, 
the RTT and HC of each route are firstly measured and then the delay per hop (DPH) 
calculated as 𝐷𝑃𝐻𝐼 =
𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐼
2𝐻𝐶𝐼
. A wormhole route is identified based on the assumption that a 
route traversing a tunnelled wormhole link has a significantly higher DPH than a normal 
route. Thus, the DPH values of all routes are ranked in descending order and a wormhole 
suspected if any (DPHI+1 – DPHI) > T, where T is the maximum permissible difference 
between two adjacent DPH values.  
 
DelPHI is an attractive detection solution since it is lightweight in terms of both 
computational complexity and network load, and it is capable of detecting both HM and PM 
wormhole nodes, provided the wormhole link is established using an I-B channel. However, 
O-B wormholes cannot be effectively detected by analysing DPH, because the time delay on 
such a wormhole link is negligibly small compared to the variation in packet processing 
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delays on intermediate nodes. Furthermore, as shown in Chiu & Lui (2006), the wormhole 
link must be up to 8 hops in most scenarios before 100% detection is achieved. Despite these 
limitations, DelPHI helped frame the motivation behind the development of TTHCA to fulfil 
Objective 1, and is consistently applied as a comparator in the critical analysis of the 
performance of TTHCA in Chapter 5.  
Wormhole Attack Prevention (WAP) (Choi et al., 2008) 
This is a more advanced version of DelPHI and is designed to not only detect wormhole 
routes but also prevent malicious nodes reappearing in routes. Every node, initiating or 
forwarding a RREQ, executes a neighbour node monitoring procedure to detect HM 
wormholes. As soon as a node sends a RREQ packet it calculates a wormhole prevention 
timer (WPT) as 𝑊𝑃𝑇 =
2𝑅
𝑆
 and waits for the retransmission of the neighbour node. WPT is 
basically a value defining the maximum time a packet is allowed to travel from the sender 
node to a neighbour node and back to the sender. If the time from sending the RREQ until 
overhearing the retransmission of the RREQ message by the neighbour is higher than WPT, 
a HM wormhole link can be considered to exist between the sender and the neighbour node 
(which in this case is a fake neighbour). This wormhole detection procedure is performed by 
every node sending or forwarding a RREQ during route discovery. To detect PM wormholes, 
WAP uses a technique similar to DelPHI by calculating a DPH value for every available 
route to a destination. If DPH > WPT for a specific route, the route is suspected to include a 
PM wormhole link. This analysis is not only performed at the source, as in DelPHI, but on 
every intermediate node receiving a RREP. Thus, if DPH at node #i > WPT then nodes #i+1 
and #i+2 are pinpointed as PM wormhole nodes and placed in a blacklist. Nodes on the 
blacklist are ignored in future route discovery procedures and hence the PM wormhole nodes 
are prevented from reappearing in routes.   
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Transmission Time based Mechanism (TTM) (Tran et al., 2007) 
TTM is a RTT-based wormhole detection scheme, similar to WAP and DelPHI, which 
measures and analyses RTT between each successive node (RTTi,i+1). The source and each 
intermediate node measures RTT between itself and the destination (RTTi), i.e. the time from 
sending/forwarding a RREQ ({TRREQs}i) until receiving the corresponding RREP ({TRREPr}i). 
Each RTTi value (RTTi = {TRREPr}i - {TRREQs}i) is then delivered to the source node in an 
additional parameter in the AODV RREP packet. Based on the RTTi values received in the 
RREP, the source calculates the RTT between each two successive nodes on the path as 
RTTi,i+1 = RTTi - RTTi+1. A wormhole is detected using the assumption that RTTi,i+1 is 
significantly higher between two successive nodes connected to a wormhole link than for 
any legitimate hop. The threshold for the maximum permissible RTTi,i+1 is empirically 
estimated via simulations.  
Wormhole Attack Detection Using Hop Latency and Adjoining Node Analysis (WAD-
HLA) (Vandana & Devaraj, 2013) 
DelPHI, WAP and TTM have all the recurring limitation that packet processing time 
variations on nodes must be small to both achieve 100% wormhole detection and avoid 
unreasonably high FP detections. WAD-HLA attempts to decrease the FP detections by 
combining hop RTT analysis with adjoining node analysis. Firstly, the RTT for each 
successive hop is measured and calculated in a similar manner to that in TTM. If any hop 
RTT is suspiciously high, then the route is considered as a potential wormhole infected route 
and the two successive nodes causing the high RTT value are considered as suspected 
wormhole nodes. A confirmation phase is then performed to ensure that the route really is 
wormhole infected by verifying if any adjoining node exists between the suspected 
wormhole nodes. If a node is identified along the path between suspect wormhole nodes, 
then a wormhole is confirmed. WAD-HLA still relies solely on hop RTT analysis for 
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wormhole detection however, and so exhibits the same limitations as DelPHI, WAP, and 
TTM. 
Analytical Hierarchy Process Methodology (Shi et al., 2013) 
This approach against wormhole attacks uses special nodes, called local most trustable 
(LMT) nodes, located close to the source and destination to perform the detection. The 
neighbours of the source and the destination with the largest weight values are elected as the 
LMT nodes. Weight values are calculated based on the relative stability, credit value and 
reciprocal of forward rate, where relative stability is evaluated based on the change rate of 
neighbors, the credit value is based on packet transmission behavior, and the reciprocal of 
forward rate is evaluated based on packet forwarding rate. Once the LMT nodes are elected 
for a specific source and destination node they perform the wormhole countermeasures for 
a route between that particular source and destination. A potential wormhole on a requested 
route is detected by comparing the HC value extracted from the RREP packet with a 
minimum HC value which is estimated based on the RTT and the mean transmission range 
of all nodes. The RTT of the route is measured by exchanging a hello request and reply 
message between the source LMT node and the destination LMT node after the source has 
received a RREP message. The route is considered wormhole infected if the route HC is less 
than the estimated minimum HC value. The motivation for introducing LMT nodes for 
wormhole detection, instead of using the source and the destination nodes, as in most other 
proposals is that the source and destination nodes cannot always be considered trustworthy. 
However, the process of calculating weight values and electing LMT nodes leads to a 
significant network overhead, especially if the topology is dynamic.  
Neighbour Probe Acknowledge (NPA) (Zhou et al., 2012) 
NPA is an alternative RTT-based approach aimed at improving the wormhole detection 
performance of related methods by analysing the standard deviation of RTT (stdev(RTT)) 
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instead of RTT. The authors have observed through theoretical analysis and experimental 
results that this is a significantly more effective metric for identifying the existence of a 
wormhole than RTT. NPA is designed for wireless Mesh networks and is triggered when a 
node detects a change in the network topology. RTT values are obtained locally by each 
node exchanging probe messages with its neighbours n times. A large stdev(RTT) indicates 
that two neighbours are connected through a wormhole. The performance of NPA has been 
evaluated in a real test bed consisting of a HM wormhole with an O-B link through a network 
cable and the results reveal that NPA performs significantly better than DelPHI both in terms 
of wormhole and FP detection. However, since the RTT is only measured on a 
neighbourhood basis, PM wormholes cannot be detected.  NPA also tends to increase the 
network overheads, especially in highly dynamic networks because of the multiple 
exchanges of probe messages (typically 50) for each change in the topology. 
Modified TTM (in this thesis it will be referred to as M-TTM) (Qazi et al., 2013) 
M-TTM is proposed to overcome the limitations of RTT-based methods. In addition to each 
node measuring hop RTT (RTTi,i+1) just as in TTM, each node also estimates the expected 
RTT to its next hop,  i.e. the sum of the RREQ and RREP packet processing times measured 
at the next hop and the maximum propagation delay (PDMAX). RTTi,i+1 is then compared with 
the estimated RTTi,i+1 and if it is significantly higher, a wormhole is suspected. M-TTM 
provides more robust wormhole attack detection than TTM and other RTT-based schemes, 
since packet processing times are taken into account in the RTT measurements. However, 
under certain conditions M-TTM has a number of limitations. Each node along a route must 
add four different timestamps to every routing packet to reflect the specific times incurred 
in receiving and forwarding RREQ and RREP packets. The assumptions underpinning how 
the estimated RTTi,i+1 is determined are also unrealistic, since PDMAX is presumed to be 1μs 
which correlates to a distance of about 300 m. In a real MANET, the PDMAX of a node will be 
dependent on both its hardware and surroundings, since in a LOS link PDMAX will be much 
57 
higher than when there are obstacles between nodes. Furthermore, applying a fixed 2 ms 
threshold for the maximum difference between the measured and expected RTT values 
means that not all wormhole types can be detected. If the MANET has a PM O-B wormhole 
for instance, where the propagation delay (PD) between the malicious nodes is the only extra 
delay incurred, RTTi,i+1 > expected RTTi,i+1 already indicates the presence of a wormhole 
since RTTi,i+1 excluding packet processing time at node #i+1 cannot be > 2PDMAX if nodes 
#i and #i+1 are legitimate.  
 
Despite the above mentioned limitations, the underlying concept of analysing the packet 
delay for each hop makes this solution attractive since it provides the base for more accurate 
wormhole attack detection compared to those analysing the average delay per HC, such as 
DelPHI and TTHCA. Thus, this partially inspired the base for the new extended version of 
TTHCA, i.e. the TTpHA wormhole detection model which will be introduced in Chapter 6 
for fulfilling research Objective 2. M-TTM is thus also applied as a comparator in the critical 
analysis of the performance of TTpHA. 
3.2.8.  Wormhole Detection Proposals Combining Multiple Features 
Some detection proposals analyse multiple wormhole related features in order to achieve 
more accurate detection performance. They typically operate in a similar manner to IDS and 
constantly monitor the network behaviour, rather than concentrating on wormhole detection 
during the route discovery process. A critical review of wormhole detection schemes that 
fall into this category is now presented.  
Decentralized Intrusion Detection Scheme (Azer et al., 2010) 
In this scheme, network monitors are measuring suspected parameters for a wormhole attack, 
such as the speed of arrival per hop of packets, transmission power of nodes, and the actual 
locations of a source and destination node. These parameters are then used by each node to 
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make a central decision about the behaviour of network nodes according to a chosen decision 
scheme. The AODV protocol is modified to allow route selection based on nodes’ opinions 
of each other instead of the lowest HC.  This scheme is attractive to MANETs since the 
actual wormhole detection method is simple and incurs no computational cost. The 
disadvantage is that it significantly increases the end-to-end delay during routing. 
Furthermore, the need for network monitors makes the scheme impractical in dynamic 
MANETs.  
Biologically Inspired Artificial Intrusion Detection System (BAIDS) (Sundararajan et 
al., 2014) 
BAIDS is biologically inspired in that it learns normal MANET node behaviour in order to 
identify abnormal behaviour, mimicking the way the human body is able to respond to 
foreign antigens. In BAIDS, which is designed as an extension for DSR, AODV and DSDV, 
each MANET node takes part in the intrusion detection, so no external monitoring nodes are 
needed. Each node is responsible for detecting malicious behaviour locally and 
independently, but neighbouring nodes can also work together to examine the network in a 
broader range. The goal with BAIDS is to not only detect misbehaving nodes but also to 
prevent them from taking part of the routing once detected.  
 
In BAIDS, each node collects data, such as RREQ packets sent, RREQ packets received, 
RREP packets sent, RREP packets received, and broken link error packets received. This 
data must be pre-processed into a certain format before intrusion detection can take place. 
The algorithm used to detect misbehaving nodes must be trained within a network where 
there is no malicious behaviour present, before it can distinguish between normal and 
malicious behaviour. The authors do not explicitly identify the wormhole type yet they claim 
that they have through simulations proved that BAIDS is able to detect wormholes with high 
accuracy.   
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The type of wormhole considered in this context can have a significant impact on the 
wormhole and FP detection performance as there is a risk that a legitimate node close to the 
end of a HM wormhole tunnel could be classified as malicious by a node at the other end of 
the wormhole tunnel if the HM wormhole nodes drop packets. In BAIDS, nodes only 
monitor packet transmission activity by their neighbours so a wormhole that is only 
established for MITM attack purposes (instead of disrupting network communications by 
dropping packets) will go undetected.  
Wormhole Detection Scheme based on Projection Pursuit (PP) (Cai et al., 2013) 
This is a statistical method that projects high-dimensional data onto low-dimensional 
subspace in order to find projections that reflect data structures and characteristics of the 
data.  It was observed that the following attribute information needed to be collected for the 
PP (Jones & Sibson, 1987) based wormhole detection mechanism: 
- Signal strength: since wormhole nodes often have higher signal strength due to 
the use of a directional antenna. 
- Throughput: since wormhole nodes typically attract large portions of network 
data. 
- Packet loss probability: as wormhole nodes typically start dropping packets once 
the wormhole is successfully established. 
- Forwarding delay: because wormhole nodes may process and forward packets 
in a slower phase than legitimate nodes since they have a higher load of packets 
to process.  
 
Network simulator version 2 (ns-2) is used to simulate AODV route discovery and data 
communication of N nodes. All four attributes described above are then collected from each 
network node. Before performing PP, the collected data is homogenised and optimized by a 
real coding genetic algorithm. Finally, the optimal projection direction is calculated by PP 
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resulting in security coefficient values for N nodes. A high security coefficient value means 
that the node is trusted and thus not a wormhole node. Correspondingly a low security 
coefficient value indicates that the node is malicious. PP provides robust wormhole attack 
detection since it examines several different wormhole features which makes the detection 
scheme versatile and capable of detecting different types of wormholes. The authors have 
not though taken HM wormholes into consideration in their performance analysis. HM 
wormholes can be detected by studying the same data attributes as for PM wormholes but 
they would lead to FP detections since legitimate neighbours of wormhole nodes would get 
low security coefficient values. Furthermore, the data collection and pre-processing phases 
cause a high network overhead.  
Pworm (Guoxing et al., 2014) 
This real-time passive scheme is proposed for detecting wormholes and locating wormhole 
nodes in WSNs. The detection and localization algorithm is based on the observation that 
wormholes attract a large amount of network traffic and after a wormhole link has been 
successfully set up, the average route HC in the MANET will decrease significantly. Another 
attribute that has been taken into account in Pworm is that wormhole nodes appear much 
more frequently in routes than legitimate nodes. Pworm consists of two major parts; topology 
collection during which routing information from the whole network is gathered and 
wormhole detection which is performed by the controller of the network, i.e. the sink node, 
by analysing changes in the collected routing information. The authors highlight Pworm as 
a lightweight solution in term of both network overheads and computational complexity 
since routing information is distributed passively to the sink together with other routing 
packets (no extra packets are needed) and the calculations needed for wormhole detection 
and wormhole node localisation are performed only at the sink node, which can be assumed 
to have adequate computational power. However, while Pworm suits well for static WSNs 
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it is not applicable in dynamic MANETs where the topology changes continuously and 
where controller nodes like sink nodes, do not exist.   
 
While these IDS like solutions are able to detect all wormhole types they all share a crucial 
limitation considering their viability for answering the overarching research question, i.e. 
the need for constantly monitoring the behaviour of the neighbours for building trust metrics 
or share connectivity information among the whole network for topology analysis purposes. 
This typically causes a high network overhead and a fairly static network environment is 
required.  
3.3. Summary 
In this Chapter, state-of-the-art wormhole detection solutions have been classified according 
to their detection strategy and their advantages as well as limitations have been critically 
analysed. The overall conclusion is that there is a lack of wormhole detection techniques 
providing accurate detection for all wormhole types without introducing either some 
impractical assumptions or the imposition of additional hardware, as well as at the same time 
being lightweight and applicable in different MANET scenarios. The review conclusively 
shows the lack of wormhole detection/prevention schemes that combine the beneficial 
features of existing schemes to provide a hybrid solution that cannot only be implemented 
across a wide range of MANET devices (from sensors to notebook computers), but crucially 
operate in diverse network environments (static, dynamic, small and scalable). Such 
solutions must incur minimal computational and network overheads, as well as route 
discovery delays. This provided the setting for the main thesis research question defined in 
Section 1.3. A summary of wormhole detection strategies and their main limitations in being 
able to fulfil the main research question is provided in Table 3.1. 
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Solutions analysing the delay in transmitting a routing/data packet either to the neighbours 
or over multiple hops and MHA which solely analyses route HC for multiple routes were 
identified as attractive solutions in the context of the overarching research question and were 
therefore selected for further study. 
 
Table 3.1: Common wormhole detection strategies and their main limitations.  
Analysed feature 
Wormhole Type 
Main limitations 
HM PM I-B O-B 
RSSI Yes No Yes Yes Unable to detect PM wormholes 
Neighbour count Yes No Yes Yes 
Only detects an HM wormhole infected 
region and not the exact infected route or 
malicious nodes.  
Network visualization Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Causes high network overhead and requires 
high node density. 
Frequency of node appearances No Yes Yes Yes 
Only PM wormhole nodes appear in routing 
tables.  
Location information Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Require all or a large part of the network 
nodes to be aware of their exact geographical 
positions.  
Multiple Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cause high network overhead and are 
typically limited to static MANET 
environments.  
 
The advantages of these solutions are typically that they are low cost in terms of both 
network and computational complexity, require no extra hardware, are topology independent 
and easy to implement. The wormhole detection capability and limitations/assumptions of 
the most attractive solutions within this category are summarized in Table 3.2. However, 
many of these approaches are based on unrealistic assumptions, such as low variations in 
packet processing delays due to RTT measurements, or instead impose fixed and impractical 
thresholds for the wormhole detection algorithm which prohibits them from detecting all 
wormhole attacks variants under flexible network conditions.  MHA on the other hand 
requires the source and destination node to be located close to the wormhole endpoints. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of wormhole detection solutions being particularly attractive in the context of the 
overreaching research question. 
Analysed feature Detection scheme/protocol 
Wormhole Type 
Limitations/assumptions 
HM PM I-B O-B 
HC MHA Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source and destination nodes must be located 
close to each end of the wormhole link. 
 
High FP rate. 
Packet delay 
Timing-based 
countermeasure  
Yes No Yes Yes 
Cryptographic trust relations between 
neighbouring nodes are required. 
DelPHI  Yes Yes Yes No 
Low packet processing time variations on 
network nodes.  
M-TTM  Yes Yes Yes No 
Wormhole detection threshold is based on 
impractical assumptions. 
 
While packet delay based methods in particular have detection advantages, this provided the 
motivation to further investigate whether a novel framework can be developed based solely 
on packet delay analysis, with crucially the assumptions on low radio range variations being 
relaxed and the wormhole detection performance, significantly improved. Packet delay 
based solutions have thus inspired the novel contributions of this thesis introduced in 
Chapters 5 to 7, but before presenting these innovations, the next Chapter discusses the 
research methodology adopted.  
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 1, a new unified wormhole detection framework has been proposed to address 
the overarching research question. This framework comprises three original inter-linked 
contributions in the form of the TTHCA, TTpHA and ∆TVE detection algorithms. To 
critically synthesise and analyse these specific contributions and evaluate their performance 
in comparison with the existing state-of-the-art detection solutions described in Chapter 3, a 
suitable research methodology must be adopted. The ideal approach to performance 
evaluation would be to implement and test the proposed framework in a real MANET 
environment or testbed.  The performance of the framework depends on several factors, 
amongst them being the wormhole attack type, node measurement accuracy, network size 
and environment, i.e. obstructed or line-of-sight (LOS). As a consequence, a major 
requirement on the flexibility and scalability of the environment has to be set, in order to 
ensure rigorous evaluation. Even though a real MANET testbed is in theory a viable option, 
large scale MANETs are currently not readily available and practical testbeds consisting of 
hundreds of nodes distributed over a large area are both time consuming and expensive to 
realise. Consequently, to undertake a critical performance analysis of the new wormhole 
detection framework, a pragmatic decision was made to initially design and develop a 
suitably robust MANET simulation environment, while realising that ultimately community 
expectations will be to apply and assess the framework within a real-world MANET context 
which will be discussed as a future work option in Chapter 8.  
 
In this Chapter, the simulation environment used for testing and evaluating the new 
framework’s performance is described. Various parameter settings which reflect different 
MANET environments and scenarios are formally defined, along with the relevant metrics 
and comparators used for performance evaluation. The strategies employed for validating 
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the correctness of all the algorithmic software implementations, and the verification of the 
statistical significance results are also presented. The next Section, provides a description of 
the adopted research methodology and details of the MANET simulation platform.   
4.2.  Overview of the Adopted Research Methodology and Simulation Platform 
A block diagram of the adopted research methodology is shown in Figure 4.1.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: A block diagram of the adopted research methodology and its various steps. 
 
The various steps in the methodology are summarised as follows: 
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1. A thorough literature review on MANET routing security (presented in Chapter 2) 
was performed and narrowed down to wormhole attack detection (Chapter 3) since 
wormholes represent one of the most severe threats to MANET routing. Limitations 
and key assumptions relating to existing state-of-the-art wormhole attack detection 
solutions have been identified and analysed.  
 
2. Step 1 provided the motivation and basis for the planning and designing phases of 
the new unified wormhole attack detection framework by testing and relaxing certain 
assumptions and where appropriate, addressing their identified limitations.  
 
3. Each algorithmic contribution to the framework was developed and implemented 
within a dedicated simulation environment (described in Section 4.3) which was used 
as the standard MANET testbed.  
 
4. Before undertaking a critical performance evaluation of each contribution, the code 
implementations were validated by correctness checks and by rigorous tests of the 
functionality. The validation methods used are presented in Section 4.5. 
 
5. The performance of each contribution was critically evaluated for a range of network 
scenarios, wormhole attack types, and node hardware capabilities using the set of 
performance metrics which are detailed in Section 4.4. Steps 2-5 are thus iterative, 
with new ideas and framework developments being trialled and rigorously tested to 
assess advancement of the framework towards the goal of satisfactorily fulfilling the 
research objectives underpinning the research question addressed by this thesis.   
 
To ensure an equitable and repeatable critical performance analysis of the new framework 
(Step 5), it needs to be implemented and tested under a wide range of conditions. As earlier 
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highlighted, a real-world MANET testbed would be ideal for providing trustworthy results. 
However, simulation environments offer greater flexibility as well as faster development 
cycles and verification iterations. They also importantly represent a more cost effective 
solution compared to having to construct a real MANET testbed. These were the main 
reasons to choose a simulation environment for development and performance analysis 
purposes of the new framework. 
 
Several different network simulators are available for realistic MANET simulation purposes 
with OPNET, GlomoSim, OMNeT++, and network simulator (ns) versions 1 to 3 being 
popular and widely-used examples (Mallapur & Patil, 2012). As a simulation platform for 
testing the new framework, ns-2 was chosen since it has been extensively used for MANET 
simulations and is widely accepted among the research community (Kurkowski, et al., 2005).  
ns-2 also provides powerful and flexible scripting and simulation setups, common routing 
protocols like AODV are implemented by default, and it supports easy implementation of 
multiple nodes and realistic mobility models (Sarkar & McHaney, 2012). ns-2 was installed 
on a PC with details of the computing platform specifications being given in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1: Detailed simulation platform specifications. 
Simulation software PC Specifications 
ns version 2.34 
Processor Intel ® CoreTM i3-2310M 2.10GHz 
RAM 8 Gb 
Hard Disk 167 Gb 
OS Debian 7.0 
 
A customised ns-2 plugin for simulating variable packet processing times was also designed 
and implemented in the simulation software to rigorously evaluate the performance of the 
∆TVE algorithm. This plugin was seamlessly incorporated into the simulation environment 
which was used throughout the performance analysis of the framework. This environment 
will now be formally detailed.  
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4.3. The Simulation Environment 
This Section describes the simulation environment, including relevant input parameters and 
simulation output data used for evaluating the performance of the wormhole detection 
framework in comparison with existing solutions. Several different test cases were designed, 
with each individual test case consisting of a series of specific parameter settings covering 
for example, the type and length of the wormhole, the environment, i.e. indoors or outdoors, 
and the ensuing implications for node radio ranges. The complete list of relevant simulation 
parameters is shown in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2: Relevant simulation parameters used for each test case. 
Parameter Settings 
Node wireless hardware IEEE 802.11n compliant 
Packet propagation speed (S) 3∙108 m/s 
Propagation Model  TwoRayGround  
(Goldsmith, 2005) 
Number of nodes N 
Network width W 
Network length L 
Wormhole length rwh 
Maximum radio range  R 
Number of infected (healthy) route 
samples 
NIR ( NHR) 
 
The simulation environment that has been developed assumes IEEE 802.11n compliant node 
hardware, providing a maximum radio range of 250 m when two communicating nodes are 
LOS (outdoors), and 70 m indoors, where the paths between nodes are assumed to be 
obstructed by obstacles such as walls (Barker et al., 2015). In this environment R=250 m, 
reflects an outdoor environment and correspondingly R = 70 m an indoor environment. For 
simplicity, the TwoRayGround propagation model is used throughout even though it was 
specifically designed for LOS. Instead, variations in node radio ranges are simulated by 
introducing a random instantaneous maximum radio range value Ri at each node, where 
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max(Ri) = R, so a node always has a circled coverage, but Ri can vary to reflect the impact 
of different obstacles around specific nodes and variabilities in antenna capability.  
  
Every test case included either a specific NIR for wormhole/time tampering detection 
evaluation or an NHR value for false positive (FP) detection evaluation. For each simulation 
run, all nodes except the wormhole nodes, were assigned new random positions. The node 
hardware, S value, and the propagation model were assumed fixed throughout, while 
parameters N, W, L, rwh, and R were varied in each test case. For wormhole detection 
evaluation two wormhole nodes were strategically placed in the centre, a specific distance 
(rwh) apart, to disrupt as much traffic as possible between all network nodes. All four 
wormhole variants were implemented, i.e. participation mode (PM), hidden mode (HM), in-
band (I-B), and out-of-band (O-B), with each being tested separately. The wormhole link 
delay twh for an O-B link was defined as rwh/S. This mirrors the circumstances where a 
wormhole with a direct wireless link is established between the two malicious nodes by 
means of a directional antenna. For I-B links, at the beginning of each simulation run, the 
shortest route between two wormhole nodes was firstly requested using AODV for 
tunnelling routing packets. In contrast, during the FP detection experiments, no wormholes 
were implemented in the network area.   
 
A visualisation output example of one simulation run is shown in Figure 4.2. with W = L = 
50 m, R0…19 = 10 m, rwh = 30 m, N = 20, node #2 as the source, and node #3 as the destination, 
while nodes #0 and #1 form a PM O-B wormhole. In this example the obtained route, i.e. 
#2#19#0#1#16#3, goes through the wormhole.  
 
To simulate node movements during the route discovery procedure the random waypoint 
mobility (RWM) model, introduced by Johnson & Maltz (1996) has been adopted. In RWM, 
each node selects a random destination within the simulation area and then moves towards 
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the destination along a straight line with a randomly selected speed. While several mobility 
models have been proposed, including random direction (Royer et al., 2001), random walk 
(Camp et al., 2002), and random Gauss-Markov (Liang & Haas, 1999), RWM is the most 
popular mobility model for evaluating MANET routing protocols, mainly due to its 
simplicity and wide availability (Gupta et al., 2013).   
 
 
Figure 4.2: A visual output of one simulation run example. 
 
One of the major contributions from the new wormhole detection framework involves the 
development of an algorithm for identifying time measurement tampering in wormhole 
detection with TTHCA and TTpHA. Time tampering means that malicious nodes provide 
fictive measurement values for the sum of the RREQ and RREP packet processing times 
(∆Ti) used in the PTT calculations. The processing time of a routing packet includes the 
packet service time (TS) and the queuing delay. These can vary because of diverse node 
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hardware and dissimilar traffic loads (ρ) on the nodes. One constraint on using ns-2 is that 
all nodes are assumed to have identical hardware, which means that packet processing delay 
variabilities are dependent only upon the traffic loads ρ of each node. As there is no 
straightforward way of introducing specific variation levels into either TS or ρ in the 
simulation environment, a special customised ns-2 plugin for simulating different ∆Ti values 
was therefore designed. This plugin, as with all standard protocol implementations in ns-2, 
was programmed in C++. When using this plugin, the packet processing time measurement 
process implemented by TTHCA and TTpHA, which occurs at the physical layer of each 
node, is replaced by the new time calculation procedure illustrated in Figure 4.3. In this 
procedure, the normal RREQ packet processing time ({∆TRREQ}i) calculation, i.e., the time 
between receiving and forwarding a RREQ packet ({TRREQs}i – {TRREQr}i), is replaced by a 
call to subroutine getPPTime which returns a packet processing delay value based on the 
given TS  and ρ values.  Full details of this customised ns-2 plugin will be presented in 
Chapter 7. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: The packet processing time measurement process at a node i when applying the custom ns-2 
plugin, using a RREQ as an example. 
 
The simulation output for each test case, comprises the number of correctly detected infected  
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routes (DC) for wormhole/time tampering evaluation and the number of healthy routes 
falsely detected as infected (DF) for FP detection evaluation. These parameters are used to 
calculate the performance metrics used with critical results evaluation which will now be 
defined.  
4.4. Performance Metrics and Evaluation 
To assess the wormhole, time tampering, and FP detection performance of the framework, 
the wormhole/time tampering detection rate and FP rate were determined separately in the 
simulation environment for several test MANET scenarios. These metrics have been widely 
used in related research papers for performance evaluation including in (Vandana & Devaraj, 
2013; Dong et al., 2011; Tran et al., 2007). To generate sufficient sample data for 
wormhole/time tampering detection evaluation for each test case, simulation runs were 
repeated until NIR different infected routes were collected. The wormhole/time tampering 
detection rate was then calculated as 
𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
𝐷𝐶
𝑁𝐼𝑅
 
(4.1)
The FP rate is correspondingly given by   
𝐹𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
𝐷𝐹
𝑁𝐻𝑅
 
(4.2)
where NHR is the number of collected healthy routes. To quantify the improvements in the 
wormhole/time tampering detection and FP rate performance of the new algorithms, a 
comparative performance analysis was undertaken with two established packet delay based 
solutions, namely DelPHI (Chiu & Lui, 2006) and M-TTM (Qazi et al., 2013). They were 
for evaluation purposes both implemented in the same simulation environment as the new 
framework. DelPHI is a natural choice as a comparator since it analyses the average packet 
DPH, except that DelPHI focuses on round trip time (RTT) rather than packet traversal time 
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(PTT) as in the new framework. Similarly M-TTM is used because it relies on PTT per hop 
analysis, though it makes a number of key network parameter value assumptions in its 
detection mechanism. These assumptions will be critically analysed and subsequently 
relaxed in the contribution Chapters. Finally, MHA was chosen as the comparator for 
TTHCA since it is an effective, existing hop count (HC) based solution that answers the 
overarching research question.   
 
No comparative solutions were available for the time tampering detection performance 
evaluation since ∆TVE is the only existing proposal for detecting time tampering attacks in 
packet delay based wormhole detection algorithms. In considering both wormhole and time 
tampering detection, the ultimate outcome would be a 100% detection rate and 0% FP rate 
thereby accomplishing maximum security and the best QoS level. However a more 
pragmatic choice of ground truths were made based upon the limitations of related wormhole 
detection techniques discussed in the previous chapter. This involves specifying a wormhole 
detection rate ≥ 70% and FP rate ≤ 30% as the baseline comparators in the subsequent 
results analysis. The rationale for these values is the fact that with the strategic placement of 
a wormhole in a MANET, which has uniformly distributed nodes, approximately up to one 
third of all network traffic is attracted (Khabbazian et al., 2009). Therefore a minimum 
detection rate of 70% means in practice that the risk of obtaining a wormhole infected route 
decreases from ≈ 33% to < 10%, which is a significant improvement. A FP detection, on the 
other hand, means that the shortest route cannot be used between two communicating nodes 
and that there will be a delay in the route discovery process, since additional iterations will 
be needed. A 30% FP rate implies that the probability for two subsequent FP detections is 
already < 0.1 meaning in the vast majority of cases, no more than one additional route 
discovery process iteration is required as a result of FP detection in the new framework. 
Using this reasoning, a minimum tolerable detection rate (70%) and a maximum tolerable 
FP rate (30%) were defined as the ground truths in the ensuing results analyses.  
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4.5. Validation of  Software Implementation and Simulation Results 
To validate all software code implementations and the trustworthiness in the comparative 
simulation results, code correctness checking techniques and statistical significance tests for 
the results were used throughout the development and performance evaluation cycles of the 
new framework. The specific correctness check techniques used, in this thesis referred to as 
software code validation, will be described in the next subsection, while the rationale for the 
adopted statistical significance test is described in Section 4.5.2. 
4.5.1. Software Code Validation 
As ns-2 was used as a platform for the simulation environment, all generic MANET related 
functionalities including the AODV routing protocol were already implemented, so the only 
new software implementations were those relating to the custom ns-2 plugin and the 
constituent framework algorithms i.e., TTHCA, TTpHA, and ∆TVE extensions, together 
with the wormhole and time tampering attack functions. Throughout the development of 
these implementations both static and dynamic tests were undertaken to validate the code. A 
static analysis tool called Cppcheck (Sourceforge, 2015), was applied for detecting coding 
and design errors, like divide by zero, integer overflow and exception handling.  
 
The correct behaviour of the code implementation of each contribution and comparator was 
manually checked by designing a number of test cases. For these dynamic tests, nodes were 
assigned static positions in the simulation environment and thus predicted results relating to 
the PTT, RTT and routing packet processing time (∆Ti) measurements as well as 
wormhole/time tampering detection algorithm output could be calculated prior to each 
simulation run and compared to the corresponding simulation output. To rigorously validate 
each wormhole/time tampering detection algorithm implementation a number of targeted 
scenarios were generated, in which the outcome for each algorithm was known a priori as 
to whether it would fail and/or succeed. Finally, the functionality of the custom ns-2 plugin 
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was validated in a similar way by manually pre-calculating a number of packet processing 
times based on a given set of TS and ⍴ values, before comparing these with the corresponding 
output values generated by the getPPTime subroutine.   
4.5.2. Statistical Significance Tests 
A series of statistical significance tests was undertaken to verify that an adequate number of 
samples were used for the critical performance analysis in comparison with other state-of-
the-art wormhole detection solutions. The output of each tested wormhole detection 
algorithm is either detected or not detected and these can be seen as two categorical values, 
i.e. the algorithm and its output. Thus, the statistical significance can be verified if there is a 
clear association between these two variables, in other words if the choice of algorithm has 
an effect on the output. In contrast, if these two variables are independent, i.e. if the choice 
of algorithm has no effect on the output then the statistical significance cannot be verified. 
For statistical significance analysis, results are typically presented in a contingency table. 
For this purpose such a table can be structured analogously to Table 4.3 where C1 and C3 are 
the number of correctly/falsely detected routes by the framework and the comparator 
respectively, while C2 and C4 are correspondingly, the number of undetected routes.   
 
Table 4.3: Wormhole and FP detection simulation results plotted in a contingency table for statistical 
significance analysis.    
Detection algorithm 
Output 
Detected Not detected 
Framework C1 C2 
Comparator C3 C4 
 
To analyse such 2 x 2 contingency tables for statistical significance, techniques including 
Chi-square test of independence, Fisher’s exact test, and the G-test can be applied 
(McDonald, 2014). For this purpose, there were some restrictions relating to the choice of 
test technique as there are many occasions where a given cell frequency (C1, C2, C3 or C4) 
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may be small, for example C2 = 0 in cases where the detection rate is 100% for the 
framework contribution. For this reason, neither the G-test nor Chi-square test can be applied 
because they require a minimum cell frequency of 5, otherwise at lower cell frequencies the 
results become inaccurate. In contrast, the Fisher’s exact test is applicable regardless of cell 
frequency and consequently this is the rationale for applying this particular test in the results 
analysis. The wormhole detection and FP rates were tested separately and the hypotheses 
for these tests defined as: 
 
H0:  Wormhole detection/FP rate is independent of the applied WH detection algorithm 
H1:  Wormhole detection/FP rate is not independent of the applied WH detection algorithm 
 
H0 indicates that regardless of the applied detection algorithm, wormhole detection rate/FP 
rate will still be similar. Therefore to prove the statistical significance of the performance 
improvements of the two wormhole detection algorithms (TTHCA and TTpHA) compared 
to other state-of-the-art solutions, TTHCA and TTpHA were separately tested against each 
comparator algorithm. The implementation of Fisher’s test is described in detail in Chapters 
5 and 6.  
4.6. Summary 
This Chapter has provided the detailed methodology for this research. A simulation 
environment developed in ns-2 has been used for critical evaluation of the performance of 
all thesis contributions. A detailed description of this environment has been presented 
together with key parameter settings, outputs, and metrics used for performance evaluation. 
State-of-the-art packet delay based wormhole detection algorithms, i.e. DelPHI, M-TTM, 
and MHA, have been implemented as comparators in the simulation environment to 
demonstrate the performance improvements of the new wormhole detection framework. The 
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statistical significance of the comparative test results have been analysed by applying 
Fisher’s exact test and its implementation has been presented. The correctness of each thesis 
contribution and comparator code implementation in the simulation environment has been 
validated through both static and dynamic tests.  The next chapter will introduce the first 
research contribution in the new wormhole attack detection framework. 
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5. WORMHOLE ATTACK DETECTION BASED ON TRAVERSAL 
TIME AND HOP COUNT ANALYSIS (TTHCA)  
5.1. Introduction 
As highlighted in Chapters 1 and 3, there is an absence of a unified wormhole detection 
solution for MANETs. This provided the main motivation for the overarching research 
question defined in Section 1.3 and is specifically addressed in this thesis.  
 
Packet delay based wormhole detection techniques, such as DelPHI (Chiu & Lui, 2006), 
WAP (Choi et al., 2008), TTM (Tran et al., 2007), WAD-HLA (Vandana & Devaraj, 2013), 
NPA (Zhou et al., 2012) and the timing-based countermeasure (Khabbazian et al., 2009) 
were in Chapter 3 identified as potential wormhole detection solutions. These approaches 
offer wormhole detection mechanisms with low network overheads and require no additional 
hardware but most of them are based on round trip time (RTT) measurements and hence the 
assumption that variations in node packet processing times are small. In a realistic MANET, 
nodes can exhibit high packet processing time variations, as a consequence for example, of 
momentary queuing delays and/or dissimilar hardware, resulting in low wormhole detection 
and high false positive (FP) rates. The timing-based countermeasure proposed in 
Khabbazian et al. (2009) relaxes the aforementioned assumption by analysing packet 
traversal time (PTT) between two neighbouring nodes, where PTT is a significantly more 
accurate metric than RTT for estimating the distance between two nodes. However, this type 
of neighbour node validation is only effective for hidden mode (HM) wormholes since even 
though two participation mode (PM) wormhole nodes are located far apart and thus have 
high PTT, they can falsely inform other nodes that they have validated each other as 
neighbours.   
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To fulfil research Objective 1 (Section 1.3), a new wormhole attack detection algorithm 
based on packet traversal time and hop count analysis (TTHCA) is proposed and rigorously 
analysed in this Chapter. This algorithm is designed as an extension to AODV since this 
routing protocol is the most popular in the research community and is applicable in MANETs 
with dynamic topologies, as discussed in Chapter 2. In TTHCA, the source node first 
measures the RTT of the routing packets, i.e. the time from sending a RREQ until receiving 
the corresponding RREP. During the routing packet exchange, the processing times of the 
RREQ and the corresponding RREP packet (∆Ti ) are measured by each intermediate as well 
as by the destination node and delivered to the source node. Hence, the source node can 
calculate the route PTT by subtracting all ∆Ti from RTT. If PTT/HC is unrealistically high, 
a wormhole is suspected and a new route is requested until a healthy route is found. 
 
The high-level and ideal aim of TTHCA is to provide 100% detection of all wormhole attack 
types with no false positive occurrences under any MANET scenario, while retaining 
negligible network overheads to provide maximum security and QoS. Though, a wormhole 
detection performance meeting the baseline comparator ground truths defined in Chapter 4, 
i.e. wormhole detection rate ≥ 70% and FP rate ≤ 30%, are already considered acceptable. 
For simplification, a base assumption is being made that all MANET nodes have identical 
hardware and are located in a line-of-sight (LOS) environment. In subsequent chapters, these 
assumptions will be both relaxed and critically analysed. 
 
Next, the TTHCA algorithm will be described in detail and its threshold for the maximum 
permissible PTT/HC is critically analysed. In Chapter 5.3 a comparative simulation results 
analysis is provided showing superior wormhole detection performance of TTHCA 
compared to MHA and DelPHI. Limitations of TTHCA are also analysed as well as the 
impact of relaxing the identical hardware and LOS assumptions on TTHCA wormhole 
detection performance.      
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5.2. The Traversal Time and Hop Count Analysis Algorithm 
TTHCA extends the AODV route discovery procedure with RTT measurements at the source 
node and ∆Ti measurements at the intermediate nodes as well as at the destination node. The 
sum of all ∆Ti (∆TTOT) is delivered to the source node for calculating PTT. The complete 
TTHCA extended AODV route discovery procedure is illustrated in Figure 5.1, where nodes 
#0 and #n are the source and destination respectively, while nodes #1 through to #i are 
intermediate nodes. 
 
Figure 5.1: The complete TTHCA extended AODV route discovery procedure.  
 
The source node starts the route discovery procedure by broadcasting a RREQ into the 
network according to the AODV routing protocol. Each node receiving a RREQ measures 
the processing time of the RREQ packet denoted by {∆TRREQ}i  (i.e. RREQ packet processing 
time at node #i) in a similar way to that proposed in Khabbazian et al. (2009), i.e. the time 
from receiving the first bit of the RREQ ({TRREQr}i) until sending the first bit of the forwarded 
81 
RREQ ({TRREQs}i). {∆TRREQ}i is temporarily stored in local memory. When the RREQ 
reaches the destination node, a RREP packet is created and sent back to the source node as 
a unicast packet through the shortest route as in normal AODV. Correspondingly to the 
RREQ broadcast procedure, each intermediate node creates the timestamp {TRREPr}i when 
receiving the first bit of RREP and {TRREPs}i when sending the first bit of the forwarded RREP 
to the next hop. After sending the RREP, the destination node calculates ∆Ti = {TRREPs}i - 
TRREQr}i and the intermediate nodes ∆Ti = {∆TRREQ}i + ({TRREPs}i - TRREPr}i) 
 
To deliver ∆TTOT to the source node, a new RREP packet (RREPTTHCA), including a ∆TTOT 
parameter, is generated at the destination with its ∆Ti value and sent as a unicast packet to 
the source after sending the original AODV RREP (RREPAODV). Each intermediate node 
receiving RREPTTHCA adds its own ∆Ti value to the ∆TTOT parameter. To achieve high 
resolution time stamps, the ∆Ti measurements must be performed at the physical layer while 
routing packets are processed at the network layer. For this reason, the ∆Ti measurement 
information cannot be added to RREPAODV. 
 
The source node records time stamps {TRREQs}i and {TRREPr}i when sending the RREQ and 
receiving the corresponding RREPAODV respectively and calculates the route RTT as follows 
𝑅𝑇𝑇 = {𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑟}𝑖 −  {𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑠}𝑖 (5.1)
When RREPTTHCA is received it then calculates the route PTT as 
𝑃𝑇𝑇 =
𝑅𝑇𝑇 −  Δ𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑇
2
 
(5.2)
A flowchart showing the constituent processes involved in TTHCA at the source node is 
shown in the Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: A flowchart of the TTHCA wormhole detection algorithm. 
 
If all MANET nodes have identical hardware and are located in a LOS environment, then 
the maximum distance a routing packet can travel is the maximum radio range R. Based on 
this, a wormhole is suspected by TTHCA if:  
𝑃𝑇𝑇
𝐻𝐶
>  
𝑅
𝑆
 
(5.3)
If the threshold in eq. (5.3) is true, then a wormhole is suspected and a new RREQ with a 
new sequence number is broadcasted to find a new route between the source and destination 
nodes. According to the AODV routing protocol, an intermediate node having a fresh route 
to the destination will reply with a RREP while other nodes will forward the new RREQ 
towards the destination. Thus, if the source node does not accept a RREP packet received 
from the same intermediate node as during the previous route discovery procedures, the 
newly requested route will be unique. This iterative route discovery process is repeated until 
a safe route is found. The performance of TTHCA and the fixed threshold eq. (5.3) will be 
critically analysed in the next Section and experimentally tested in Section 5.3.    
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5.2.1.  Critical Analysis of the Static Threshold 
To detect a wormhole using the threshold in eq. (5.3), the total deviation of the PTT of each 
legitimate hop (PTTi,i+1 which is equivalent to ri,i+1/S, where ri,i+1 is the actual distance 
between two successive nodes) from R/S must be small relative to the wormhole link delay 
(twh) which is defined as:  
𝑡𝑤ℎ =  
𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
+  
∆𝑇𝑤ℎ
2
 
(5.4)  
where rwh is the length and ∆Twh is the total packet processing time of the wormhole link, i.e. 
∆Twh is the sum of all ∆Ti at the legitimate nodes through which the malicious nodes tunnel 
routing packets to each other (in case of I-B wormhole) and the ∆Ti values at the wormhole 
nodes (in the case of a HM wormhole).  In the example MANET shown in Figure 5.3, rwh is 
the distance between wormhole nodes #3 and #6. If an HM I-B wormhole is launched then 
∆Twh = ∆T2 + ∆T6 + ∆T7 + ∆T3 while for a PM I-B wormhole ∆Twh = ∆T6 + ∆T7. The 
difference in the two ∆Twh values is because HM wormhole nodes do not process routing 
packets and thus they do not add their ∆Ti values to ∆TTOT. Conversely, an HM O-B 
wormhole means that ∆Twh = ∆T2 + ∆T3 , while ∆Twh = 0 for a PM O-B wormhole since the 
malicious nodes are able to directly tunnel routing packets to each other over a dedicated 
network link. 
 
Figure 5.3: A visualization of a MANET where nodes #2 and #3 are malicious launching either an I-B or 
O-B wormhole, with nodes #0 and #5 being the source and destination nodes respectively.  
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The PTT of a wormhole infected route, as calculated by the source node, is the sum of all 
legitimate PTTi,i+1 and twh:  
∑ (
𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1
𝑆
) + 𝑡𝑤ℎ
𝐻𝐶−1
𝑖=1
 
(5.5)
where HC is the route length in terms of hops as calculated by the routing protocol. So in the 
Figure 5.3 example, HC = 3 if a HM wormhole is launched (as the fictive route is 
#0#1#4#5) and HC = 5 (#0#1#2#3#4#5) for a PM wormhole. 
 
The ideal scenario arises when ri,i+1 = R because then the PTT of a healthy route is HC∙ 
𝑅
𝑆
  
which equals the maximum permissible route PTT inferred by eq. (5.3). To be effective, rwh 
must be > R so any wormhole link will lead to a condition where PTT > HC∙ 
𝑅
𝑆
  and thus be 
detected. However, in a realistic MANET environment where nodes are randomly distributed, 
ri,i+1 is typically < R and therefore must lie within the bounds specified by Lemma 5.1. 
   
Lemma 5.1: Assuming the maximum radio range R is identical for every node, then ri,i+1 is 
bounded by: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1 ≤ 𝑅 (5.6)
(𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1 + 𝑟𝑖+1,𝑖+2) > 𝑅 (5.7) 
Proof: Eq. (5.6) cannot be false since otherwise intermediate nodes #i and #i+1 will be out 
of radio range coverage. Correspondingly, eq. (5.7) must be true since otherwise the 2-hop 
neighbour of intermediate node #i (#i+2) will still be within radio range and thus become 
only a 1-hop neighbour.                   ■ 
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The value of the threshold in eq. (5.3) which must be upheld is formally defined in Lemma 
5.2. 
 
Lemma 5.2: Assuming identical S through both the air and on the wormhole link, then eq. 
(5.3) is upheld if:  
∑ (
𝑅 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1
𝑆
) <
𝐻𝐶−1
𝑖=1
 𝑡𝑤ℎ −
𝑅
𝑆
 
(5.8)
Proof: Eq. (5.3) implies a wormhole will be detected whenever route PTT > HC ∙ 
𝑅
𝑆
, so if  
eq. (5.8) is false, then from eq. (5.2) the calculated PTT ≤  𝐻𝐶 ∙
𝑅
𝑆
, which means the wormhole 
will not be detected.                   ■ 
 
An I-B or a HM wormhole incurs a high ∆Twh since routing packets are tunneled through 
legitimate nodes in the I-B case and HM wormhole nodes do not modify the routing packets. 
Routing packet processing times >> PTT and thus I-B and HM wormholes are 
straightforward to detect by applying the static threshold eq. (5.3) as will be shown in Section 
5.3.1. 
 
PM O-B wormholes are the most challenging for TTHCA to detect since ∆Twh = 0 and 
therefore twh is significantly smaller than for an I-B and a HM wormhole. As an illustration 
assume R = 100 m and that a 3-hop PM O-B wormhole exists within the MANET. This 
implies rwh = 3R so if all ri,i+1 are closer to the lower bound eq. (5.6), e.g. 51 m, a wormhole 
infected route will not be detected if the route HC > 4 because then eq. (5.8) will not hold. 
On the other hand, if all ri,i+1 are close to the upper bound eq. (5.7), e.g. 99 m, then a 
wormhole infected route would be detected for route HC up to 200. So, since ∆Twh  = 0  the 
TTHCA wormhole detection performance on a PM O-B wormhole is highly dependent on 
the sum of all  R – ri,i+1 in relation to the length of the wormhole link, which can be derived 
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from eq. (5.8). This is also clearly reflected in the simulation results showing TTHCA 
wormhole detection performance on PM O-B wormholes with various lengths in the next 
Section.  
5.3. Simulation and Results Analysis 
The performance of TTHCA was rigorously evaluated by analysing the wormhole detection 
rate eq. (4.1) and the FP rate eq. (4.2) in comparison with DelPHI and MHA in the ns-2 
simulation environment described in Chapter 4. DelPHI operates in a similar manner as 
TTHCA in terms of route delay per HC analysis, with the significant difference being that 
TTHCA uses PTT rather than RTT. In this Section it will be shown how this strategy 
significantly improves wormhole detection performance. Correspondingly, the reason for 
using MHA as a comparator is to show that HC analysis as such is not adequate for robustly 
detecting wormholes. In the simulations it is assumed that all timestamps can be recorded 
with 1 ns accuracy, which is currently only possible with either specialist hardware 
(Microsemi, 2013) or by using a special receiver architecture on existing hardware (Exel et 
al., 2010). It is also assumed there is no time tampering of the ∆TTOT value. These 
assumptions will be subsequently relaxed in Chapters 6 and 7, where timestamp accuracy 
and time tampering issues will be more rigorously analysed. 
 
The specific simulation environment parameters used for these experiments are defined in 
Table 5.1. The rationale behind choosing large values for both network length (L) and 
maximum radio range (R) was to reflect an outdoor LOS environment analogously to Jen et 
al. (2009), while the corresponding indoor environment scenario is analysed in Chapter 6. 
To reflect different network environment topography i.e., square and rectangular with 
varying widths, W was assigned a random value during each simulation run, while the overall 
network area was kept constant.  
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Table 5.1: Specific simulation parameters used for testing TTHCA, MHA and DelPHI to reflect and 
outdoor LOS environment. 
Parameter Settings 
N 300 
W Random value:  
1500 m – 4000 m 
L 4 000 000 m2
𝑊
 
R 250 m   
NIR and NHR 100 
  
For DelPHI, the time threshold T = 3 ms was chosen in accordance with Chiu & Lui (2006) 
as this offers  a pragmatic balance between detection and FP rates, while for MHA, RREPlim 
= 2 was used since when there is only one wormhole in the network, two comparable route 
samples are sufficient to detect the wormhole infected route. In the ensuing experimental 
testing, all four wormhole variants i.e. HM, PM, I-B and O-B were considered.  
5.3.1. Detection Performance 
In the first set of experiments, the detection performance for HM I-B/O-B and PM I-B 
wormholes was tested for various wormhole lengths, with the results being displayed in 
Figures 5.4 - 5.6. For all simulated wormhole types, the length indicates the physical distance 
between the two wormhole nodes and is specified in hops where 1-hop = R, so for a 3-hop 
wormhole, rwh = 3R. 
 
TTHCA detection rates are consistently superior compared to DelPHI and MHA as TTHCA 
detected all wormholes and generated no false positives, while the respective wormhole 
detection rates for DelPHI and MHA were 30% to 60 % and 30% to 70%. When the MANET 
is infected by a HM wormhole, malicious nodes do not modify the routing packets, they just 
tunnel them to each other so the malicious nodes do not add their ∆Ti values to the ∆TTOT 
parameter of the RREP packet. Hence, the delay of the wormhole link (twh) is significantly 
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higher than any hop PTT (PTTi,i+1) and therefore the condition eq. (5.8) in Lemma 5.2 is 
always met.  
 
HM I-B wormholes incur even higher twh than HM O-B wormholes since malicious nodes 
tunnel routing packets to each other through other legitimate nodes. So, twh will in the HM 
I-B wormhole case include both packet processing times of the wormhole nodes as well as 
of the legitimate nodes through which the routing packets were tunneled and so again Lemma 
5.2 is always fulfilled.      
 
 
Figure 5.4: Comparative HM O-B wormhole and FP detection performance. 
 
Even though HM O-B/I-B and PM I-B wormhole links are significantly slower than PM O-
B wormhole links, the detection performance of DelPHI in contrast is generally poor. The 
reason for this is the variation in packet processing times and the occurrence of queuing 
delays which typically are much greater than packet service times. If for example, one or 
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more nodes on a fresh route cause queueing delays, the RTT/HC of that route may potentially 
be higher than the RTT/HC of a wormhole infected route where no queuing delays are 
experienced. For the same reason, the FP rate for DelPHI is correspondingly higher for all 
wormhole types 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Comparative HM I-B wormhole and FP detection performance. 
 
In the next set of experiments, the comparative wormhole attack detection performance for 
a PM O-B wormhole is analysed and the results plotted in Figure 5.7. As discussed in Section 
5.2.1, the PM O-B wormhole is the most challenging to detect for TTHCA since ∆Twh  = 0 
and therefore the only delay caused by the wormhole link is the PTT between the malicious 
nodes. This is reflected in the detection performance as 100% wormhole detection is only 
achieved when the wormhole is > 6 hops due to the fact that then the wormhole link is long 
enough for the condition defined in  eq. (5.8) to always uphold. When decreasing the length 
of the wormhole link, the detection rate progressively starts to drop. Though, a wormhole ≥ 
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4 hops is still detected with a likelihood of > 90% which is significantly higher than the 
baseline comparator ground truth (70%) defined in Chapter 4.  However, TTHCA cannot 
robustly detect PM O-B wormholes < 4 hops due to the fact that then the sum of all R – ri,i+1 
is often large in relation to the wormhole length and hence the eq. (5.8) condition will not 
hold.   
 
 
Figure 5.6: Comparative PM I-B wormhole and FP detection performance. 
 
DelPHI was unable in practice, to detect any PM O-B wormholes since the FP rates were 
always higher than the wormhole detection rate. The difference between the wormhole link 
delay (twh) and any hop packet traversal time (PTTi,i+1), for a PM O-B wormhole is negligibly 
small compared to variations in packet processing times and so it is not possible for DelPHI 
to distinguish between an infected and a healthy route.  
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Figure 5.7: Comparative PM O-B wormhole and FP detection performance. 
 
For MHA, the value of twh is immaterial since it only analyses route HC in its wormhole 
detection mechanism. It was though revealed from the test results that MHA is ineffective 
on all tested wormhole types as the detection rate is poor (between 35% and 70%) in all 
cases. Under these circumstances where all nodes were randomly distributed in the 
simulation test area there were many instances where the wormhole link did not have the 
shortest HC, which decreases the detection rate while commensurately increasing the 
likelihood of false positives. There are also many cases where the HC of the shortest route 
is significantly smaller than the HC of the second shortest route, which also generates FP 
detections. The detection performance was slightly better for PM wormholes (between 50 
and 70%) compared to HM wormholes (between 35 and 50%). The reason is that there is a 
risk for all routes to traverse the HM wormhole during the MHA extended AODV route 
discovery since HM wormhole nodes cannot be included in the graylist as discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
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5.3.2. Statistical Significance Analysis 
To evaluate the statistical significance of the results presented in the previous Section, which 
show clear wormhole and FP detection performance improvements for TTHCA compared to 
DelPHI and MHA, Fisher’s exact test was applied as explained in Chapter 4. In short, the 
rationale behind this test was to determine whether the choice of wormhole detection 
mechanism is related to the wormhole detection and FP rate. The hypotheses were defined 
as follows: 
 
H0: TTHCA performance = MHA/DelPHI performance 
H1: TTHCA performance ≠ MHA/DelPHI performance 
 
The test results for all wormhole types, i.e. HM, PM, O-B, and I-B, are presented Table 5.2. 
They show that the wormhole detection and FP rate differences observed between TTHCA 
and DelPHI are statistically significant for all wormhole variants as H0 was false by a clear 
margin. Similarly, the differences between TTHCA and MHA in FP rates are also 
statistically significant for all test cases. When wormhole detection for TTHCA in 
comparison to MHA is considered, Ho was false in all cases except for PM O-B wormholes 
shorter than 4 hops, where only a marginal difference was observed with corresponding 
detection rates of 57% for TTHCA compared to 51% for MHA.  
 
To summarise, these statistical significance tests indicate that an adequate amount of samples 
have been generated in the simulations for producing comparative wormhole detection and 
FP performance results for TTHCA vs. MHA as well as TTHCA vs. DelPHI showing clear 
improvements of TTHCA. The only exception is the 3-hop PM O-B wormhole case where 
the conclusion can be drawn MHA and TTHCA wormhole detection performance is 
equivalent.    
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Table 5.2: Fisher’s exact test results for wormhole detection and FP performance where p is the 
probability for that H0 is true. 
Wormhole variants 
Result type TTHCA vs. MHA TTHCA vs. DelPHI 
Type Length (hops) 
HM I-B 
HM O-B 
PM I-B 
3–6 
Wormhole H0 = false 
(p < 0.0001) 
FP 
PM O-B 
3 
Wormhole 
H0 = true 
(p = 0.4782) H0 = false 
(p < 0.0001) 
FP 
H0 = False 
(p < 0.0001) 
4–6 
Wormhole H0 = false 
(p < 0.0001) FP 
 
5.3.3. Network Overheads 
The destination and intermediate nodes only perform addition and subtraction operations for 
calculating routing packet processing delays (∆Ti), while the source node performs a 
subtraction to calculate round trip time, a subtraction and division for calculating packet 
traversal time in eq. (5.2) and two division operations for the wormhole threshold check in 
eq. (5.3). All these calculations together on the destination node and the intermediate nodes 
have linear complexity O(HC). 
 
Due to the requirement for an additional routing packet, RREPTTHCA, when applying TTHCA 
in AODV, there will be an increased delay incurred in the route discovery process which can 
be expressed as:  
∑({∆𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃_𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐶𝐴}𝑖 + 
𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1,
𝑆
)
𝐻𝐶
𝑖=1
 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠  
(5.9)
where {∆TRREP_TTHCA}i is the RREPTTHCA packet processing time at intermediate node i. This 
delay is small however, compared to MHA where the route discovery procedure must always 
be performed at least twice to be able to perform the HC analysis algorithm. In contrast, 
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TTHCA only requires a single RREQ broadcast operation if the first obtained route is healthy.  
DelPHI also requires only one RREP per route discovery but incurs a higher load on the 
network compared to both MHA and TTHCA because it uses a modified version of the 
AODV protocol to identify all possible routes between the source and destination node.   
5.3.4. Results Discussion 
The presented results confirm that TTHCA pragmatically fulfils the research Objective 1 to 
accurately and consistently detect  HM/PM O-B and PM I-B wormholes with no false 
positive detection occurring. Any route infected by either a HM/PM O-B or PM I-B 
wormhole is straightforward to distinguish from a healthy route since it leads to a 
significantly higher PTT/HC due to the high ∆Twh value which leads eq. (5.8) to be upheld. 
The high detection rate is not always met however, when the MANET is infected by a PM 
O-B wormhole and the wormhole link is short, i.e. less than 6 hops in the test simulation 
environment. This is true because ∆Twh = 0 for such a wormhole and therefore a long route 
with a short wormhole means that Lemma 5.2 is not fulfilled and the wormhole is undetected. 
Though the detection rate is higher than the defined baseline comparator ground truth (70%) 
when the wormhole length ≥ 4 hops. 
 
From a computational and network complexity perspective, TTHCA offers a low overhead 
solution as all the operations have linear complexity O(HC). However, the new routing 
packet RREPTTHCA introduces an extra delay in the route discovery procedure and some 
additional packet processing at both the intermediate and destination nodes is incurred 
because TTHCA requires two reply packets instead of one in the AODV protocol.  
 
A summary of the high level aims to fulfil Objective 1 and how the proposed TTHCA 
algorithm fulfils these goals when nodes have identical hardware and are in LOS is presented 
in Table 5.3.  
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Table 5.3: A summary of desired goal settings for TTHCA and how they were fulfilled. 
Desired goal settings 
TTHCA 
Objective 
achieved? 
Summary 
100% wormhole detection Partially 
Detection rate is 100% for HM/PM O-B 
and PM I-B wormholes but < 100% for 
short PM O-B wormholes. 
Network topology independent Partially 
A short PM O-B wormhole in relation 
to the route HC is not detected. 
No FP detection  Yes 
Assuming accurate RTT and ∆Ti 
measurements eq. (5.3) can never be 
true for a healthy route. 
Low computational overheads Yes 
All computational operations have order 
of complexity O(HC)  
Negligible bandwidth load Partially 
New routing packet RREPTTHCA causes 
a minor delay on the routing discovery 
procedure and bandwidth overheads on 
intermediate nodes.   
 
Using the fixed threshold in eq. (5.3) has proven to work well provided all nodes have same 
R and are located in a LOS environment. However, the wormhole detection rate degrades 
once the aforementioned assumptions are relaxed, such as for instance, high variability in 
radio coverage, which can be experienced due to different MANET node hardware and/or 
variability in network surroundings.  
 
To illustrate the effect of relaxing the LOS environment assumption on TTHCA wormhole 
detection performance, consider the 5 HC route example in Figure 5.8, where A and D are 
the source and destination nodes respectively, M1 and M2 are malicious PM O-B wormhole 
nodes, and B as well as C are legitimate intermediate nodes. 
 
 
Figure 5.8: An example of a route infected by a PM O-B wormhole. 
 
Assuming identical node hardware with R = 100 m, and all ri,i+1 values being close to the 
lower bound eq. (5.6) in Lemma 5.1, such as 51 m. If the wormhole link is 3R (3 hops) then 
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the corresponding PTT for that route will be  
∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1+
𝐻𝐶−1
𝑖=1 𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
 = 1680 ns and the wormhole 
will in a LOS environment be detected, but only within the very narrow window (𝑃𝑇𝑇
𝐻𝐶
=
336𝑛𝑠 >  
𝑅
𝑆
= 333𝑛𝑠) from eq. (5.3). If however, there are physical obstacles between two or 
more nodes on the A to D path, the lower bound for ri,i+1 between these nodes will inevitably 
become lower than eq. (5.6) and as a result there is a higher likelihood the wormhole will 
not be detected. For example, if rA,B = 44 m due to an obstacle between A and B, while all 
remaining ri,i+1 = 51 m, PTT/HC will then = 332 ns which is less than R/S so the wormhole 
will not be detected using the static threshold in eq. (5.3).  
 
The impact of relaxing the assumptions on network environment and node hardware is 
rigorously analysed in Chapter 6 where a new extended version of TTHCA, called TTpHA 
is presented which integrates a dynamic threshold mechanism which is able to adapt to the 
prevailing network conditions and thus provides improved wormhole detection performance 
in challenging environments where there are high radio range variations. 
5.4. Summary 
This Chapter has presented a new wormhole detection algorithm, TTHCA, that is based on 
PTT/HC analysis. Similarly to the RTT based approach DelPHI, TTHCA analyses the delay 
of a route in relation to its HC for identifying a wormhole infected route, however unlike 
DelPHI and other RTT-based solutions, it reduces all node packet processing delays from the 
RTT measurement to get the PTT. PTT more accurately reflects the distance of a route 
compared to RTT and is therefore significantly more robust for detecting wormholes.  
 
Simulation results showed that TTHCA works well when assuming LOS environments and 
identical hardware on all nodes and therefore TTHCA fulfils Objective 1 to a satisfactory 
standard. TTHCA wormhole detection and false positive performance was also significantly 
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better compared to DelPHI and MHA. However, if the route is infected by a short PM O-B 
wormhole in relation to the route HC there is a risk that TTHCA wormhole detection will 
fail. High fluctuations in radio ranges further increase the risk that TTHCA will not detect 
PM O-B wormholes. TTHCA uses a fixed threshold for PTT/HC validation which has two 
main limitations, firstly it does not adapt to prevailing network conditions meaning that the 
wormhole detection performance in an indoor environment is poor since such an environment 
requires a lower threshold than a LOS environment. Secondly, in a heterogeneous network 
where network nodes are using dissimilar wireless communication technologies the threshold 
for the maximum permissible PTT/HC cannot be based on R since it may be highly variable 
even in a LOS environment.       
 
To address the identified limitations of TTHCA in node radio range variability and fulfill 
research Objective 2, a new extended version of TTHCA, called TTpHA is proposed in the 
next Chapter.  
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6. WORMHOLE ATTACK DETECTION USING PACKET 
TRAVERSAL TIME PER HOP ANALYSIS WITH DYNAMIC 
THRESHOLD 
6.1. Introduction 
To address the limitations of TTHCA identified in Chapter 5 in regard to using a static 
threshold in the packet traversal time (PTT) per hop count (HC) analysis, this Chapter 
introduces a new flexible wormhole attack detection technique called traversal time per hop 
analysis (TTpHA), which employs a dynamic threshold for the maximum permissible PTT 
for each hop. This feature enables TTpHA to automatically adapt to prevailing network 
conditions and handle variable node radio ranges. Analysing the delay for each hop is a more 
accurate approach to wormhole detection than average hop delay analysis. This observation 
was firstly identified in round trip time (RTT)-based approaches like WAP (Choi et al., 
2008), TTM (Tran, Hung et al. 2007), and then more recently in a modified variant of TTM 
(M-TTM) (Qazi et al., 2013).  
 
A key factor in any packet delay based wormhole detection technique is the accuracy of the 
timestamps recorded for incoming and outgoing routing packets. This Chapter includes a 
critical analysis of the requirements on the timestamp resolution (TR) for TTpHA and 
provides comparative evaluation of wormhole detection performance between TTpHA and 
M-TTM for different TR values and network conditions. The impact of node mobility during 
the route discovery procedure on wormhole attack detection performance is also evaluated 
for TTpHA and M-TTM. Without loss of generality, the focus in this Chapter will be upon 
participation mode (PM) out-of-band (O-B) wormholes as these are the most challenging to 
detect. The same broad design objectives are set for TTpHA as for TTHCA, though the 
assumptions of identical and high timestamp resolution hardware nodes located in a line-of-
sight (LOS) environment are relaxed.  
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6.2.  The Packet Traversal Time per Hop Analysis Algorithm 
TTpHA is a major extension to the original TTHCA algorithm presented in Chapter 5, 
embracing two significant improvements:  
i) TTpHA measures and analyses PTT for each successive hop (PTTi,i+1) rather 
than PTT/HC to provide more accurate wormhole attack detection. 
ii) TTpHA uses a dynamic threshold for the maximum permissible PTTi,i+1 to 
automatically adapt to variable radio ranges and network environments.  
In this Section, the extended TTpHA route discovery procedure employed to determine the 
PTTi,i+1 calculations is firstly discussed, before a critical analysis of the new dynamic 
threshold mechanism is presented. 
6.2.1. TTpHA Extended AODV Route Discovery Procedure 
TTpHA operates just as the TTHCA algorithm in broadcasting RREQAODV packets, but the 
procedure at the intermediate nodes is extended in receiving and sending RREP messages. 
Each intermediate node calculates not only routing packet processing times (∆Ti), as in 
TTHCA, but also the PTT between itself and the destination node (PTTi), which is then 
inserted as an element of a new dedicated PTTi vector parameter in the RREPTTpHA packet. 
PTTi is determined at each intermediate node upon receipt of a RREPAODV packet according 
to eq. (5.2). To clarify the difference between the PTTi and PTTi,i+1 notation, consider the 
MANET scenario illustrated in Figure 5.3. In this scenario, PTT1,2  refers to the measured 
traversal time of a routing packet that is sent between nodes #1 and #2, while PTT1 refers to 
the packet traversal time between node #1 and the destination node.  
 
The complete TTpHA extended route discovery procedure is illustrated in Figure 6.1, where 
as in Figure 5.1, node #0 is the source, nodes #1 to #i are intermediate nodes and #n is the 
destination node.  
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Figure 6.1: The TTpHA extended AODV route discovery procedure, with the new elements shaded in 
grey (all other blocks are as in TTHCA (Karlsson et al., 2011)).  
 
In addition to the route PTT, the source node also calculates each PTTi,i+1 from 
𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖,𝑖+1 = 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖 (6.1)
where it is assumed node #i+1 is the destination, otherwise it sets 
𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖,𝑖+1 = 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖  − 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖−1 (6.2)
Each hop packet traversal time value (PTTi,i+1) is then inserted as an element to a vector V 
whose elements are ranked in ascending order. V is used to determine a dynamic threshold 
(Θ) for the maximum permissible PTTi,i+1 of the route. If nodes #i and #i+1 form a PM 
wormhole, then PTTi,i+1 at node #i will be larger than any healthy PTTi, i+1 so the wormhole 
link is detected if VHC > Θ. The situation where several wormholes exist in a MANET must 
also be considered for TTpHA, so all elements in V must be separately evaluated. The 
101 
complete TTpHA algorithm at the source node is shown in Figure 6.2, while the 
methodology used to determine the new TTpHA dynamic threshold Θ is critically analysed 
in next Section.  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Flowchart of the TTpHA algorithm at the source node where the new elements are shaded 
in grey (other blocks are as for TTHCA (Karlsson et al., 2011)). 
6.2.2. Details and Critical Analysis of the Dynamic Threshold Θ 
To successfully identify the PTTi,i+1 of a wormhole link it must be compared with a threshold 
value that is considered to be the upper bound of a range of healthy hop packet traversal time 
values. Other packet delay approaches such as TTM, WAP, M-TTM, and TTHCA use static 
thresholds for this purpose, e.g. in M-TTM the maximum permissible PTTi,i+1 is set to 1 µs 
while in TTHCA the corresponding maximum permissible PTT/HC is defined in eq. (5.3). 
Using a fixed threshold is fine provided some specific network conditions are upheld, i.e. 
102 
outdoor LOS environments. When moving indoors however, the momentary radio range Ri 
at each node will incur variations due to physical obstacles between nodes and R may not 
necessarily be constant on all devices because of different types of hardware, such as 
antennae. To automatically adapt to variable network environments and diverse node 
hardware, the Θ threshold value applied in TTpHA needs to be dynamically determined. To 
achieve this, an outlier detection technique, such as Grubb’s test (Grubbs, 1969), the Box 
plot method (Tukey, 1977), or Dixon’s Q-test (Dean & Dixon, 1951) needs to be applied to 
identify the probable hop packet traversal time value PTTi,i+1 of a wormhole link, which is 
typically significantly higher than any healthy PTTi,i+1 . To define the threshold Θ, the Q-test 
was chosen due to its ease of implementation, low computational complexity and being 
specifically designed for small sample numbers n, typically 3 ≤ n ≤ 10. While larger sample 
numbers (n ≤ 30) were considered (Rorabacher, 1991), it is a pragmatic design assumption 
that n ≤ 30 since at higher values, communicating nodes will be located unrealistically long 
distances apart so any route will incur high delays. In contrast, the Grubb’s test is not 
recommended for n < 7 and the Box plot method requires n > 4 in order to produce reliable 
results. The Q-test was thus a logical choice for this purpose since in analyzing all PTTi,i+1 
values of a route, then n = HC. If a route is infected by a PM wormhole, then the minimum 
HC for that route will be 3 i.e., the route comprises only the destination node and the 
malicious wormhole pair. When HC = 3 for a wormhole infected route, then one of the hops 
must include the wormhole link and this will exhibit a higher PTTi,i+1  value than the two 
legitimate hops. In applying the Q-test, an unrealistically high PTTi,i+1  value is identified if:    
𝑉𝑛 −   𝑉𝑛−1
𝑉𝑛 −  𝑉1
>  𝑄𝐶 
(6.3)
where Vn and Vn-1 is the largest and second largest PTTi,i+1 value respectively, V1 is the 
smallest value, and QC is the critical Q value for a chosen confidence level α and sample 
numbers n = HC (Verma & Quiroz-Ruiz (2006). Thus, the threshold Θ can be derived from  
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eq. (6.3) as:  
𝛩 =
𝑉𝑛−1 −  𝑄𝐶𝑉1
1 −  𝑄𝐶
 
(6.4)
If the route HC < 3, then eq. (6.4) cannot be used since such a route cannot include a PM 
wormhole and it is then reasonable to apply the fixed threshold in eq. (5.2) by defining Θ =  
𝑅
𝑆
. A wormhole is then suspected if 
𝑉𝑛 >  𝛩 (6.5)
If several wormholes exist in the MANET, then a route can potentially include multiple 
infected links. If these wormholes are all PM O-B with their respective lengths (rwh) being 
analogous, then there is a risk that all the wormhole links will go unidentified if only n = 
HC is considered in both eq. (6.4) and (6.5). Consequently, eq. (6.4) and (6.5) must be 
repeated for 1 ≤ n ≤ HC. The choice of parameter α provides a useful design trade-off 
mechanism between wormhole and false positive (FP) rates. A high α means low FP rates 
but a concomitant low wormhole detection probability. Conversely, a lower α increases the 
probability of detecting a wormhole, but with a higher FP rate. A confidence level α = 0.9 
was empirically determined for all the ensuing simulations as it represents the best design 
choice from a detection perspective.   
 
A critical analysis of how key framework factors including radio range variability, 
timestamp resolution, and node mobility, influence the wormhole detection capability of Θ 
will now be presented. 
Radio Range Variability 
If the route HC ≥ 3, then eq. (6.4) is applied to calculate Θ. As Θ is automatically determined 
from all the values in V, the TTpHA wormhole detection performance is dependent not only 
on the calculated hop packet traversal time value PTTi,i+1 of the wormhole link as in the static 
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threshold scenario, but also on the variability of V1…n-1. The maximum permissible variability 
of V1…n-1 which can still guarantee 100% detection of PM O-B wormholes is defined by the 
following Lemma. 
 
Lemma 6.1: If Vn has a high PTTi,i+1 as a result of a wormhole, then it will always be detected 
provided all V1…n-1 values are bounded by:   
𝑥𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
≤ 𝑉𝑖  ≤  
𝑅
𝑆
 
(6.6)
where x defines the smallest permissible hop distance ri,i+1 in relation to rwh, derived from 
eq. (6.3) as: 
𝑟𝑤ℎ − 𝑅
𝑟𝑤ℎ − 𝑥 ∙ 𝑟𝑤ℎ
= 𝑄𝐶 ⟹ 𝑥 =
𝑟𝑤ℎ(1 − 𝑄𝐶) − 𝑅
𝑅(−𝑄𝐶)
 
(6.7)
for the worst case scenario being Vn-1 = 
𝑅
𝑆
, i.e. when the largest ri,i+1 = R.  
Proof: If Vn-1 = 
𝑅
𝑆
 and V1 ≥ 
𝑥𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
 then from eq. (6.4) Θ  <  
𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
 and thus the wormhole is 
detected. Correspondingly, if V1 < 
𝑥𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
 then Θ ≥ 
𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
 and the wormhole will not be detected.        
■ 
 
For example, if R = 250 m, rwh = 3R (3-hop wormhole), and route HC = 3, which means Qc 
= 0.885 (Verma & Quiroz-Ruiz, 2006), then from eq. (6.7) x = 0.247. This means in practice 
that the distances between the healthy nodes can range between 186 m and 250 m, so if for 
example V1 = 
186𝑚 
𝑆
 and Vn-1 = 
250𝑚 
𝑆
 then Θ = 2475 ns, while Vn = 
750𝑚 
𝑆
 = 2500 ns and thus 
the wormhole will be detected with a narrow tolerance. Now if for the same example, V1 = 
185𝑚 
𝑆
 then Θ = 2501 ns and the wormhole will go undetected. The tolerance of variability in 
Vi values is dependent on both the route HC and the length of the wormhole. It has been 
observed in the simulations that when rwh < 3R then it does not attract a significant amount 
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of network traffic and so it can be pragmatically considered as the shortest possible 
wormhole link. A range of x-values in eq. (6.7) under different wormhole lengths and route 
HC are plotted in Figure 6.3. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Values for x calculated from eq. (6.7) for variable route HC and wormhole lengths.   
 
The calculated x-values show that all PM wormholes will be detected provided the HC > 4 
since then all x-values are 0 which implies, that all Vi values lie in the range [0,  
𝑅
𝑆
 ] and the 
wormhole is detected. Also, if the route HC = 4, all PM wormholes ≥ 4 hops will be detected. 
The most challenging detection scenario for applying Θ is when a PM wormhole infected 
route HC = 3 and the wormhole link is also 3 hops. In these circumstances, if 𝑉𝑛−1 =  
𝑅
𝑆
  then 
the wormhole will go undetected if V1 < 
0.247𝑟𝑊𝐻
𝑆
 according to eq. (6.6) and (6.7).  
Lemma 5.1 proved that ri,i+1 in a homogeneous LOS MANET environment can lie within the 
range [0, R]. This means that TTpHA cannot achieve 100% detection of PM O-B wormholes 
if both the wormhole link and route are short. Though in real world large scale LOS MANET 
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environments, where nodes are uniformly distributed, the average ri,i+1 value will generally 
be much closer to the maximum radio range R. For example, physical obstacles in network 
environments and differences in antenna capabilities lead to a higher variability in ri,i+1 since 
the maximum momentary radio range Ri at many nodes is less than R. The corresponding 
bounds for the hop distance ri,i+1 in a non-LOS environment are given in the following 
Lemma.  
 
Lemma 6.2: If the maximum radio coverage of a specific node in a non-LOS environment is 
Ri then the hop distance ri,i+1 is bounded by 
𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1 + 𝑟𝑖+1,𝑖+2 > min {𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑖+1} (6.8)
𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1 ≤  𝑅𝑖 (6.9)
Proof: Eq. (6.8) cannot be false because then the 2-hop neighbour of node #i (#i+2) would 
still lie within radio range and thus become a direct (1-hop) neighbor. Correspondingly, eq. 
(6.9) must be true as otherwise nodes #i and #i+1 will be out of radio coverage.               ■ 
 
Thus, from Lemma 6.2 it is evident, that a short PM O-B wormhole in a short route will have 
a higher probability of being undetected in a non-LOS environment than in a LOS 
environment. This case will be thoroughly studied in the simulation results presented in the 
next Section.  
Timestamp Resolution (TR) 
So far, the ideal case TR = 1 ns has been considered. However, for most off-the-shelf 
wireless hardware TR > 1 ns and most current technology supports only TR = 1 µs (Geiger, 
2010), though more specialised devices claim higher resolutions (Microsemi, 2013). The 
impact of different timestamp resolution levels will now be critically analysed. In TTpHA, 
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each PTTi i+1 measurement is calculated from a number of time stamps. Each intermediate 
node records four timestamps in calculating ∆Ti ({TRREQr}i, {TRREQs}i, {TRREPr}i and {TRREPs}i), 
while the destination node correspondingly records two ({TRREQr}i and {TRREPs}i). The source 
node also records two time stamps in calculating RTT namely {TRREQs}i and {TRREPr}i. The 
measurement error due to the timestamp resolution (ETR) for each individual recorded 
timestamp lies within the bounds: 
0 ≤ 𝐸𝑇𝑅 < 𝑇𝑅 
(6.10)
The value of each recorded timestamp can therefore be expressed as 
{𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑠}𝒊 = {𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑟}𝒊 = {𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑠}𝒊 = {𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑟}𝒊 = 𝑇𝐴 + 𝐸𝑇𝑅 (6.11)
where TA is the actual time of arrival of the first bit of an incoming or actual transmission 
time of the first bit of an outgoing routing packet. For example, TR = 1 µs means that the 
wireless hardware is capable of registering an event, i.e. the arrival of the first bit of an 
incoming or transmission of the first bit of an outgoing packet, not more frequently than 
once every 1 µs. If the hardware checks for an event at time TC and the actual time of the 
event is for example, TA = TC+0.5 µs, then the event will be registered and a time stamp 
recorded at TC+TR, so ETR=(TC+TR) – TA. Conversely, if TA = TC then ETR = 0, but as this 
is a causal system, ETR must be positive because an event cannot be registered before it has 
occurred. Using eq. (6.10) and (6.11), the variability caused by ETR in each of the measured 
PTTi i+1 values is given by the following Lemma. 
 
Lemma 6.3: Assuming a uniform distribution for ETR, then each measured PTTi,i+1 value lies 
within the following bounds:   
(
𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1
𝑆
− 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐸𝑇𝑅)) ≤ 𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖,𝑖+1 ≤ (
𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1
𝑆
+ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐸𝑇𝑅)) 
(6.12)
where max(ETR) is the maximum ETR value within the range specified by eq. (6.10).  
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Proof: Since each PTTi,i+1 can be expressed as: 
𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖,𝑖+1 =
{𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑟 −  𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑠}𝑖 −  {𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑠 −  𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑟}𝑖+1
2
 
(6.13)
it is evident ETR gives the smallest possible PTTi,i+1 as ETR = max(ETR) when generating 
{TRREQs}i and {TRREPs}i+1, while ETR = 0 for all other timestamps. In this scenario PTTi i+1 will 
be close to the lower bound in eq. (6.12). Conversely, the highest possible PTTi,i+1 occurs as 
ETR = max(ETR) when generating {TRREPs}i and {TRREQr}i+1, with ETR = 0 for all other 
timestamps, which results in PTTi,i+1 being close to the upper bound in eq. (6.12).                                    
■ 
 
Using eq. (6.10 – 6.11) and Lemma 6.3, it can be concluded that a PM O-B wormhole will 
always be detected provided the following condition is upheld:  
(
𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
− 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐸𝑇𝑅)) >
(
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1)
𝑆 + 𝑚𝑎𝑥
(𝐸𝑇𝑅)) −  𝑄𝐶(
𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1)
𝑆 − 𝑚𝑎𝑥
(𝐸𝑇𝑅))
1 −  𝑄𝐶
 
(6.14)
Rearranging this equation gives: 
𝑇𝑅 <
𝑄𝐶(𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1) −  𝑟𝑊𝐻) +  𝑟𝑊𝐻 − 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1)
2𝑆
 
(6.15)
To illustrate the conditions in eq. (6.14) and (6.15), consider the 5 HC route infected with a 
PM O-B wormhole shown in Figure 6.4 where A is the source node and D is the destination 
node. If for example R = 250 m reflects an outdoor environment for IEEE 802.11n compliant 
hardware, rA,B = 50 m, rB,M1=rM2,C = 100 m, rC,D=R, and rwh = 750 m (i.e. a 3-hop wormhole), 
then eq. (6.15) indicates that the TR can be up to 182 ns and the wormhole is still detected 
with 100% probability. On the other hand if TR = 183 ns, eq. (6.15) is not upheld and as a 
result the wormhole goes undetected. For a longer wormhole link, e.g. 5 hop, then a larger 
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TR value can be tolerated, i.e. 551 ns. The TR tolerance is also dependent on the route HC 
since the wormhole detection performance of TTpHA improves with the number of 
measurement samples, as shown in Lemma 6.1. Using the same min(ri,i+1) and max(ri,i+1) 
values in the above example, the corresponding maximum tolerable TR values would be 501 
ns (3-hop wormhole) and 1097 ns (5-hop wormhole) if the route HC is as large as 15. It 
needs to be stressed that eq. (6.14) and (6.15) represents the worst case scenario where the 
PTTi,i+1 of the wormhole link obtains a value close to the lower bound defined in eq. (6.12). 
In contrast, when its value is close to the upper bound the likelihood for wormhole detection 
increases, so TTpHA provides satisfactory wormhole attack detection performance even for 
higher TR values than specified in eq. (6.15), as will be confirmed in the next Section.  
 
 
Figure 6.4: An example of a PM O-B wormhole infected route 
 
Mobility 
Node mobility during the route discovery procedure will have impact on a measured hop 
packet traversal time value PTTi,i+1 in the sense that it will not exactly correspond to the hop 
distance value ri,i+1 when at some time instant, node #i either sends a RREQ or receives a 
RREPAODV, unless of course, both nodes #i and #i+1 are moving in the same direction at the 
same speed. PTTi,i+1 will still represent a valid ri,i+1 that lies within the bounds specified by 
Lemma 6.2 because even though two successive nodes on a route are moving they are unable 
to communicate if ri,i+1 > Ri. For this reason, the wormhole attack detection performance of 
TTpHA will not be affected.  In the next Section, the detection performance of TTpHA will 
be rigorously evaluated. 
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6.3. Simulation and Results Analysis 
A series of experiments were undertaken to critically analyse the performance metrics, i.e. 
the wormhole detection rate eq. (4.1) and the FP rate eq. (4.2), for different wormhole 
lengths, Ri variations, and TR values. The impact of node mobility on wormhole attack 
detection performance was also evaluated. The simulation environment used for these 
experiments, with relevant parameters and applied mobility model, was detailed in Chapter 
4. TTHCA (Karlsson et al., 2011) and M-TTM (Qazi et al., 2013) were used as comparators, 
because TTpHA is an extended version of TTHCA and uses a similar packet delay analysis 
scheme as M-TTM. As discussed in Chapter 3, the proposed 2 ms fixed threshold for the 
maximum permissible difference between any measure hop round trip time vlaue RTTi,i+1 
and expected RTTi,i+1 is not feasible for PM O-B wormhole detection. Therefore, a wormhole 
is suspected if a measured RTTi,i+1 > expected RTTi,i+1 in these experiments.  Both an outdoor 
and an indoor MANET environment is considered, with the respective parameter settings 
being defined in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1: Specific simulation parameter settings used for outdoor and indoor environments. 
Parameter Outdoor settings Indoor settings 
Number of nodes (N) 300 300 
Network width (W) 1000 m 100 m 
Netowrk length (L) 4000 m 400 m 
Maximum radio range (R) 250 m 70 m 
Number of infected (NIR) and 
healthy route samples (NHR) 
200 200 
 
In both environments, it is assumed all nodes use IEEE 802.11n compliant wireless hardware 
which determines the corresponding R values in Tables 6.1 (Barker et al., 2015). The same 
outdoor environment dimensions and value of N are used as in Chapter 5 (Jen et al., 2009), 
while the indoor environment dimensions were chosen to reflect a large building. In a real 
MANET, the momentary radio range Ri will be dependent on the antenna used and node 
surroundings. For example, in an indoor environment containing obstructions like walls, Ri 
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will be smaller than when the node is located in a direct LOS. To reflect the different 
surroundings and variations in node hardware, a random Ri distance value lying in the range 
min(Ri) ≤ Ri ≤ R is introduced. The results from these experiments will be presented in the 
following subsections.  
6.3.1. Variable Radio Range 
In the first set of experiments, the comparative detection performance of TTpHA, TTHCA, 
and M-TTM were evaluated for different levels of Ri variability and wormhole lengths. The 
results shown in Figure 6.5, reveal that radio range variability for TTpHA, does not 
negatively impact upon the wormhole detection performance in the way it did for TTHCA, 
where the combination of a short wormhole link and high radio range variability led to a 
significant deterioration in the detection rates. In contrast, for TTpHA > 90% of the 
wormhole infected routes were detected in the outdoor and > 80% in the indoor environment 
for all tested variations in Ri.  
 
In the outdoor scenario, the wormhole detection rate tended to fall with increased Ri 
variability. For example, the detection rate of the 3-hop wormhole was  95% for min(Ri) = 
R and 90% for min(Ri) = 0.2R. The opposite trend was observed for the indoor environment, 
with the wormhole detection rate being 82% in the 3-hop wormhole case for min(Ri )= R and 
100% for min(Ri) = 0.2R. The reason for this is that the route HC in the indoor environment 
was often < 5 when min(Ri) = R. Hence, the condition in eq. (6.6) has a significantly higher 
probability of being upheld when min(Ri) = 0.2R since the average route HC is then 
significantly higher than when min(Ri) = R.  In the outdoor environment, the average route 
HC was higher than in the indoor environment and therefore eq (6.6) was mostly upheld 
even for min(Ri) = R.   
 
The detection performance of TTHCA drops dramatically for min(Ri )< R because it is based  
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on the average PTT/HC and when Ri < R then the average ri,i+1 is low in relation to R and so 
the eq. (5.8) condition does not hold.  M-TTM on the other hand, provided 100% detection 
of all wormholes in the outdoor environment and indoors for 5-hop wormholes but not for 
wormholes shorter than 5 hop. 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Comparative TTpHA and M-TTM wormhole detection and FP performance for different 
wormhole lengths and radio range variabilities. 
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The reason is that M-TTM assumes PDMAX = 1 µs when calculating the estimated RTTi,i+1 
(as discussed in Section 3.2.7) and since in these simulations a wormhole is suspected if the 
measured RTTi,i+1 > the estimated RTTi,i+1 it means that any wormhole link with  rwh > 
1µ𝑠
𝑆
 
is detected. A cursory analysis of the results reveals that TTpHA is much more flexible since 
it can automatically adjust its threshold to the prevailing environment while M-TTM and 
TTHCA are essentially only applicable in outdoor environments.  
 
In terms of the corresponding FP rates, it was observed that the level of Ri variability does 
impact on the performance of TTpHA since in the outdoor environment the FP rate was just 
4% when all Ri = R while it was 10% when 0.2R ≤ Ri ≤ R. The corresponding FP rates in 
the indoor environment were marginally lower at 2% and 8% respectively. These results can 
be reduced by choosing a higher confidence value α in determining the threshold, however 
this will decrease wormhole detection rates. From a detection perspective, a FP rate of up 
to 10% is still a laudable outcome when cognisance is made of the significant detection 
improvement achieved by TTpHA compared to both TTHCA and M-TTM. Furthermore, a 
higher FP rate does not mean a node cannot communicate with a destination node, but rather 
that it simply is unable to use the shortest route.  
 
It needs to be noted that the fixed thresholds used in M-TTM and TTHCA can be manually 
adjusted to indoor situations to provide similar detection performance to those achieved for 
outdoor environments. However, since this would involve a decrease in the actual threshold 
values, M-TTM and TTHCA would at the same time generate a larger number of false 
positive detections in the outdoor environment. This highlights a key benefit of TTpHA, 
namely its ability to automatically adapt to its environment and move seamlessly between 
different surroundings without requiring manual parameter intervention.      
 
These results are based on the assumption that each time stamp used in all three detection  
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techniques can be recorded with a 1 ns measurement accuracy, which is not a wholly realistic 
assumption for all constituent MANET hardware. Consequently, the next Section presents a 
performance insight into relaxing this assumption.  
6.3.2. Time Measurement Accuracy  
The next series of experiments analysed the requirements imposed upon wireless interface 
hardware in regard to the timestamp resolution tolerances required to monitor and process 
in-coming and out-going routing packets. Again different wormhole lengths were used and 
the performance of TTpHA and M-TTM was tested across a range of TRs from 1 ns to 1 µs, 
where for example, TR = 10 ns means that every node is capable of both detecting and 
timestamping reception or transmission of a routing packet every 10 ns. In these 
experiments, a radio range variability of 0.2R ≤  Ri ≤  R was used to reflect a realistic mixture 
of node hardware and obstacles. Due its overall poor wormhole detection performance in 
highly variable radio range scenarios, TTHCA was not included as a comparator in this 
particular results analysis.  
 
The simulation results shown in Figure 6.6 conclusively prove that TTpHA wormhole 
detection performance does not significantly decrease in either outdoor or indoor 
environments. Even for the case TR = 100 ns, more than 90% of all tested wormholes were 
successfully detected. The reason for this is logical in the outdoor scenario because the 
maximum allowable TR value in eq. (6.15) >100 ns when the route HC ≥ 5 and rwh = 750 
m, while in this environment the majority of the obtained wormhole infected routes had more 
than 5 hops.  
 
The corresponding maximum tolerable TR value for the indoor environment does not exceed 
100 ns before the route HC ≥ 9. However, since each hop packet traversal time value PTTi,i+1 
can vary within the bounds specified in Lemma 6.3, the eq. (6.15) condition is only 
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compromised in exceptional circumstances, so the wormhole detection rate does not 
significantly decrease even though a large proportion of the wormhole infected routes were 
shorter than 9 hops. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Comparative TTpHA and M-TTM wormhole detection performance and FP detections for 
different wormhole lengths and TR values. 
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Even when TR = 1 µs, TTpHA still provides good performance in the outdoor environment 
scenario with a detection rate of 90% for all wormholes. For the indoor environment, the 
wormhole detection performance becomes heavily degraded when TR = 1 µs with a 
detection rate of only 30-50%. The reason is that TR is in fact larger than any 
𝑟𝑖,𝑖+1
𝑆
 as well 
as 
𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
 and therefore it is in practice impossible to discern a healthy from a wormhole infected 
link which is evidenced by the corresponding FP rate (~32%) being akin to the detection 
rate.  
 
When TR = 1 µs, M-TTM interestingly detected nearly 30% of the 3-hop wormholes and up 
to 50% of the 4-hop wormholes in the indoor environment even though for both wormhole 
lengths 
𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
 < PDMAX. The reason for this is that (PDMAX - 
𝑟𝑤ℎ
𝑆
) < TR and as a result ETR often 
causes a measured wormhole link PTTi,i+1 to be > PDMAX. While these are still poor results, 
the detection rate of the 5-hop wormhole was satisfactory as more than 70% of the 
wormholes were detected compared to 50% for TTpHA. However, when cognisance is taken 
of the overall wormhole detection performance, TTpHA is strikingly superior because it 
offers greater flexibility than M-TTM in detecting all wormholes types at consistently high 
rates in both indoor and outdoor environments, even when TR =100 ns. In contrast, M-TTM 
cannot detect 3 and 4-hop wormholes at all, in the indoor scenario.  
 
While the FP rate tends to increase for TTpHA with growing TR values, the rate never 
exceeds 13% when TR ≤ 100 ns in either of the tested environments. This is a satisfactory 
outcome since there is still an 87% probability of finding the shortest healthy route between 
the source and destination nodes. When TR = 1 µs the FP rates for the outdoor and the 
indoor environments are 37% and 32% respectively which although high, are still acceptable 
since they only marginally exceed the baseline comparator ground truth (30%) established 
in Chapter 4. This confirms that TTpHA is able to be implemented in outdoor environments 
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using existing off-the-shelf IEEE 802.11n compliant wireless hardware. In the outdoor 
environment, the wormhole detection rate of M-TTM was, as for TTpHA, unchanged under 
all tested TR values. However, for TR = 1 µs, M-TTM generated a FP rate of 62% which 
is too high as it means in only 38% of cases can the shortest route be used for communication. 
The reason for this high FP rate is that 
𝑃𝐷𝑀𝐴𝑋 – 𝑅
𝑆
 = 166 ns which is much less than TR = 1 
µs and therefore there is a high likelihood that the measured RTTi,i+1 of a healthy route > the 
estimated RTTi,i+1.  
 
So far, it has been assumed that nodes are stationary in both environments during the route 
discovery procedure. In the next Section this particular assumption will be relaxed. 
6.3.3. Mobility 
In this set of experiments, the impact of node mobility on wormhole detection rates is 
analysed. The respective comparative results for stationary and moving nodes are displayed 
in Figures 6.7 and 6.8 for the outdoor and indoor scenarios. The RWM model was chosen 
for simulating node movement with the maximum velocity assumed to be 33.3 m/s for 
outdoors and 2.5 m/s for indoors, reflecting the maximum speeds of a car driving along a 
motorway and walking pace of humans respectively. The results reveal that node mobility 
does not have any effect on either TTpHA or M-TTM wormhole detection performance in 
either environment which supports the claim made in Section 6.2. TTpHA false positive 
detection is slightly increased as a result of mobility in the outdoor environment when TR = 
100 ns while the FP rates are similar when TR = 1 µs. The reason for this is that node 
mobility causes higher variability in PTTi i+1 values which naturally increases the FP rate.  
 
On the other hand, when TR = 1 µs the variability in PTTi,i+1 caused by measurement errors 
is significantly higher than variabilities due to mobility and therefore the FP rate is not 
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increased in this case. For M-TTM, the FP rate interestingly decreases from 62% to 33% in 
the outdoor environment when nodes are moving and TR = 1 µs.  
 
 
Figure 6.7: Comparative TTpHA and M-TTM wormhole detection performance and FP detections in 
the outdoor environment for both stationary and moving nodes.  
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Figure 6.8: Comparative TTpHA and M-TTM wormhole detection performance and FP detections in 
the indoor environment for both stationary and moving nodes.  
 
The reason is that the ri,i+1 on a route tends to decrease when nodes are moving because if 
ri,i+1 between two nodes is close to R they can easily move out-of-range from each other,  
which breaks the communications link between these nodes even before the route discovery 
procedure has finished. In the indoor environment, no significant differences were observed 
in TTpHA and M-TTM FP rates since nodes were moving at a significantly lower speed. 
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6.3.4. Statistical Significance Tests 
To assess the statistical significance of the observed differences between TTpHA and 
TTHCA/M-TTM the Fisher’s exact test (McDonald, 2014) was applied in a similar manner 
to that presented in Chapter 5. Again, the rationale behind this test was to statistically 
determine whether the choice of wormhole detection mechanism is related to the wormhole 
detection and FP rates. The hypotheses were defined as follows: 
 
H0: TTpHA performance = TTHCA/M-TTM performance 
H1: TTpHA performance ≠ TTHCA/M-TTM performance 
 
The detailed significance test results for all test cases are presented in Tables 6.2 – 6.4. The 
results confirm that the wormhole detection and FP rate differences observed between 
TTpHA and TTHCA/M-TTM are statistically significant, i.e. p(H0 = true) < 0.05, in most 
cases and most importantly, when TTpHA exhibited clear superior performance compared 
to TTHCA/M-TTM. In the test scenarios were H0 = true, the observed detection rates of 
both comparative detection algorithms were either identical or only negligible differences 
were identified i.e. mostly below 3% and in these cases the conclusion could be reasonably 
made that the performance of both algorithms were equivalent. 
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Table 6.2: Fisher’s exact test results for the variable radio range test cases where p is the probability 
that H0 is true. 
Environment Wormhole 
length 
(hops) 
TTpHA vs. TTHCA TTpHA vs. M-TTM 
R ≤ Ri ≤ R 0.6R ≤ Ri ≤ R 0.2R ≤ Ri ≤ R R ≤ Ri ≤ R 0.6R ≤ Ri ≤ R 0.2R ≤ Ri ≤ R 
Outdoor 
3 
H0 = false  
(p < 0.0001) 
H0 = false  
(p < 0.0001) 
H0 = false  
(p = 0.0301) 
H0 = false  
(p<0.0001) 
H0 = false  
(p = 0.0004) 
4 
H0 = true 
(p = 1.0000)  
H0 = false  
(p < 0.0073) 
H0 = false  
(p < 0.0001) 
5 
H0 = true 
(p = 0.1231)   
H0 = true 
(p = 0.1231)   
H0 = false  
(p = 0.0004)  
FP 
H0 = false  
(p = 0.0073)  
H0 = false  
(p = 0.0073)  
H0 = false    
(p < 0.0001)   
Indoor 
3 - 4 
H0 = false  
(p < 0.0001) 
H0 = false  
(p < 0.0001) 
5 
H0 = true 
p = 0.4987  
H0 = true  
(p=1.0000) 
FP 
H0 = true  
(p = 0.1231)  
H0 = false  
(p = 0.0017)  
H0 = false  
(p < 0.0001) 
H0 = true  
(p = 0.1231) 
H0 = false  
(p = 0.0017) 
H0 = false  
(p < 0.0001) 
 
Table 6.3: Fisher’s exact test results for the variable TR test cases where p is the probability that H0 is 
true. 
Environment Wormhole 
length 
(hops) 
TTpHA vs. M-TTM 
TR = 10 ns TR = 100 ns TR = 1 µs 
Outdoor 
3 
H0 = false  
(p < 0.0001) 
4 
H0 = false  
(p < 0.0001) 
H0 = false  
(p = 0.0004) 
H0 = false  
(p < 0.0001) 
5 H0 = false  
(p < 0.0001) FP 
Indoor 
3 
H0 = false  
(p < 0.0001) 
H0 = true 
(p = 0.1579) 
4 
H0 = false  
(p = 0.0197) 
5 
H0 = false  
(p = 0.0301) 
H0 = true  
(p = 0.4987) 
H0 = false  
(p < 0.0001) 
FP 
H0 = false  
(p < 0.0001) 
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Table 6.4: Fisher’s exact test results for variable TR under the influence of node mobility where p is the 
probability that H0 is true. 
Environment Wormhole 
length 
(hops) 
TTpHA vs. M-TTM 
TR = 10 ns TR = 100 ns TR = 1 µs 
Outdoor 
3 
H0 = false 
p < (0.0001) 
H0 = false 
(p = 0.0017) 
H0 = false 
(p < 0.0001) 
4 – 5 
H0 = false 
(p < 0.0001) 
FP 
H0 = false 
(p < 0.0001) 
H0 = true 
(p = 0.9163) 
Indoor 
3 
H0 = false 
(p < 0.0001) 
H0 = false 
(p = 0.0005) 
4 
H0 = true 
(p = 0.3641) 
5 
H0 = true 
(p = 1.0000) 
H0 = true 
(p = 0.1231) 
H0 = false 
(p < 0.0001) 
FP 
H0 = false 
(p < 0.0001) 
 
6.3.5. Computational and Network Traffic Overheads 
The only additional processing costs incurred by TTpHA in comparison with TTHCA and 
M-TTM are the source node operations relating to the Q-test outlier technique used to 
calculate the dynamic threshold Θ in eq. (6.4) and the PTTi calculations performed at the 
intermediate nodes. This involves determining and ranking PTTi,i+1 values which incurs 
order of time complexities of O(HC) and O(HC2) respectively, but since HC is a very small 
value, this is a negligible increase in the overheads. At each intermediate node, PTTi has to 
be computed and added to a new RREP packet parameter which is not required in TTHCA. 
This involves one operation and a 32∙HCi bits larger RREP than in TTHCA, where HCi refers 
to the HC from the intermediate node #i to the destination. While all these operations are 
also required in M-TTM, with the exception of ranking, the M-TTM PTTi values are 
calculated at the source and the corresponding RREP packets are 3∙32∙HCi bits longer than 
those in TTpHA. So to summarize, as well as being a more flexible wormhole detection 
solution, TTpHA consistently affords significant performance improvements in comparison 
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with TTHCA and M-TTM, while incurring a very small cost in computation and network 
traffic overheads.  
6.3.6. Results Discussion 
The presented results show that TTpHA significantly improves PM O-B wormhole detection 
compared to TTHCA especially in the challenging scenarios of either a short wormhole 
length < 4 hops or when there is high variability in node radio ranges. TTpHA is able to 
adapt to different environments as the wormhole detection rate is almost identical for both 
test environments, i.e. outdoors (R = 250 m) and indoors (R = 70 m), while both TTHCA 
and M-TTM worked in only one environment. In this context, TTpHA successfully fulfils 
research Objective 2 and also Objective 1 to a higher extent than TTHCA because of its 
enhanced detection performance for short PM O-B wormholes. A summary of the high level 
characteristics of TTpHA is provided in Table 6.5.  
 
Table 6.5: Summary of desired characteristic and outcomes for TTpHA. 
Desirable Characteristics Summary 
100% wormhole detection 
Detection rate for PM O-B wormholes =100% for indoor 
environments when TR = 1 ns and min(Ri) = 0.2R.  
In other test scenarios, detection rate > 90%.  
Network topology independent Detection rate = 100% when the route HC > 5. 
No FP  Generally < 10% 
Low computational overheads Complexity is O(HC) or O(HC2), where HC is a small integer.  
Negligible bandwidth load 
Routing packet RREPTTpHA introduces a short delay on route 
discovery and small bandwidth cost for intermediate nodes.   
Handles dissimilar node hardware and 
different network environments 
Using a dynamic threshold, variable R or Ri has no impact on 
detection performance. 
 
A constraint upon TTpHA is if the route HC < 5, then the condition in eq. (6.6) may on some 
occasions, not hold if there is a high variation in ri,i+1.. Therefore 100% wormhole detection 
is not achieved. While FP detections are generated in all test cases, the defined baseline 
comparator ground truths for both wormhole detection rate (≥ 70%) and FP rate (≤ 30%) 
were still fulfilled by a clear margin in most test scenarios. These restrictions however, are 
more than offset by the benefits derived from the significant security improvements TTpHA 
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delivers compared to TTHCA and the state-of-the-art solution M-TTM. A common 
limitation of both the framework contributions and M-TTM is their inability to detect PM 
O-B wormholes when low TR hardware is used in indoor environments where radio ranges 
are short. Some preliminary ideas for possible solutions to this challenging issue will be 
presented in the Future Work (Chapter 8). 
6.4. Summary 
This Chapter has presented a new wormhole detection algorithm, TTpHA, which extends 
TTHCA to significantly improve detection performance by analysing PTT for each hop 
(PTTi,i+1), rather than the average PTT. The most distinguishing feature of TTpHA is its use 
of a dynamic threshold for the maximum permissible PTTi,i+1 which enables TTpHA to adapt 
to variable radio ranges in diverse environments and dissimilar node hardware. Results 
confirm that TTpHA performed well in both indoor and outdoor environments, in contrast 
to the fixed threshold based comparators, TTHCA and M-TTM, which were only effective 
in the outdoor environment. The assumption for high TR hardware and stationary nodes was 
relaxed and TTpHA requirements on TR for different environments and the impact of node 
mobility on the detection performance were critically analysed. It was proven that TTpHA 
can both tolerate low TR hardware and use off-the-shelf IEEE 802.11n compliant wireless 
hardware in outdoor environments. So far, it has been assumed all acquired PTT 
measurements are accurate and have not been fabricated. This assumption will be examined 
in the next Chapter where the impact of PTT measurement time tampering on TTHCA and 
TTpHA wormhole detection performance will be rigorously analysed and a novel time 
tampering detection extension introduced. 
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7. IDENTIFYING PACKET TRAVERSAL TIME MEASUREMENT 
TAMPERING   
7.1. Introduction 
Packet delay based wormhole detection schemes which are based on analysing packet 
traversal time (PTT), such as TTHCA, TTpHA and M-TTM, provide superior wormhole 
attack detection performance compared to round trip time (RTT)-based schemes, but 
simultaneously bring new security treats related to the time measurements. To be able to 
calculate route PTT or hop PTT (PTTi,i+1), the source node or any intermediate node needs 
to cooperate with other nodes as PTT is calculated by reducing packet processing times at 
intermediate nodes from RTT.  A potential weakness in this process is that under specific 
conditions, participation mode (PM) wormhole nodes can alter their time measurements and 
prevent the wormhole from being detected.  
 
In this Chapter, the impact of time tampering attacks on the wormhole detection performance 
of TTHCA and TTpHA is critically analysed and a novel solution, called ΔT vector extension 
(ΔTVE), is introduced as an extension to TTHCA and TTpHA to identify time tampering in 
PM in-band (I-B) wormholes. ΔTVE replaces the ΔTTOT parameter in the RREPTTHCA/TTpHA 
packet with a list of the individual routing packet processing delay (ΔTi) values from all 
intermediate nodes. A tampered ΔTi can then be identified by the source node as it will 
typically be significantly larger than a healthy ΔTi when the wormhole uses an I-B link. In 
the next Section the conditions and nature of a time tampering attack will be rigorously 
analysed before ΔTVE is introduced in Section 7.3.  
7.2. The Time Tampering Attack 
A wormhole node can potentially prevent TTHCA and TTpHA from detecting infected 
routes by adding a fictive packet processing time ∆TF to the ∆TTOT parameter of the 
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RREPTTHCA/TTPCA packet. It is though important to point out that time tampering is not a 
modification attack per se as the wormhole nodes never alter routing packet parameters, but 
instead produce false measurement information. Therefore, schemes designed to prevent 
packet alteration by for example, encrypting all routing packet parameters, will be 
ineffectual against a TTHCA or TTpHA time tampering attack even though they prevent 
malicious nodes from tampering with ∆Ti values of the legitimate nodes. The conditions and 
requirements for launching a successful time tampering attack, from the attackers’ point of 
view, are in TTHCA and TTpHA slightly different due to their distinct time measurement 
strategies. These will be respectively examined in Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.   
7.2.1. Time Tampering in TTHCA 
In TTHCA, a wormhole infected route has high PTT/HC and therefore the wormhole nodes 
must artificially produce a lower PTT than in reality for that route to avoid being detected. 
This can be accomplished by increasing ∆TTOT. However, since ∆TTOT >> PTT and ∆Ti 
values may incur large variations it is challenging for the wormhole nodes to know exactly 
how to set ∆TF as it must be precisely defined within a narrow time window to achieve 
successful time measurement tampering. This window is defined in the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 7.1: Assuming constant S and identical R for all nodes, then ∆TF must lie within the 
following bounds to achieve a successful time tampering attack: 
(𝑅𝑇𝑇 − ∆𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑇 − 2𝐻𝐶
𝑅
𝑆
) ≤  ∆𝑇𝐹 ≤ (𝑅𝑇𝑇 −  ∆𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑇) 
(7.1)  
Proof: If ∆TF is less than the lower bound, TTHCA is still able to detect the wormhole since 
in this case 
(𝑅𝑇𝑇−(∆𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑇 −∆𝑇𝐹))/2
𝐻𝐶
>  
𝑅
𝑆
  and hence eq. (5.3) is true. Conversely, if ∆TF is larger 
than the upper bound, the resulting PTT value calculated at the source node will be negative 
since then RTT < (∆TTOT +∆TF)).                               ■ 
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If the wormhole uses an I-B link, it is not possible for a malicious node to exactly know the 
time tampering window since it can only be aware of the R and S values in eq. (7.1). 
However, successful time tampering is still feasible if the malicious nodes (M1 and M2) can 
estimate the RTT of the wormhole link (RTTwh). In an I-B link, RTTwh can have high 
variations due to the variable packet processing times at nodes through which the wormhole 
is tunnelled. This makes the precise estimation of RTTwh challenging. One approach for 
estimating RTTwh for PM wormhole links is to use tightly synchronized clocks at the 
malicious nodes. During route discovery, wormhole node M1 adds the exact time 
information as a parameter within a separate tunnelled packet (RREQwh) after forwarding 
the RREQ to the other malicious node M2. Upon receiving RREQwh, M2 estimates the precise 
PD of the RREQ through the wormhole PDRREQ by comparing the received time information 
with its own clock. A similar process occurs when M2 returns RREPAODV to M1, with time 
information this time being added to the tunnelled RREPTTHCA to M2. When M1 receives the 
tunnelled RREPTTHCA, it calculates PDRREP to give 
𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑊𝐻 =  𝑃𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄 + 𝑃𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃 (7.2)
M1 can then add ∆TF defined as 
∆𝑇𝐹 = 𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑊𝐻 −  2
𝑅
𝑆
 
(7.3)
to ∆TTOT of the RREPTTHCA in addition to its own ∆Ti.  
 
Alternatively, the wormhole nodes can split the time tampering attack into two steps. Firstly, 
M2 adds the fictive value 
∆𝑇𝐹1 = 𝑃𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄 −  
𝑅
𝑆
 
(7.4)
before M1 adds  
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∆𝑇𝐹2 = 𝑃𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃 − 
𝑅
𝑆
 
(7.5)
∆TF = ∆TF1 + ∆TF2 is then added to ∆TTOT.  
 
Alternatively, if the wormhole uses an out-of-band (O-B) link ∆TF is easier to estimate 
provided the wormhole length rwh is known and the PD of the wormhole link is constant. If 
for example the O-B wormhole link is established using directional antennae, ∆TF can be 
estimated as:  
∆𝑇𝐹 = 2(
𝑟𝑤ℎ − 𝑅
𝑆
) 
(7.6)
To illustrate the conditions that must prevail for TTHCA time tampering to be achieved, 
consider the MANET example in Figure 7.1, where a PM I-B wormhole is formed by nodes 
M1 and M2 which tunnel routing packets between each other via I2 and I3.   
 
 
Figure 7.1: MANET scenario where A and D are the source and destination nodes, M1 and M2 are 
malicious wormhole nodes and ti is 2 ∙ PTTi,i+1. 
 
It is assumed for simplicity that all nodes are in an idle state, have identical hardware, and 
the inter-node distance is the same, so both ti and ∆Ti values are constant. Let ti = 1600 ns 
and ∆Ti = 8 ms for all i. If RTTwh = 16.0048 ms then RTT = 56.0112 ms. For this PM I-B 
scenario, the HC is 5 and ∆TTOT = 40 ms, so from eq. (5.2) source node A calculates PTT = 
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8.0056 ms giving PTT/HC = 1.60112 ms. If it is assumed that R = 250 m, then from eq. 
(5.3) the upper bound for PTT/HC = 833 ns which means TTHCA will successfully detect 
the wormhole. Using eq. (7.1), it can be determined that M1 and M2 are able to prevent 
detection by increasing ∆TTOT with a value ∆TF when 16.002867 ms ≤ ∆TF ≤ 16.0112 ms 
 
 
This means that the time tampering window is only 8.33 s wide which is a stringent 
constraint. However, if synchronized clocks are being used by both M1 and M2, it is still a 
realistic design tolerance in achieving wormhole detection avoidance.  
 
In this PM I-B example, both M1 and M2 will calculate ∆TF = 16.003133 ms which implies 
that the tampered value falls within the window in eq. (7.1) defined in Lemma 7.1 to avoid 
wormhole discovery. In these circumstances, the tampered measurement results in ∆TTOT = 
56.003133 ms. From eq. (5.2) the source node A calculates PTT = 4.033 ns and PTT/HC = 
806 ns. This means that this wormhole route will be undetected by TTHCA. 
7.2.2. Time Tampering in TTpHA 
A wormhole infected route is detected in TTpHA if any hop packet traversal time (PTTi,i+1) 
is larger than the dynamic threshold Θ  in eq. (6.4). Malicious nodes must therefore 
artificially produce a PTTi,i+1 ≤ Θ to avoid detection which, as in the case of TTHCA above, 
is accomplished by increasing ∆TTOT. Since however, the PTT is analysed for each hop in 
TTpHA rather than the average PTT as in TTHCA, the time tampering window is narrower 
than in Lemma 7.1 and is formally defined as follows.  
 
Lemma 7.2: Assume two malicious wormhole nodes M1 and M2 and the next hop node M3 
to M2 on a route towards the destination node, then ∆TF must lie within the following bounds 
to achieve a successful time tampering attack: 
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((2𝑃𝑇𝑇1 − 2𝛩 ) − 2𝑃𝑇𝑇2) ≤  ∆𝑇𝐹 < (2𝑃𝑇𝑇1 − 2𝑃𝑇𝑇2 ) (7.7)  
Proof: PTT1,2 = 𝑃𝑇𝑇1 − 𝑃𝑇𝑇2 =
((𝑅𝑇𝑇1−{∆𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑇}2 )−(𝑅𝑇𝑇2−{∆𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑇}3))
2
 where {∆TTOT}i refers to 
the ∆TTOT  parameter as calculated at node #i after it has added its own ∆Ti. So when ∆TF is 
added to {∆TTOT}2, then evidently PTT1,2 > Θ when ∆TF is less than the lower bound in eq. 
(7.7). Conversely, if ∆TF is greater than or equal to the upper bound then PTT1,2 ≤ 0.          ■ 
 
As Θ is unknown by the malicious nodes, either ∆TF or ∆TF1 and ∆TF2 cannot be estimated 
as in eq. (7.3) or eq. (7.4) and eq. (7.5). Instead, the malicious nodes can use for instance, 
the PTTi values in the RREPTTpHA packet and then set ∆TF as: 
∆𝑇𝐹 = 𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑊𝐻 −  2𝑃𝑇𝑇2 (7.8)
when M3 is the destination node, or otherwise: 
∆𝑇𝐹 = 𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑊𝐻 −  2(𝑃𝑇𝑇2 − 𝑃𝑇𝑇3) (7.9)
The rationale behind this is that since PTTi,i+1 is calculated in accordance to eq. (6.1) and 
(6.2) the malicious nodes can by defining ∆TF as in eq. (7.8) and (7.9) create the illusion that  
PTT1,2 is equivalent to PTT2,3. Correspondingly, to split ∆TF in two parts, M2 can set ∆TF1 
and M1 ∆TF2 as 
∆𝑇𝐹1 = 𝑃𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄 −  𝑃𝑇𝑇2 (7.10)
∆𝑇𝐹2 = 𝑃𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃 −  𝑃𝑇𝑇2 (7.11) 
if node M3 is the destination node, otherwise  
∆𝑇𝐹1 = 𝑃𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄 −  (𝑃𝑇𝑇2 −  𝑃𝑇𝑇3) (7.12)
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∆𝑇𝐹2 = 𝑃𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃 −  (𝑃𝑇𝑇2 −  𝑃𝑇𝑇3) (7.13) 
In applying either eq. (7.10 and 7.11) or eq. (7.12 and 7.13), M1 must also decrease PTT1 by 
subtracting it with an artificial value PTTF, otherwise the calculated PTTi,i+1 value for the 
previous hop to M1 will be negative if RTTwh is high, i.e. the wormhole uses an I-B link . To 
prevent this, M1 can set PTTF for instance as: 
𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐹 =  
∆𝑇𝐹2
2
 
(7.14)
These value selections for PTTF, ∆TF1 and∆TF2 create the illusion that PTT1,2 (the PTT of the 
wormhole link) is the same as PTT2,3 and so the wormhole goes undetected. 
 
If the wormhole uses an O-B link, ∆TF is easier to estimate provided the wormhole length 
rwh is known and the PD of the wormhole link is constant. For such a wormhole, ∆TF can be 
estimated analogously to eq. (7.6) with R replaced by either 2(𝑃𝑇𝑇2 − 𝑃𝑇𝑇3) or 
alternatively 2𝑃𝑇𝑇2, if node M3 is the destination. 
 
To illustrate a scenario where malicious nodes M1 and M2 launch a time tampering attack on 
TTpHA, consider the MANET example in Figure 7.1 again, with ti = 1600 ns  and ∆Ti = 8 
ms for all i, PDRREQ = 4.0012 ms and PDRREP = 12.0036 ms. In this example, all relevant 
node time measurements together with the ∆TF1, ∆TF2, and PTTF values calculated at the two 
malicious nodes are presented in Table 7.1, for the both the case of a time tampering attack 
launched in accordance to eq. (7.12 – 7.14), and where no time tampering occurs.  
 
When there is no time tampering, source node A calculates PTTi,i+1 = 800 ns, from eq. (6.1) 
and (6.2), for all i except i = 1 (PTTM1, M2) which will be 8.0024 ms. Hence, from eq. (6.4) 
Θ = 800 ns and the wormhole link will be correctly detected. 
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Table 7.1: Time measurement values for the Figure 7.1 MANET example scenario with ti = 1600 ns and 
∆Ti = 8 ms for all i, PDRREQ = 4.0012 ms and PDRREP = 12.0036 ms. 
No time tampering 
Node 
RTTi  
eq. (5.1) 
{∆TTOT}i 
  
PTTi 
eq. (5.2) 
PTTi,i+1 
eq. (6.1)/  
(6.2) 
∆TF1 
eq. (7.12) 
∆TF2 
eq. (7.13) 
PTTF 
eq. (7.14) 
D - 8 ms - - - - - 
I4 8.0016 ms 16 ms 0.8 µs 800 ns - - - 
M2 16.0032 ms 24 ms 1.6 µs 800 ns - - - 
M1 40.008 ms 32 ms 8.004 ms 8.0024 ms - - - 
I1 48.0096 ms 40 ms 8.0048 ms 800 ns - - - 
A 56.00112 ms - 8.0056 ms 800 ns - - - 
 
Time tampering attack (tampered values in bold) 
Node 
RTTi  
eq. (5.1) 
∆TTOT 
  
PTTi 
eq. (5.2) 
PTTi,i+1 
eq. (6.1)/  
(6.2) 
∆TF1 
eq. (7.12) 
∆TF2 
eq. (7.13) 
PTTF 
eq. (7.14) 
D - 8 ms -  - - - 
I4 8.0016 ms 16 ms 0.8 µs 800 ns - - - 
M2 16.0032 ms 28.0004 ms 1.6 µs 800 ns 4.0004 ms - - 
M1 40.008 ms 48.0032 ms 2.4 µs 800 ns - 12.0028ms 6.0014 ms 
I1 48.0096 ms 56.0032 ms 3.2 µs 800 ns - - - 
A 56.00112 ms - 4.0 µs 800 ns - - - 
 
Conversely, if M2 and M1 respectively add the fictive values ∆TF1 = 4.0004 ms eq. (7.12) 
and ∆TF2 = 12.0028 ms eq. (7.13) to ∆TTOT , and M1 subtracts PTTF = 6.0014 ms eq. (7.14) 
from PTT1 then all PTTi,i+1 = 800 ns and the wormhole link will go undetected. Note this 
example ∆TF = ∆TF1 + ∆TF2 = 16.0032 ms is nearly the same as the corresponding TTHCA 
value of 16.003133 ms. The corresponding time tampering window for TTpHA is however, 
much narrower (see Lemma 7.2) i.e. 12.0028 ms ≤ ∆TF ≤ 12.0044 ms using eq. (7.7), with 
the respective windows for TTpHA and TTHCA being 1.6 s and 8.33 s. 
 
In the next Section, a new mechanism for identifying time tampering in PM I-B wormhole 
detection will be presented before it is critically evaluated in Section 7.4.  
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7.3.  The ∆T Vector Extension (ΔTVE) 
The previous Section showed that the essential condition for the TTHCA and TTpHA 
algorithms to be unable to detect a wormhole route is for the malicious nodes to increase 
∆TTOT within the strict bounds defined in Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2. Any successfully tampered 
∆TTOT is always greater than the actual ∆TTOT and this observation provided the motivation 
for investigating whether the ∆TTOT parameter can be analysed for identifying tampered 
values. Solely analysing ∆TTOT values will not necessarily identify time tampered wormhole 
routes because these values usually exhibit high variance.  Furthermore, O-B wormhole links 
only consist of transmission medium propagation delays and so only a very small ∆TF is 
required for successful tampering as formally defined in eq. (7.6). Analysing each individual 
∆Ti can though lead to acceptable time tampering detection in PM I-B wormhole detection 
and this strategy is utilized in ∆TVE as will now be introduced. 
 
In ∆TVE, ∆TTOT is replaced by a new ∆T vector comprising all measured ∆Ti values. This 
extension means that some new elements are introduced into the TTHCA and TTpHA route 
discovery process to support the embedding of this vector. These elements are highlighted 
in the flowcharts of Figures 7.2 and 7.3 by the shaded blocks. The RREQ broadcast 
procedures remain as in TTHCA and TTpHA, but instead of using a ∆TTOT parameter, the 
new ∆T vector is included in the RREPTTHCA/TTpHA packet by the destination node to which 
the destination node and each intermediate node inserts its individual ∆Ti as a new element. 
 
If a PM I-B wormhole attack is launched alongside a time tampering attack, at least one of 
the ∆T vector components will be falsely increased in accordance with eq. (7.3 – 7.5) or (7.8 
– 7.14). An outlier detection technique can now be applied to identify tampered ∆Ti values 
within the ∆T vector. If a suspicious ∆Ti is identified, TTHCA/TTpHA then requests a new 
route. On the other hand, if no suspicious ∆Ti is found, then TTHCA/TTpHA continues with 
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its normal wormhole attack detection procedure. The implementation of an outlier detection 
technique for identifying a tampered ∆Ti is described in detail in the next Section. 
 
 
Figure 7.2: The complete TTHCA/TTpHA route discovery procedure with the new ∆TVE elements as 
shaded blocks.  
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Figure 7.3: The ∆TVE extended TTHCA/TTpHA elements at the source node as shaded blocks.  
 
7.3.1. Identifying Tampered ∆Ti Values 
∆TVE assumes that a malicious node can only modify its own ∆Ti. This is a realistic 
assumption, since in an actual MANET environment routing packets must be secured from 
modification attacks for the routing process to be trustworthy. A wormhole link typically 
consists of two malicious nodes, therefore a ∆T vector received through a wormhole infected 
route will include either one or two tampered ∆Ti values. It is possible to distinguish 
tampered ∆Ti values from healthy ∆Ti measurements by applying an appropriate outlier 
detection technique, such as the Grubb’s test (Grubbs, 1969), Dixon’s Q-test (Dean & Dixon, 
1951) or the Box plot method (Tukey, 1977), though several conditions can affect the 
performance of the chosen outlier method. In this context, two distinct MANET scenarios are 
considered.  
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CASE 1: A node has been a part of the network for some time and generated a track record 
of ∆Ti values gained from ∆T vectors in earlier route discovery procedures. In this scenario, 
the availability of a large number of ∆Ti samples can be reasonably assumed.  
 
CASE 2: A node has joined the MANET for the first time and therefore the only available 
∆Ti values are those existing in the ∆T vector. 
 
Due to the inherently dynamic nature of a MANET, several different types of ∆Ti 
distributions can arise which will impact on the performance of the outlier detection scheme. 
The ideal is when all MANET nodes have identical hardware and the network traffic loads 
are low. Such a condition would result in negligible ∆Ti variations and time tampering is 
then straightforward to detect. This is not, however, a realistic MANET situation, because 
there are a myriad of factors which can cause ∆Ti variations. For example, mixed node 
processing capacities and packet service times, allied with high network traffic loads in 
certain parts of the MANET can lead to queuing delays at specific nodes.  
 
In a heterogeneous MANET consisting of uniformly distributed nodes where the network 
traffic load is low and there are no queuing delays, the ∆Ti values can be assumed to follow 
a uniform distribution. In MANETs with high network traffic load variations, however, some 
of the ∆Ti values will include queuing delays which will be much greater than the actual 
packet service times (Gao & Jäntti, 2004). The ∆Ti values will then tend to follow an 
assymetric distribution with only a small percentage of ∆Ti values being significantly larger 
than the average. For such a distribution, it is very challenging to discriminate a tampered 
from a normal ∆Ti value as a modified ∆Ti can potentially be lower than a healthy ∆Ti if the 
tampered measurement contains no queuing delay, while the healthy ∆Ti does contain.  
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The outlier detection method selected for time tampering detection purposes must therefore 
be applicable to both large and small ∆Ti datasets so that it can cover both CASE 1 and 
CASE 2 respectively, as well as for both uniform and asymmetric distributed measurements. 
As in TTpHA wormhole attack detection, Dixons Q-test (Dean & Dixon, 1951) was chosen 
for this purpose due to its simplicity and applicability to both small and large datasets. 
Assuming that a route can only be infected by one PM I-B wormhole, the Q-test is used to 
separately test the two largest ∆Ti values in the ∆T vector. The test is performed by first 
ranking the ∆T vector in order and then respectively calculating two Q values: 
𝑄1 =  
∆T𝐻𝐶 − ∆T𝐻𝐶−1 
∆T𝐻𝐶 − ∆T1
 
(7.15)
𝑄2 =  
∆T𝐻𝐶−1 − ∆T𝐻𝐶−2 
∆T𝐻𝐶−1 − ∆T1
 
(7.16)
Time tampering is suspected if either Q1 or Q2 is greater than the corresponding critical Q-
value for the chosen confidence level. In this analysis, a low confidence level of 80% was 
chosen, since from a security perspective, a higher time tampering detection rate is preferable 
to a low FP rate. The performance of ∆TVE will now be rigorously tested and critically 
analysed.  
7.4. Simulations and Results Analysis 
The performance metrics applied for ∆TVE, i.e. the detection and FP rates in eq. (4.1) and 
eq. (4.2) respectively, were analysed in the test environment using a customised ns-2 plugin 
that simulates different {∆TRREQ/RREP}i values as described in Chapter 4. The basis for the 
plugin was to be able to evaluate ∆TVE under a variety of conditions from a packet processing 
delay variability perspective, by providing an option to define different variation levels in 
packet service times TS and node traffic loads ρ when synthesising the processing delay of a 
RREQ/RREP packet at each node ({∆TRREQ/RREP}i).  In generating these values, each node is 
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assumed to have an OS that supports multi-programming, with a scheduler assigning equal 
time slices to each process in rotation. Thus a logical processor, with the capacity being the 
ratio of the physical processor capacity and the multi-programming level, executes each 
multi-programmed task in rotation. Nodes typically have different physical processing 
capacities and multi-programming levels, but the equivalent multi-programming level for 
each node will be relatively stable during a single route discovery procedure. The TS values 
of the RREQ and RREP packets are thus assumed to be the same at every node, while TS 
amongst different nodes is assumed to be variable. Many concurrent route detection 
procedures lead to routing packet queues in MANET nodes, since received routing packets 
must be sequentially processed to uphold route table updating requirements. For this reason, 
the packet processing times ({∆TRREQ/RREP}i) have been generated using the M/D/1 queuing 
model (Gross et al., 2008), which assumes Poisson distributed packet arrivals, deterministic 
TS, a single central processing unit, and an infinite maximum queue length. Hence, at each 
node   
{∆𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑄}𝑖 =  {∆𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃}𝑖 = 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 + 𝑇𝑆 =
𝑇𝑆(2 −  ⍴)
2(1 −  ⍴)
 
(7.17)
Variations in both node processing capacity and multiprogramming level are reflected by 
using random TS values from a uniform probability distribution of different intervals denoted 
by the relative standard deviation (σR), which is the standard deviation of all the packet 
service times divided by their average. Variable network traffic loads between nodes are 
mirrored by randomly selecting ρ on each node within the interval 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρmax, where ρmax 
is the maximum network traffic load per node. 
 
Both CASE 1 and CASE 2 scenarios were considered with time tampering attacks simulated 
in accordance with eq. (7.4) and (7.5). Note the results presented relate solely to the ∆TVE 
time tampering detection performance which will be identical for both TTHCA and TTpHA 
139 
algorithms, while the specific simulation parameters used for these tests are the same as 
those defined in Table 5.1. This reflects an outdoor environment, though the type of 
environment in terms of radio ranges in this case is irrelevant, as ∆TVE only analyses ∆Ti 
values. No comparators’ solutions are included since ∆TVE is the only mechanism that 
specifically addresses this type of time tampering attack, so the baseline ground truths 
established in Section 4.4 are employed in this analysis. The ∆TVE time tampering 
performance will now be tested separately for the CASE 1 and CASE 2 scenarios.  
7.4.1. CASE 1: MANET Nodes with ∆Ti Track Records  
In the first series of experiments, the situation where a node has been in the MANET for a 
period of time is analysed and there is a history of at least 15 previous ∆Ti values available. 
Figure 7.4 shows the impact of variations in both routing packet service time (σR) and 
network traffic load (ρmax) upon the time tampering detection performance for different 
wormhole lengths. The results reveal that for the ideal case where ∆Ti is constant, reflecting 
nodes having identical hardware and multiprogramming level (σR = 0) and each node carries 
negligible network traffic load (ρmax = 0), then 100% time tampering detection is achieved 
for all wormhole lengths with no corresponding false positives being detected (see Figure 
7.5). Predictably, as variations in ∆Ti increase, the time tampering detection rate falls and 
the FP rate increases, though the detection rate is still at least 86% for all wormhole lengths 
analysed even when σR = 0.35 and ρmax = 0.6.  
 
For wormhole lengths ≥ 5 hops, 87% of tampered ∆Ti values are successfully detected under 
all conditions when σR = 0.5 and ρmax = 0.9. A notably aspect of the performance of ∆TVE, 
is that a minimum of 74% of tampered ∆Ti values can still be detected even when the 
wormhole length is 4 hops. Pragmatically, this means that successfully launching a time 
tampering attack in wormholes greater than 4 hops will be extremely difficult to achieve 
since the probability of avoiding detection is less than 30%.  
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Figure 7.4: Time tampering detection performance for different wormhole lengths, for variable network 
traffic loads (ρmax), and for variable routing packet service times (σR) with at least 15 ∆Ti samples 
available.  
 
For 3-hop wormholes, the time tampering detection performance drops markedly when there 
are variations in either network traffic load or routing packet service times, because a healthy 
node can then often produce a higher ∆Ti than a tampered ∆Ti. This reflects the situation of 
heavy network traffic loads (ρ  1) causing unavoidably long queuing delays and/or high 
multiprogramming levels leading to increased service times for routing packets. In contrast, 
the wormhole nodes and those nodes through which routing packets are tunnelled may 
continue to have negligible loads (ρ  0) and correspondingly short packet service times.  
Despite this decline in performance, tampered ∆Ti values can still be detected with an 
accuracy of 57% for 3-hop wormholes, when σR = 0.5 and ρmax = 0.9. Despite this being 
lower than the baseline detection rate comparator (≥ 70%) defined in Chapter 4, it still 
represents an important advance to both TTHCA and TTpHA, especially when cognisance 
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is taken of the stringent criteria necessary to successfully launch a time tampering attack in 
the first instance.  
 
Figure 7.5: FP detection under variable network traffic loads (ρmax) and routing packet service times 
(σR) with at least 15 ∆Ti samples available. 
 
The corresponding FP rate remains  20% for the σR range considered, provided ρmax ≤ 0.6. 
The reason for this is that the Q-test compares the difference between the two largest ∆Ti 
values in relation to the difference between min(∆Ti) and max(∆Ti,) which will be 
approximately constant, regardless of the interval, provided the ∆Ti values are uniformly 
distributed. When ρmax = 0.9, the FP rate rises because the queuing delay of a node increases 
rapidly as ρ tends to 1, and the ∆Ti distributions are no longer uniform. This means a ∆Ti 
value from a node with high network traffic load can easily become confused with a 
tampered ∆Ti. Realistically however, even a FP rate of 30% is still a satisfactory outcome 
since it fulfils the baseline FP rate comparator bound defined in Chapter 4.  
7.4.2. CASE 2: MANET Nodes without ∆Ti Track Records  
The second set of experiments analysed the situation when a new node joins the MANET 
and requests a route for the first time. The same conditions are employed as in Section 7.4.1, 
though now it is assumed a priori knowledge is unavailable concerning previously measured 
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∆Ti values. The corresponding time tampering detection results are displayed in Figure 7.6. 
The absence of any track record means that detection performance is not as consistent as 
CASE 1, though a time tampering detection rate of ≥ 80% has still been achieved for all 
wormhole lengths when σR ≤ 0.2 and ρmax ≤ 0.6. For wormholes ≥ 5 hops, at least 68% of 
tampered ∆Ti values were correctly detected even when σR = 0.5 and ρmax = 0.9, though this 
is marginally below the baseline comparator level. The equivalent FP rates, displayed in 
Figure 7.7, were slightly higher than in CASE 1 for ρmax ≤ 0.6 though the baseline comparator 
was still met under these circumstances. The performance was more sensitive to high 
network traffic load variations (ρmax = 0.9) due to the smaller number of ∆Ti samples. 
Nevertheless, even a FP rate of 45% when ρmax = 0.9 does not completely interrupt network 
communication as more than half of all possible routes are available.  
 
Overall, the time tampering detection performance is less robust in CASE 2 when no ∆Ti 
track record is available, though this does typify the worst possible MANET situation, when 
a new node performs its first route discovery procedure. As a node repeatedly runs the route 
discovery procedure, the corresponding time tampering detection rate will quickly improve 
and converge towards the results presented for CASE 1. This implies that to strengthen the 
time tampering detection performance for new nodes, it is prudent to run a few route 
discovery procedures before starting to communicate within the network. This could for 
instance, be accomplished by specifying within the routing protocol that a node is not 
allowed to start communicating within a MANET until a minimum of 15 ∆Ti samples have 
been collected.  
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Figure 7.6: Time tampering detection performance for different wormhole lengths under variable 
network traffic loads (ρmax) and routing packet service times (σR) with no available ∆Ti track record. 
 
 
Figure 7.7: False positive detection under variable network traffic loads (ρmax) and routing packet 
service times (σR) with no available ∆Ti track record. 
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7.4.3. Network Overheads and Computational Complexity 
One of the consequences of ∆TVE is a larger RREPTTHCA/TTpHA packet size as it must contain 
the individual ∆Ti values of each intermediate node of a route, while the original TTHCA 
and TTpHA mechanism only required the sum ∆TTOT. The size of the ∆T vector is dependent 
on the route HC. If for example each ∆Ti value is represented by 32 bits, then the size of ∆T 
vector at node #i will be 32∙HCi. This contrasts with the corresponding RREPTTHCA/TTpHA 
packet which will have a 32 bits ∆TTOT value in each node. A ∆T vector with more than one 
element theoretically increases the transmission and reception time requirements for the 
routing packet. However, when cognisance is taken of the high bandwidths available in 
modern wireless technologies, then the extended RREP packets will have negligible 
performance impact.  
 
The time complexity analysis for the new ∆TVE reveals the only auxiliary cost incurred 
compared with the original TTHCA and TTpHA algorithms, is the outlier detection scheme 
performed by the source node, and the only extra operations are those involved in ranking 
the ∆T vector values. Since the number of ∆T vector values equals the route HC, the time 
required for ranking is O(HC2). However, ranking can be implemented as a linear search of 
four ∆T values, since the Q-test uses just the three largest and the smallest ∆T vector values, 
so the overall time complexity for ∆TVE is O(HC).  
7.4.4. Results Discussion 
The desired target in satisfactorily fulfilling research Objective 3 was to develop a solution 
that achieved 100% time tampering attack prevention in TTHCA and TTpHA for both I-B 
and O-B PM wormholes, with no false positive detections and minimal additional network 
overheads. In critically assessing the performance of ∆TVE, it broadly meets this goal and 
provides a significant improvement to both TTHCA and TTpHA by detecting a large 
proportion of time tampering attacks in PM I-B wormholes The results also confirm the 
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baseline comparator ground truth established in Chapter 4 is largely upheld, with in the 
majority of test cases, ∆TVE detecting over 70% of time tampering attacks in PM I-B 
wormholes longer than 4 hops, while the corresponding FP rate is < 30%. In shorter 
wormholes (< 5 hops), the lower ∆TF1 and ∆TF2 values make it more challenging for ∆TVE 
to identify time tampering, especially under the conditions of high σR and ρmax values. The 
cost in terms of network overhead is minor since the overall computational complexity is 
O(HC) and the increase of RREPTTHCA/TTPHA  packets is only 32 ∙ HCi at each node. While there 
are circumstances where ∆TVE does not always maintain the baseline comparator detection 
rates for I-B wormholes, even the worst-case time tampering detection rate is still ≈ 50% 
which can be viewed as a notable security enhancement to the original TTHCA and TTpHA 
algorithms taking into account the practical complexities of launching a tampering attack. 
To fully meet Objective 3, further investigations are needed into suitable strategies to both 
decrease the FP rate and improve the accuracy of time tampering detection, especially for  
PM O-B wormhole links, across the range of σR and ρmax values.  
7.5. Summary  
This Chapter has analysed the conditions for a time tampering attack to succeed in TTHCA 
and TTpHA from an attacker’s point of view and proposed a new security extension called 
∆TVE for detecting tampered ∆Ti values in PM I-B wormholes. Simulation results 
confirmed that ∆TVE provides accurate time tampering attack detection of PM I-B 
wormholes under a wide range of conditions, though the performance drops to some extent 
for shorter wormhole links, and when there is high variability in the node packet service 
times and network traffic loads. Another observation is the relatively high FP rates (20% to 
45%) which often prevents the shortest route from being used and which can lead to a delay 
into the route discovery process. Some proposals for addressing these issues allied with new 
ideas for detecting time tampering in PM O-B wormholes, are presented in a couple of the 
future framework extensions discussed in the next Chapter.   
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8. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
8.1. Introduction 
The new unified wormhole attack detection framework presented in this thesis makes a series 
of original contributions to the MANET routing security field. It also affords a rich flexible 
platform for undertaking further investigations into different aspects of MANET routing 
security, which extend the findings presented as well as offering new opportunities. Some 
potential research proposals originating from this work will now be discussed.   
8.2.  Framework Extensions 
TTHCA was introduced as the first step towards a novel wormhole attack detection 
algorithm based on packet traversal time (PTT) analysis. This was followed by an extended 
version TTpHA which provided greater flexibility and more accurate detection performance 
under a variety of network conditions. One of the objectives defined for the wormhole 
detection framework was to be able to detect all wormhole types with low computational 
overheads, network bandwidth loads and false positive (FP) rates. While TTpHA is 
lightweight in terms of both computational complexity and network bandwidth, it does 
generate higher FP rates under all test conditions, and in particular, a FP rate close to 40% 
when low timestamp resolution (TR) wireless hardware is used, i.e. TR = 1 µs. Although 
this is an insufficiently fine resolution for TTpHA to be relevant in an indoor environment 
where the radio ranges are typically short, it is still adequate for ensuring good wormhole 
attack detection performance in outdoor environments with longer ranges. As most current 
wireless hardware does not have TR < 1 µs, this provides impetus to undertake further 
investigations into how the FP rate can be lowered without impacting on the wormhole 
detection rate. Lemma 6.1 highlighted the worst case scenario for TTpHA, which is a short 
route hop count i.e., < 5 hops, since then only a low variability in hop packet traversal time 
values (PTTi,i+1) is permissible for successful wormhole detection. An interesting future 
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direction for the new framework would be to introduce a minimum length (NMIN) for vector 
V that must be upheld before the dynamic threshold Θ is calculated by the source node. In 
practice this would require TTpHA to initially check if the length of V ≥ NMIN whenever a 
source node performs the TTpHA extended AODV route discovery procedure to obtain a 
route. If this condition is true, then TTpHA proceeds as in Section 6.2.2 to calculate Θ from 
V. Otherwise, the source node must perform additional route discovery iterations until the 
length of V ≥ NMIN. The rationale behind this idea is that by increasing the length of V, the 
probability of wormhole detection is also increased. Simultaneously, the significance level 
α, used when calculating Θ from eq. (6.4), can be increased. This has the effect of not only 
decreasing the false positive level, but because more samples are now available, the 
wormhole detection performance will still be accurate despite the higher α. The counter 
argument to introducing NMIN is that there will be higher delays in the route discovery 
procedure, especially in small networks where the average route hop count is low. Thus, 
future investigations could focus upon determining the best α and NMIN values to deliver an 
optimal performance balance for the wormhole detection, false positive occurrence and route 
delay nexus. 
 
Introducing NMIN and increasing α will not improve detection rates for low TR hardware in 
indoor environments, where radio ranges are short and the PTTi, i+1 values are small in 
comparison to the TR. The PTTi,i+1 measurement accuracy can however be improved by 
performing the measurements multiple times, which is a strategy adopted in some time-of-
arrival (TOA) based indoor positioning systems (Casacuberta & Ramirez, 2012; Wibowo et 
al., 2009). The drawback with performing multiple PTT measurements during a route 
discovery procedure is that the latency will be significantly increased and higher network 
traffic overheads will be incurred. Another interesting research aim would therefore be, to 
build a real MANET comprising low TR hardware and test the number of PTTi,i+1 
measurement samples needed to achieve satisfactory wormhole detection rates.  
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8.3.  Distributed Time Tampering Detection 
A restriction of the new framework is its vulnerability to measurement time tampering. It 
was revealed in Chapter 7 that while time tampering is very complex to implement from an 
attacker’s point of view and the artificial packet processing time measurement value ∆TF 
must be defined within a strict time window in order to succeed, it is still a persistent threat 
to the wormhole detection performance of both TTHCA and TTpHA. The ∆TVE mechanism 
introduced for identifying time tampering attacks in TTHCA/TTpHA is based on analysing 
∆Ti values. This is only effective on participation mode (PM) in-band (I-B) wormholes 
requiring a high ∆TF value added to the ∆Ti value of a wormhole node, because the delay of 
the wormhole link is high when packets are tunneled through legitimate nodes. In a PM out-
of-band (O-B) wormhole, there are no intermediate nodes in the wormhole link so only a 
small ∆TF is required and hence ∆TVE cannot discriminate a tampered from a legitimate ∆Ti 
value. For these reasons, further research is needed to develop more robust strategies to either 
detect or prevent time tampering attacks in both PM I-B and O-B wormholes.  
 
There also exists considerable potential to explore the application of distributed approaches 
within the new framework for identifying time tampering in both PM I-B and O-B wormhole 
detection. By requiring each node in the network to operate in a promiscuous mode, third-
party neighbour nodes could potentially be utilized to validate ∆Ti measurements. Consider 
the MANET scenario in Figure 8.1 where A is the source node, D is the destination node 
and a route has been established through node B, while the PM O-B wormhole is established 
between M1 and M2. If the third party node C lies within the radio range of both B and M2, 
it can eavesdrop upon both the RREPAODV packet delivered to M2 and also when it is 
forwarded from M2 to M1. It can thus measure the time from overhearing reception and the 
forwarding of this packet. Node C can then compare this time value with the ∆Ti produced 
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at M2. If it is smaller than ∆Ti then time tampering is suspected and C can then for instance, 
broadcast an alert message to its neighbours that M2 must be omitted from any routing. 
 
 
Figure 8.1: A MANET scenario where a third party node C can overhear the reception and forwarding 
of RREPAODV messages at malicious node M2 and thus validate the ∆Ti of M2.  
 
The accuracy of this ∆Ti validation strategy, its corresponding impact upon the network 
overheads, and the requirements on the node density are all obvious key research questions 
that need to be critically investigated before consideration can be given to a real world 
MANET implementation.  
8.4. Wormhole Attack Detection using Machine Learning Methods 
A broader limitation of current MANET routing security solutions is that several different 
variants are often needed to provide protection from all threats. For example, the secure 
routing protocols presented in Chapter 2 typically only provide protection against a subset 
of threats while either separate algorithms or protocol add-ons are necessary to cover other 
specific threats, including wormhole attacks. This provides the motivation to explore a single 
routing security system, such as an IDS, that would offer protection against all known attacks 
and eliminate the need for using multiple standalone security mechanisms. The use of 
machine learning based algorithms for MANET IDS is currently an emerging research topic 
(Nishani & Biba, 2015) since such algorithms offer considerable potential due to their 
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generic nature. However, current MANET algorithms do not offer full wormhole detection, 
so the specific features of each wormhole attack type need to firstly be established in order 
to distinguish between healthy and wormhole infected routes. Some preliminary proof-of-
concept investigations into this feature engineering process has been presented in Karlsson 
et al. (2014). A promising future work objective would be to evaluate whether a new 
wormhole detection model could be trained with reference inputs, based on identifiable 
features characterising a wormhole link before being deployed in a real MANET on 
unknown inputs.   
  
151 
9. CONCLUSION 
The self-configuring, infrastructure-less and dynamic topological features of a MANET 
offer significant implementational and operational advantages including easy and fast large-
scale computer network deployments in diverse applications like the IoT, military and 
extreme emergency environments. However, at the same time they present major challenges 
relating to QoS provision, connectivity management, end-to-end delay, packet loss on multi-
hop routes and IP address management. Security, particularly routing security, is one of the 
most challenging obstacles to wide scale MANET adoption with wormhole attacks being 
one of the most severe routing threats. Wormholes are difficult to detect as they can be 
launched in different modes, with each enforcing its own distinct requirements on the 
detection mechanism. Many wormhole detection mechanisms have been proposed but most 
are based on either unrealistic assumptions about the network environment and/or their 
constituent devices, or exhibit limitations such as they are unable to detect certain wormhole 
types or are computationally very intensive. This provided the context for the research 
question addressed in this thesis. 
 
Packet delay analysis based wormhole attack detection schemes have been recognized as 
easy to implement and low-cost solutions providing the potential to be implemented in a 
wide range of networks and devices and thus be an attractive viable solution to the research 
question. Most packet delay analysis based schemes however, are based on round trip time 
(RTT) analysis which is an inaccurate metric for estimating the distance of a route or a hop 
due to the high variability in node packet processing times.  
 
This thesis has presented a new unified wormhole attack detection framework based on 
packet traversal time (PTT) analysis. This framework is significantly more flexible and 
accurate compared to existing packet delay based detection mechanisms that use RTT 
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analysis. It detects all wormhole variants, is adaptive to a range of node hardware and 
MANET environments, and incurs both low computational and network bandwidth 
overheads. The framework makes three original scientific contributions to the field of 
MANET routing security: 
 
i) The most significant innovation is the new wormhole detection algorithm TTpHA 
that uses a dynamic threshold for the maximum permissible PTT per route hop. 
TTpHA can tolerate higher radio range fluctuations in node hardware and is more 
flexible than existing solutions, since it automatically adapts to different network 
environments. In outdoor environments with long radio ranges, TTpHA can be 
implemented using low timestamp resolution (TR) off-the-shelf wireless hardware 
and tolerates high node mobility during the route discovery procedure, while 
providing consistently high detection rates. While TTpHA is not yet sufficiently 
mature to be applied to low TR hardware in indoor environments which inevitably 
involve short radio ranges, some preliminary future research ideas have been 
presented to address these challenges.  
 
ii) TTHCA was the first major contribution in the new framework and introduced the 
novel idea of identifying wormhole attack infected routes based on route PTT 
analysis. It consistently provided significant improvements in wormhole attack 
detection performance compared to related RTT-based solutions, while maintaining 
low network overheads and generating no false positives. Despite encouraging 
results however, TTHCA was not effective in detecting routes infected by short 
participation mode (PM) out-of-band (O-B) wormholes relative to the route hop 
count (HC). Furthermore, when some of the underlying system assumptions relating 
to line-of-sight (LOS) environments and node hardware were relaxed, high 
fluctuations in radio ranges led to occurrences of PM O-B wormholes remaining 
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undetected. The use of a fixed threshold for PTT/HC validation restricted the 
flexibility of TTHCA to adapt to variable network conditions including, outdoors 
with long radio ranges and indoors with far shorter ranges. Despite these limitations, 
TTHCA became a core constituent module within the more advanced TTpHA model 
in i). 
 
iii) The final contribution is related to how fraudulent packet processing measurements 
can be successfully identified and prevented in both TTHCA and TTpHA. The 
prevailing conditions to successfully launch time tampering attacks were firstly 
analysed and shown to be complicated from an attacker’s point of view, since false 
measurement values had to be defined within a narrow time window. However, they 
are still feasible and thus considered to be a significant security threat. Time 
tampering is not only relevant for TTHCA and TTpHA, but equally in other packet 
delay based wormhole attack detection solutions, such as M-TTM, which involve 
collaborative time measurements at multiple nodes. A new time tampering detection 
extension called ∆TVE has been proposed to detect these attacks by applying 
statistical analysis to collected time measurement values and is the first known time 
tampering attack detection solution. ∆TVE is consistently able to detect time 
tampering in PM in-band (I-B) wormholes, but PM O-B wormholes are more 
challenging because their links only need a marginal increase in the time 
measurement values for an attack to succeed. Some initial ideas for a new distributed 
approach to detect time tampering in both PM I-B and O-B wormhole detection have 
been proposed.  
 
In reflecting upon the framework and contrasting with existing state-of-the-art wormhole 
detection solutions, it offers many innovative features and benefits in terms of wormhole 
detection, adaptability to diverse MANET scenarios and general low complexity. Practical 
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issues remain in regard to timestamp resolution of existing hardware especially for indoor 
environments, and time tampering mechanisms for PM O-B wormholes. Rigorous testing on 
real MANET devices are also required before the performance and applicability of the 
presented framework can be fully confirmed. However, as this issue is equivalent for most 
state-of-the-art wormhole attack detection solutions, due to the lack of real MANET 
environments, it is cogently contended that the new unified framework is a noteworthy 
contribution in affording a flexible platform for future real-world wormhole detection 
solutions in MANET environments.  
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